Inflation Targeting Under Asymmetric Preferences

This paper develops and estimates a game-theoretical model of inflation targeting where the central banker's preferences are asymmetric around the targeted rate. In particular, positive deviations from the target can be weighted more, or less, severely than negative ones in the central banker's loss function. It is shown that some of the previous results derived under the assumption of symmetry are not robust to the generalization of preferences. Estimates of the central banker's preference parameters for Canada, Sweden, and the United Kingdom are statistically different from the ones implied by the commonly used quadratic loss function. Econometric results are robust to different forecasting models for the rate of unemployment but not to the use of measures of inflation broader than the one targeted.

Asymmetric Smiles, Leverage Effects and Structural Parameters.

In this paper, we characterize the asymmetries of the smile through multiple leverage effects in a stochastic dynamic asset pricing framework. The dependence between price movements and future volatility is introduced through a set of latent state variables. These latent variables can capture not only the volatility risk and the interest rate risk which potentially affect option prices, but also any kind of correlation risk and jump risk. The standard financial leverage effect is produced by a cross-correlation effect between the state variables which enter into the stochastic volatility process of the stock price and the stock price process itself. However, we provide a more general framework where asymmetric implied volatility curves result from any source of instantaneous correlation between the state variables and either the return on the stock or the stochastic discount factor. In order to draw the shapes of the implied volatility curves generated by a model with latent variables, we specify an equilibrium-based stochastic discount factor with time non-separable preferences. When we calibrate this model to empirically reasonable values of the parameters, we are able to reproduce the various types of implied volatility curves inferred from option market data.

Exact Multivariate Tests of Asset Pricing Models with Stable Asymmetric Distributions

In this paper, we propose exact inference procedures for asset pricing models that can be formulated in the framework of a multivariate linear regression (CAPM), allowing for stable error distributions. The normality assumption on the distribution of stock returns is usually rejected in empirical studies, due to excess kurtosis and asymmetry. To model such data, we propose a comprehensive statistical approach which allows for alternative - possibly asymmetric - heavy tailed distributions without the use of large-sample approximations. The methods suggested are based on Monte Carlo test techniques. Goodness-of-fit tests are formally incorporated to ensure that the error distributions considered are empirically sustainable, from which exact confidence sets for the unknown tail area and asymmetry parameters of the stable error distribution are derived. Tests for the efficiency of the market portfolio (zero intercepts) which explicitly allow for the presence of (unknown) nuisance parameter in the stable error distribution are derived. The methods proposed are applied to monthly returns on 12 portfolios of the New York Stock Exchange over the period 1926-1995 (5 year subperiods). We find that stable possibly skewed distributions provide statistically significant improvement in goodness-of-fit and lead to fewer rejections of the efficiency hypothesis.

Asymmetric cell division intersects with cell geometry : a method to extrapolate and quantify geometrical parameters of sensory organ precursors

La division cellulaire asymétrique (DCA) consiste en une division pendant laquelle des déterminants cellulaires sont distribués préférentiellement dans une des deux cellules filles. Par l’action de ces déterminants, la DCA générera donc deux cellules filles différentes. Ainsi, la DCA est importante pour générer la diversité cellulaire et pour maintenir l’homéostasie de certaines cellules souches. Pour induire une répartition asymétrique des déterminants cellulaires, le positionnement du fuseau mitotique doit être très bien contrôlé. Fréquemment ceci génère deux cellules filles de tailles différentes, car le fuseau mitotique n’est pas centré pendant la mitose, ce qui induit un positionnement asymétrique du sillon de clivage. Bien qu’un complexe impliquant des GTPases hétérotrimériques et des protéines liant les microtubules au cortex ait été impliqué directement dans le positionnement du fuseau mitotique, le mécanisme exact induisant le positionnement asymétrique du fuseau durant la DCA n'est pas encore compris. Des études récentes suggèrent qu’une régulation asymétrique du cytosquelette d’actine pourrait être responsable de ce positionnement asymétrique du faisceau mitotique. Donc, nous émettons l'hypothèse que des contractions asymétriques d’actine pendant la division cellulaire pourraient déplacer le fuseau mitotique et le sillon de clivage pour créer une asymétrie cellulaire. Nos résultats préliminaires ont démontré que le blebbing cortical, qui est une indication de tension corticale et de contraction, se produit préférentiellement dans la moitié antérieure de cellule précurseur d’organes sensoriels (SOP) pendant le stage de télophase. Nos données soutiennent l'idée que les petites GTPases de la famille Rho pourraient être impliqués dans la régulation du fuseau mitotique et ainsi contrôler la DCA des SOP. Les paramètres expérimentaux développés pour cette thèse, pour étudier la régulation de l’orientation et le positionnement du fuseau mitotique, ouvrirons de nouvelles avenues pour contrôler ce processus, ce qui pourrait être utile pour freiner la progression de cellules cancéreuses. Les résultats préliminaires de ce projet proposeront une manière dont les petites GTPases de la famille Rho peuvent être impliqués dans le contrôle de la division cellulaire asymétrique in vivo dans les SOP. Les modèles théoriques qui sont expliqués dans cette étude pourront servir à améliorer les méthodes quantitatives de biologie cellulaire de la DCA.

Innis Lecture: Can the Theory of Incentives Explain Decentralization?

This survey presents within a single model three theories of decentralization of decision-making within organizations based on private information and incentives. Renegotiation, collusion, and limits on communication are three sufficient conditions for decentralization to be optimal.

A Prudent Central Banker

This paper studies monetary policy in an economy where the central banker's preferences are asymmetric around optimal inflation. In particular, positive deviations from the optimum can be weighted more, or less, severely than negative deviations in the policy maker's loss function. It is shown that under asymmetric preferences, uncertainty can induce a prudent behavior on the part of the central banker. Since the prudence motive can be large enough to override the inflation bias, optimal monetary policy could be implemented even in the absence of rules, reputation, or contractual mechanisms. For certain parameter values, a deflationary bias can arise in equilibrium.

Upper Semicontinuous Extensions of Binary Relations.

Suzumura shows that a binary relation has a weak order extension if and only if it is consistent. However, consistency is demonstrably not sufficient to extend an upper semi-continuous binary relation to an upper semicontinuous weak order. Jaffray proves that any asymmetric (or reflexive), transitive and upper semicontinuous binary relation has an upper semicontinuous strict (or weak) order extension. We provide sufficient conditions for existence of upper semicontinuous extensions of consistence rather than transitive relations. For asymmetric relations, consistency and upper semicontinuity suffice. For more general relations, we prove one theorem using a further consistency property and another with an additional continuity requirement.

Does the Barro-Gordon Model Explain the Behavior of US Inflation? a Reexamination of the Empirical Evidence

This paper tests the predictions of the Barro-Gordon model using US data on inflation and unemployment. To that end, it constructs a general game-theoretical model with asymmetric preferences that nests the Barro-Gordon model and a version of Cukierman’s model as special cases. Likelihood Ratio tests indicate that the restriction imposed by the Barro-Gordon model is rejected by the data but the one imposed by the version of Cukierman’s model is not. Reduced-form estimates are consistent with the view that the Federal Reserve weights more heavily positive than negative unemployment deviations from the expected natural rate.

Risk Aversion, Intertemporal Substitution, and Option Pricing

This paper develops a general stochastic framework and an equilibrium asset pricing model that make clear how attitudes towards intertemporal substitution and risk matter for option pricing. In particular, we show under which statistical conditions option pricing formulas are not preference-free, in other words, when preferences are not hidden in the stock and bond prices as they are in the standard Black and Scholes (BS) or Hull and White (HW) pricing formulas. The dependence of option prices on preference parameters comes from several instantaneous causality effects such as the so-called leverage effect. We also emphasize that the most standard asset pricing models (CAPM for the stock and BS or HW preference-free option pricing) are valid under the same stochastic setting (typically the absence of leverage effect), regardless of preference parameter values. Even though we propose a general non-preference-free option pricing formula, we always keep in mind that the BS formula is dominant both as a theoretical reference model and as a tool for practitioners. Another contribution of the paper is to characterize why the BS formula is such a benchmark. We show that, as soon as we are ready to accept a basic property of option prices, namely their homogeneity of degree one with respect to the pair formed by the underlying stock price and the strike price, the necessary statistical hypotheses for homogeneity provide BS-shaped option prices in equilibrium. This BS-shaped option-pricing formula allows us to derive interesting characterizations of the volatility smile, that is, the pattern of BS implicit volatilities as a function of the option moneyness. First, the asymmetry of the smile is shown to be equivalent to a particular form of asymmetry of the equivalent martingale measure. Second, this asymmetry appears precisely when there is either a premium on an instantaneous interest rate risk or on a generalized leverage effect or both, in other words, whenever the option pricing formula is not preference-free. Therefore, the main conclusion of our analysis for practitioners should be that an asymmetric smile is indicative of the relevance of preference parameters to price options.

Uncovering Financial Markets Beliefs About Inflation Targets

This paper exploits the term structure of interest rates to develop testable economic restrictions on the joint process of long-term interest rates and inflation when the latter is subject to a targeting policy by the Central Bank. Two competing models that econometrically describe agents’ inferences about inflation targets are developed and shown to generate distinct predictions on the behavior of interest rates. In an empirical application to the Canadian inflation target zone, results indicate that agents perceive the band to be substantially narrower than officially announced and asymmetric around the stated mid-point. The latter result (i) suggests that the monetary authority attaches different weights to positive and negative deviations from the central target, and (ii) challenges on empirical grounds the assumption, frequently made in the literature, that the policy maker’s loss function is symmetric (usually a quadratic function) around a desired inflation value.

The Inflation Bias When the Central Bank Targets, the Natural Rate of Unemployment

This paper studies the proposition that an inflation bias can arise in a setup where a central banker with asymmetric preferences targets the natural unemployment rate. Preferences are asymmetric in the sense that positive unemployment deviations from the natural rate are weighted more (or less) severely than negative deviations in the central banker's loss function. The bias is proportional to the conditional variance of unemployment. The time-series predictions of the model are evaluated using data from G7 countries. Econometric estimates support the prediction that the conditional variance of unemployment and the rate of inflation are positively related.