L'ingénierie des documents d'affaires dans le cadre du web sémantique

Dans cette thèse, nous présentons les problèmes d’échange de documents d'affaires et proposons une méthode pour y remédier. Nous proposons une méthodologie pour adapter les standards d’affaires basés sur XML aux technologies du Web sémantique en utilisant la transformation des documents définis en DTD ou XML Schema vers une représentation ontologique en OWL 2. Ensuite, nous proposons une approche basée sur l'analyse formelle de concept pour regrouper les classes de l'ontologie partageant une certaine sémantique dans le but d'améliorer la qualité, la lisibilité et la représentation de l'ontologie. Enfin, nous proposons l’alignement d'ontologies pour déterminer les liens sémantiques entre les ontologies d'affaires hétérogènes générés par le processus de transformation pour aider les entreprises à communiquer fructueusement.

Von Neumann-Morgenstern Stable Sets in Matching Problems

The following properties of the core of a one well-known: (i) the core is non-empty; (ii) the core is a lattice; and (iii) the set of unmatched agents is identical for any two matchings belonging to the core. The literature on two-sided matching focuses almost exclusively on the core and studies extensively its properties. Our main result is the following characterization of (von Neumann-Morgenstern) stable sets in one-to-one matching problem only if it is a maximal set satisfying the following properties : (a) the core is a subset of the set; (b) the set is a lattice; (c) the set of unmatched agents is identical for any two matchings belonging to the set. Furthermore, a set is a stable set if it is the unique maximal set satisfying properties (a), (b) and (c). We also show that our main result does not extend from one-to-one matching problems to many-to-one matching problems.

Matching Markets under (In)complete Information

We are the first to introduce incomplete information to centralized many-to-one matching markets such as those to entry-level labor markets or college admissions. This is important because in real life markets (i) any agent is uncertain about the other agents' true preferences and (ii) most entry-level matching is many-to-one (and not one-to-one). We show that for stable (matching) mechanisms there is a strong and surprising link between Nash equilibria under complete information and Bayesian Nash equilibria under incomplete information. That is,given a common belief, a strategy profile is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium under incomplete information in a stable mechanism if and only if, for any true profile in the support of the common belief, the submitted profile is a Nash equilibrium under complete information at the true profile in the direct preference revelation game induced by the stable mechanism. This result may help to explain the success of stable mechanisms in these markets.

Annotation XML et interrogation de corpus pour l’étude de la conceptualisation métaphorique

Département de linguistique et de traduction