Some Additional Specification Tests for Generalized Method of Moments Estimators with Macro-Economic Applications Part I : Theory

In This Paper Several Additional Gmm Specification Tests Are Studied. a First Test Is a Chow-Type Test for Structural Parameter Stability of Gmm Estimates. the Test Is Inspired by the Fact That \"Taste and Technology\" Parameters Are Uncovered. the Second Set of Specification Tests Are Var Encompassing Tests. It Is Assumed That the Dgp Has a Finite Var Representation. the Moment Restrictions Which Are Suggested by Economic Theory and Exploited in the Gmm Procedure Represent One Possible Characterization of the Dgp. the Var Is a Different But Compatible Characterization of the Same Dgp. the Idea of the Var Encompassing Tests Is to Compare Parameter Estimates of the Euler Conditions and Var Representations of the Dgp Obtained Separately with Parameter Estimates of the Euler Conditions and Var Representations Obtained Jointly. There Are Several Ways to Construct Joint Systems Which Are Discussed in the Paper. Several Applications Are Also Discussed.

Intertemporal Social Evaluation

Intertemporal social-evaluation rules provide us with social criteria that can be used to assess the relative desirability of utility distributions across generations. The trade-offs between the well-being of different generations implicit in each such rule reflect the underlying ethical position on issues of intergenerational equity or justice. We employ an axiomatic approach in order to identify ethically attractive socialevaluation procedures. In particular, we explore the possibilities of using welfare information and non-welfare information in a model of intertemporal social evaluation. We focus on the individuals’ birth dates and lengths of life as the relevant non-welfare information. As usual, welfare information is given by lifetime utilities. It is assumed that this information is available for each alternative to be ranked. Various weakenings of the Pareto principle are employed in order to allow birth dates or lengths of life (or both) to matter in social evaluation. In addition, we impose standard properties such as continuity and anonymity and we examine the consequences of an intertemporal independence property. For each of the Pareto conditions employed, we characterize all social-evaluation rules satisfying it and our other axioms. The resulting rules are birth-date dependent or lifetime-dependent versions of generalized utilitarianism. Furthermore, we discuss the ethical and axiomatic foundations of geometric discounting in the context of our model.

A Note on Ordinally Equivalent Pareto Surfaces

Assuming at least three individuals and some regularity conditions, we construct a set S* of Pareto surfaces which is an ordinal basis of the set S of all surfaces: every surface in S is ordinally equivalent to some surface in S* and all surfaces in S* are ordinally distinct.

A Generalized Index of Fractionalization

The goal of this paper is to contribute to the economic literature on ethnic and cultural diversity by proposing a new index that is informationally richer and more flexible than the commonly used ‘ethno-linguistic fractionalization’ (ELF) index. We characterize a measure of diversity among individuals that takes as a primitive the individuals, as opposed to ethnic groups, and uses information on the extent of similarity among them. Compared to existing indices, our measure does not require that individuals are pre-assigned to exogenously determined categories or groups. We show that our generalized index is a natural extension of ELF and is also simple to compute. We also provide an empirical illustration of how our index can be operationalized and what difference it makes as compared to the standard ELF index. This application pertains to the pattern of fractionalization in the United States.

Priorities in the Location of Multiple Public Facilities

A collective decision problem is described by a set of agents, a profile of single-peaked preferences over the real line and a number k of public facilities to be located. We consider public facilities that do not su¤er from congestion and are non-excludable. We provide a characterization of the class of rules satisfying Pareto-efficiency, object-population monotonicity and sovereignty. Each rule in the class is a priority rule that selects locations according to a predetermined priority ordering among interest groups. We characterize each of the subclasses of priority rules that respectively satisfy anonymity, hiding-proofness and strategy-proofness. In particular, we prove that a priority rule is strategy-proof if and only if it partitions the set of agents into a fixed hierarchy. Alternatively, any such rule can be viewed as a collection of fixed-populations generalized peak-selection median rules (Moulin, 1980), that are linked across populations, in a way that we describe.

Affine and generalized affine models : Theory and applications

Thèse numérisée par la Division de la gestion de documents et des archives de l'Université de Montréal

The Double Pareto-Lognormal Distribution and its applications in actuarial science and finance

Le but de ce mémoire de maîtrise est de décrire les propriétés de la loi double Pareto-lognormale, de montrer comment on peut introduire des variables explicatives dans le modèle et de présenter son large potentiel d'applications dans le domaine de la science actuarielle et de la finance. Tout d'abord, nous donnons la définition de la loi double Pareto-lognormale et présentons certaines de ses propriétés basées sur les travaux de Reed et Jorgensen (2004). Les paramètres peuvent être estimés en utilisant la méthode des moments ou le maximum de vraisemblance. Ensuite, nous ajoutons une variable explicative à notre modèle. La procédure d'estimation des paramètres de ce mo-\\dèle est également discutée. Troisièmement, des applications numériques de notre modèle sont illustrées et quelques tests statistiques utiles sont effectués.

Pareto Dominance of Deferred Acceptance through Early Decision

An early decision market is governed by rules that allow each student to apply to (at most) one college and require the student to attend this college if admitted. This market is ubiquitous in college admissions in the United States. We model this market as an extensive-form game of perfect information and study a refinement of subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) that induces undominated Nash equilibria in every subgame (SPUE). Our main result shows that this game can be used to define a decentralized matching mechanism that weakly Pareto dominates student-proposing deferred acceptance.