First-Degree Discrimination in a Competitive Setting: Pricing and Quality Choice

The paper investigates competition in price schedules among vertically differentiated dupolists. First order price discrimination is the unique Nash equilibrium of a sequential game in which firms determine first whether or not to commit to a uniform price, and then simultaneously choose either a single price of a price schedule. Whether the profits earned by both firms are larger or smaller under discrimination than under uniform pricing depends on the quality gap between firms, and on the disparity of consumer preferences. Firms engaged in first degree discrimination choose quality levels that are optimal from a welfare perspective. The paper also reflects on implications of these findings for pricing policies of an incumbent threatened by entry.

L'expérience anglaise des appels d'offres obligatoires (Compulsory competitive tendering).

Rapport de recherche

Question period of the Liberal Neutrality Conference (May 1-3, 2008)

This is the audio recording of all discussion sessions of the International Conference on the Re-evaluation of Liberal Neutrality organized by CRÉUM, Montreal May 1-3 2008. (The conference announcement is at http://www.creum.umontreal.ca/spip.php?article765) // Ceci est l'enregistrement audio des périodes de discussion du colloque organisé par le CRÉUM (Montréal, 1-3 mai 2008) et portant sur une ré-évaluation de la neutralité libérale. (L'annonce du colloque est à l'adresse http://www.creum.umontreal.ca/spip.php?article765)

Neutrality and the social contract

Given the fact of moral disagreement, theories of state neutrality which rely on moral premises will have limited application, in that they will fail to motivate anyone who rejects the moral premises on which they are based. By contrast, contractarian theories can be consistent with moral scepticism, and can therefore avoid this limitation. In this paper, I construct a contractarian model which I claim is sceptically consistent and includes a principle of state neutrality as a necessary condition. The principle of neutrality which I derive incorporates two conceptions of neutrality (consequential neutrality and justificatory neutrality) which have usually been thought of as distinct and incompatible. I argue that contractarianism gives us a unified account of these conceptions. Ultimately, the conclusion that neutrality can be derived without violating the constraint established by moral scepticism turns out to rely on an assumption of equal precontractual bargaining power. I do not attempt to defend this assumption here. If the assumption cannot be defended in a sceptically consistent fashion, then the argument for neutrality given here is claimed to be morally minimal, rather than fully consistent with moral scepticism.

Liberal Neutrality : Constructivist, not foundationalist

In defending the principle of neutrality, liberals have often appealed to a more general moral principle that forbids coercing persons in the name of reasons those persons themselves cannot reasonably be expected to share. Yet liberals have struggled to articulate a non-arbitrary, non-dogmatic distinction between the reasons that persons can reasonably be expected to share and those they cannot. The reason for this, I argue, is that what it means to “share a reason” is itself obscure. In this paper I articulate two different conceptions of what it is to share a reason; I call these conceptions “foundationalist” and “constructivist.” On the foundationalist view, two people “share” a reason just in the sense that the same reason applies to each of them independently. On this view, I argue, debates about the reasons we share collapse into debates about the reasons we have, moving us no closer to an adequate defense of neutrality. On the constructivist view, by contrast, “sharing reasons” is understood as a kind of activity, and the reasons we must share are just those reasons that make this activity possible. I argue that the constructivist conception of sharing reasons yields a better defense of the principle of neutrality.

Neutrality as a Twofold Concept

Under the circumstances of pluralism people often claim that the state ought to be neutral towards its citizens’ conceptions of the good life. However, what it means for the state to be neutral is often unclear. This is partly because there are different conceptions of neutrality and partly because what neutrality entails depends largely on the context in which neutrality is demanded. This paper discusses three different conceptions of neutrality – neutrality of impact, neutrality as equality of opportunity and justificatory neutrality – and analyses the strengths and weaknesses of the different conceptions in different contexts. It suggests that there are two common elements of neutrality in all its exemplifications: a) an element of “hands-off” and b) an element of equal treatment. It therefore argues that while justificatory neutrality is necessary for the state to be neutral it is not sufficient and claims that while conceptions of the good must not enter thejustificationof state regulations, they must be taken into consideration when deliberating theimplementation of these regulations.

An Epistemic Argument in Support of Liberal Neutrality

My aim in the present paper is to develop a new kind of argument in support of the ideal of liberal neutrality. This argument combines some basic moral principles with a thesis about the relationship between the correct standards of justification for a belief/action and certain contextual factors. The idea is that the level of importance of what is at stake in a specific context of action determines how demanding the correct standards to justify an action based on a specific set of beliefs ought to be. In certain exceptional contexts –where the seriousness of harm in case of mistake and the level of an agent’s responsibility for the outcome of his action are specially high– a very small probability of making a mistake should be recognized as a good reason to avoid to act based on beliefs that we nonetheless affirm with a high degree of confidence and that actually justify our action in other contexts. The further steps of the argument consist in probing 1) that the fundamental state’s policies are such a case of exceptional context, 2) that perfectionist policies are the type of actions we should avoid, and 3) that policies that satisfy neutral standards of justification are not affected by the reasons which lead to reject perfectionist policies.

Are Cities Illiberal? Municipal Jurisdictions and the Scope of Liberal Neutrality

One of the main characteristics of today’s democratic societies is their pluralism. As a result, liberal political philosophers often claim that the state should remain neutral with respect to different conceptions of the good. Legal and social policies should be acceptable to everyone regardless of their culture, their religion or their comprehensive moral views. One might think that this commitment to neutrality should be especially pronounced in urban centres, with their culturally diverse populations. However, there are a large number of laws and policies adopted at the municipal level that contradict the liberal principle of neutrality. In this paper, I want to suggest that these perfectionistlaws and policies are legitimate at the urban level. Specifically, I will argue that the principle of neutrality applies only indirectly to social institutions within the broader framework of the nation-state. This is clear in the case of voluntary associations, but to a certain extent this rationale applies also to cities. In a liberal regime, private associations are allowed to hold and defend perfectionist views, focused on a particular conception of the good life. One problem is to determine the limits of this perfectionism at the urban level, since cities, unlike private associations, are publicinstitutions. My aim here is therefore to give a liberal justification to a limited form of perfectionism of municipal laws and policies.

Beyond Equality of What: Sen and Neutrality

Based on a close reading of the debate between Rawls and Sen on primary goods versus capabilities, I argue that liberal theory cannot adequately respond to Sen’s critique within a conventionally neutralist framework. In support of the capability approach, I explain why and how it defends a more robust conception of opportunity and freedom, along with public debate on substantive questions about well-being and the good life. My aims are: (i) to show that Sen’s capability approach is at odds with Rawls’s political liberal version of neutrality; (ii) to carve out a third space in the neutrality debate; and (iii) to begin to develop, from Sen’s approach, the idea of public value liberalism as a position that falls within that third space.

(Minimally) 'epsilon'-incentive compatible competitive equilibria in economies with indivisibilities

We consider competitive and budget-balanced allocation rules for problems where a number of indivisible objects and a fixed amount of money is allocated among a group of agents. In 'small' economies, we identify under classical preferences each agent's maximal gain from manipulation. Using this result we find the competitive and budget-balanced allocation rules which are minimally manipulable for each preference profile in terms of any agent's maximal gain. If preferences are quasi-linear, then we can find a competitive and budget-balanced allocation rule such that for any problem, the maximal utility gain from manipulation is equalized among all agents.

Technological Neutrality

"The paper speaks about the both positive and negative arguments of the concept of technological neutrality. Technology is the part and parcel of present people's daily life having aesthetic and devil impact on world. The experts and philosophers on interpretation of the influence of technology in life are concerned about the ongoing misuse of technology. The debate is whether technology itself becomes destructive and detrimental to us or the people inventing technology are responsible to make it more harmful for their own greediness. States are preparing to adopt new laws regarding the proper, exact and neutral use of technology in a sense to protect the deviation of technology behavior. The introduction tells about the fundamental impact and effectiveness of technology in life; ""definition of technology"" goes ahead to identify the various aspect of technology development stages; ""autonomous technology"" heading finds out the true characters of technology as against to human power and strength; ""neutral technology"" implies the adaptation of laws for neutral use of technology itself; ""neutrality principle in economy and communication science"" has the notion of impartial rationale of being unbiased for upholding technology neutrality principle in practice; and finally the conclusion ends with summing up the average influences of technology on human being at large."

Four Stages In Assessing Liberal Neutrality

La notion de neutralité, bien que référent central au sein d’un État libéral, est souvent invoquée de manière imprécise et contradictoire dans le discours public. Proposant que cela résulte en partie des limites inhérentes à une compréhension abstraite et uniforme de ce concept, le présent article exposera comment l’idéal de neutralité libérale doit plutôt s’inscrire et s’évaluer par le biais de quatre étapes successives. Les quatre étapes en question dépassent la simple herméneutique philosophique du libéralisme en trouvant déjà des assises dans le droit ; elles seront dès lors illustrées tout au long du texte à l’aide des décisions pertinentes de la Cour Suprême du Canada.

Imperfect indifference : the rhythm, structure and politics of neutrality

Cette thèse propose l’émergence d’une poésie de l’entre deux dans la littérature expérimentale, en suivant ses développements du milieu du vingtième siècle jusqu'au début du vingt-et-unième. Cette notion d’entre-deux poétique se fonde sur une théorie du neutre (Barthes, Blanchot) comme ce qui se situe au delà ou entre l'opposition et la médiation. Le premier chapitre retrace le concept de monotonie dans la théorie esthétique depuis la période romantique où il est vu comme l'antithèse de la variabilité ou tension poétique, jusqu’à l’émergence de l’art conceptuel au vingtième siècle où il se déploie sans interruption. Ce chapitre examine alors la relation de la monotonie à la mélancolie à travers l’analyse de « The Anatomy of Monotony », poème de Wallace Stevens tiré du recueil Harmonium et l’œuvre poétique alphabet de Inger Christensen. Le deuxième chapitre aborde la réalisation d’une poésie de l’entre-deux à travers une analyse de quatre œuvres poétiques qui revisitent l’usage de l’index du livre paratextuel: l’index au long poème “A” de Louis Zukofsky, « Index to Shelley's Death » d’Alan Halsey qui apparait à la fin de l’oeuvre The Text of Shelley's Death, Cinema of the Present de Lisa Robertson, et l’oeuvre multimédia Via de Carolyn Bergvall. Le troisième chapitre retrace la politique de neutralité dans la théorie de la traduction. Face à la logique oppositionnelle de l’original contre la traduction, il propose hypothétiquement la réalisation d’une troisième texte ou « l’entre-deux », qui sert aussi à perturber les récits familiers de l’appropriation, l’absorption et l’assimilation qui effacent la différence du sujet de l’écrit. Il examine l’oeuvre hybride Secession with Insecession de Chus Pato et Erin Moure comme un exemple de poésie de l’entre-deux. A la fois pour Maurice Blanchot et Roland Barthes, le neutre représente un troisième terme potentiel qui défie le paradigme de la pensée oppositionnelle. Pour Blanchot, le neutre est la différence amenée au point de l’indifférence et de l’opacité de la transparence tandis que le désire de Barthes pour le neutre est une utopie lyrique qui se situe au-delà des contraintes de but et de marquage. La conclusion examine comment le neutre correspond au conditions de liberté gouvernant le principe de créativité de la poésie comme l’acte de faire sans intention ni raison.