Sharing the Cost of a Public Good: an Incentive-Constrained Axiomatic Approach

We study the problem of provision and cost-sharing of a public good in large economies where exclusion, complete or partial, is possible. We search for incentive-constrained efficient allocation rules that display fairness properties. Population monotonicity says that an increase in population should not be detrimental to anyone. Demand monotonicity states that an increase in the demand for the public good (in the sense of a first-order stochastic dominance shift in the distribution of preferences) should not be detrimental to any agent whose preferences remain unchanged. Under suitable domain restrictions, there exists a unique incentive-constrained efficient and demand-monotonic allocation rule: the so-called serial rule. In the binary public good case, the serial rule is also the only incentive-constrained efficient and population-monotonic rule.

Budget-Balance, Fairness and Minimal Manipulability

A common real-life problem is to fairly allocate a number of indivisible objects and a fixed amount of money among a group of agents. Fairness requires that each agent weakly prefers his consumption bundle to any other agent’s bundle. Under fairness, efficiency is equivalent to budget-balance (all the available money is allocated among the agents). Budget-balance and fairness in general are incompatible with non-manipulability (Green and Laffont, 1979). We propose a new notion of the degree of manipulability which can be used to compare the ease of manipulation in allocation mechanisms. Our measure counts for each problem the number of agents who can manipulate the rule. Given this notion, the main result demonstrates that maximally linked fair allocation rules are the minimally manipulable rules among all budget-balanced and fair allocation mechanisms. Such rules link any agent to the bundle of a pre-selected agent through indifferences (which can be viewed as indirect egalitarian equivalence).

(Minimally) 'epsilon'-incentive compatible competitive equilibria in economies with indivisibilities

We consider competitive and budget-balanced allocation rules for problems where a number of indivisible objects and a fixed amount of money is allocated among a group of agents. In 'small' economies, we identify under classical preferences each agent's maximal gain from manipulation. Using this result we find the competitive and budget-balanced allocation rules which are minimally manipulable for each preference profile in terms of any agent's maximal gain. If preferences are quasi-linear, then we can find a competitive and budget-balanced allocation rule such that for any problem, the maximal utility gain from manipulation is equalized among all agents.

Le processus d’attribution rénale québécois défavorise-t-il les patients en attente d’une greffe combinée rein-pancréas?

Étude de cas / Case study

Probabilistic Assignments of Identical Indivisible Objects and Uniform Probabilistic Rules.

We consider a probabilistic approach to the problem of assigning k indivisible identical objects to a set of agents with single-peaked preferences. Using the ordinal extension of preferences, we characterize the class of uniform probabilistic rules by Pareto efficiency, strategy-proofness, and no-envy. We also show that in this characterization no-envy cannot be replaced by anonymity. When agents are strictly risk averse von-Neumann-Morgenstern utility maximizers, then we reduce the problem of assigning k identical objects to a problem of allocating the amount k of an infinitely divisible commodity.

Resource-Monotonicity for House Allocation Problems

We study a simple model of assigning indivisible objects (e.g., houses, jobs, offices, etc.) to agents. Each agent receives at most one object and monetary compensations are not possible. We completely describe all rules satisfying efficiency and resource-monotonicity. The characterized rules assign the objects in a sequence of steps such that at each step there is either a dictator or two agents who “trade” objects from their hierarchically specified “endowments.”

Allocation via Deferred-Acceptance under Responsive Priorities

In many economic environments - such as college admissions, student placements at public schools, and university housing allocation - indivisible objects with capacity constraints are assigned to a set of agents when each agent receives at most one object and monetary compensations are not allowed. In these important applications the agent-proposing deferred-acceptance algorithm with responsive priorities (called responsive DA-rule) performs well and economists have successfully implemented responsive DA-rules or slight variants thereof. First, for house allocation problems we characterize the class of responsive DA-rules by a set of basic and intuitive properties, namely, unavailable type invariance, individual rationality, weak non-wastefulness, resource-monotonicity, truncation invariance, and strategy-proofness. We extend this characterization to the full class of allocation problems with capacity constraints by replacing resource- monotonicity with two-agent consistent con ict resolution. An alternative characterization of responsive DA-rules is obtained using unassigned objects invariance, individual rationality, weak non-wastefulness, weak consistency, and strategy-proofness. Various characterizations of the class of "acyclic" responsive DA-rules are obtained by using the properties efficiency, group strategy-proofness, and consistency.

House allocation via deferred-acceptance

We study the simple model of assigning indivisible and heterogenous objects (e.g., houses, jobs, offi ces, etc.) to agents. Each agent receives at most one object and monetary compensations are not possible. For this model, known as the house allocation model, we characterize the class of rules satisfying unavailable object invariance, individual rationality, weak non-wastefulness, resource-monotonicity, truncation invariance, and strategy-proofness: any rule with these properties must allocate objects based on (implicitly induced) objects' priorities over agents and the agent-proposing deferred-acceptance-algorithm.

Décentralisation et allocation des ressources : les détours de la municipalisation du système de santé brésilien.

Dans cette thèse, nous avons analysé le déroulement d’un processus de municipalisation du système de santé, effectué au Rio Grande do Norte (RN), un des états fédérés du nord-est du Brésil. En tenant compte des contextes historiques d’implantation, nous avons centré notre attention sur la contribution des acteurs impliqués dans ce processus, spécialement dans l’allocation des ressources financières du système. Les croyances, perceptions, attentes, représentations, connaissances, intérêts, l’ensemble des facteurs qui contribuent à la constitution des capacités cognitives de ces acteurs, favorise la réflexivité sur leurs actions et la définition de stratégies diverses de façon à poursuivre leurs objectifs dans le système de santé. Ils sont vus ainsi comme des agents compétents et réflexifs, capables de s’approprier des propriétés structurelles du système de santé (règles et ressources), de façon à prendre position dans l’espace social de ce système pour favoriser le changement ou la permanence du statu quo. Au cours du processus de structuration du Système unique de santé brésilien, le SUS, la municipalisation a été l’axe le plus développé d’un projet de réforme de la santé. Face aux contraintes contextuelles et de la dynamique complexe des espaces sociaux de la santé, les acteurs réformistes n’ont pas pu suivre le chemin de l’utopie idéalisée; quelques détours ont été parcourus. Au RN, la municipalisation de la santé a constitué un processus très complexe où la triade centralisation/décentralisation/recentralisation a suivi son cours au milieu de négociations, de conflits, d’alliances, de disputes, de coopérations, de compétitions. Malgré les contraintes des contextes successifs, des propriétés structurelles du système et des dynamiques sociales dans le système de santé, quelques changements sont intervenus : la construction de leaderships collectifs; l’émergence d’une culture de négociation; la création des structures et des espaces sociaux du système, favorisant les rencontres des acteurs dans chaque municipalité et au niveau de l’état fédéré; un apprentissage collectif sur le processus de structuration du SUS; une grande croissance des services de première ligne permettant d’envisager une inversion de tendance du modèle de prestation des services; les premiers pas vers la rupture avec la culture bureaucratique du système. Le SUS reste prisonnier de quelques enjeux institutionnalisés dans ce système de santé : la dépendance du secteur privé et de quelques groupes de professionnels; le financement insuffisant et instable; la situation des ressources humaines. Les changements arrivés sont convergents, incrémentiels, lents; ils résultent d’actions normatives, délibérées, formalisées. Elles aussi sont issues de l’inattendu, de l’informel, du paradoxe; quelques-unes plus localisées, d’autres plus généralisées, pour une courte ou une plus longue durée.

Le financement des municipalités par le gouvernement fédéral au Canada et aux États-Unis: transferts et facteurs d'allocation.

Rapport de recherche

Multiple Public Goods and Lexicographic Preferences Replacement Principle.

We study the problem of locating two public goods for a group of agents with single-peaked preferences over an interval. An alternative specifies a location for each public good. In Miyagawa (1998), each agent consumes only his most preferred public good without rivalry. We extend preferences lexicographically and characterize the class of single-peaked preference rules by Pareto-optimality and replacement-domination. This result is considerably different from the corresponding characterization by Miyagawa (2001a).

Fair Production and Allocation of an Excludable Nonrival Good

We study fairness in economies with one private good and one partially excludable nonrival good. A social ordering function determines for each profile of preferences an ordering of all conceivable allocations. We propose the following Free Lunch Aversion condition: if the private good contributions of two agents consuming the same quantity of the nonrival good have opposite signs, reducing that gap improves social welfare. This condition, combined with the more standard requirements of Unanimous Indifference and Responsiveness, delivers a form of welfare egalitarianism in which an agent's welfare at an allocation is measured by the quantity of the nonrival good that, consumed at no cost, would leave her indifferent to the bundle she is assigned.

Efficient Strategy-Proof Allocation Functions in Linear Production Economies

In a linear production model, we characterize the class of efficient and strategy-proof allocation functions, and the class of efficient and coalition strategy-proof allocation functions. In the former class, requiring equal treatment of equals allows us to identify a unique allocation function. This function is also the unique member of the latter class which satisfies uniform treatment of uniforms.

Coherent Cost-Sharing Rules

We reconsider the discrete version of the axiomatic cost-sharing model. We propose a condition of (informational) coherence requiring that not all informational refinements of a given problem be solved differently from the original problem. We prove that strictly coherent linear cost-sharing rules must be simple random-order rules.