Question period of the Liberal Neutrality Conference (May 1-3, 2008)

This is the audio recording of all discussion sessions of the International Conference on the Re-evaluation of Liberal Neutrality organized by CRÉUM, Montreal May 1-3 2008. (The conference announcement is at http://www.creum.umontreal.ca/spip.php?article765) // Ceci est l'enregistrement audio des périodes de discussion du colloque organisé par le CRÉUM (Montréal, 1-3 mai 2008) et portant sur une ré-évaluation de la neutralité libérale. (L'annonce du colloque est à l'adresse http://www.creum.umontreal.ca/spip.php?article765)

À propos de The Practice of Liberal Pluralism de William Galston : un dialogue avec l’auteur

Document de travail

Polygamy’s Challenge : Women, Religion And The Post-Liberal State

Dossier : Should Polygamy be Recognized in Canada ? Ethical and Legal Considerations

Liberal Neutrality : Constructivist, not foundationalist

In defending the principle of neutrality, liberals have often appealed to a more general moral principle that forbids coercing persons in the name of reasons those persons themselves cannot reasonably be expected to share. Yet liberals have struggled to articulate a non-arbitrary, non-dogmatic distinction between the reasons that persons can reasonably be expected to share and those they cannot. The reason for this, I argue, is that what it means to “share a reason” is itself obscure. In this paper I articulate two different conceptions of what it is to share a reason; I call these conceptions “foundationalist” and “constructivist.” On the foundationalist view, two people “share” a reason just in the sense that the same reason applies to each of them independently. On this view, I argue, debates about the reasons we share collapse into debates about the reasons we have, moving us no closer to an adequate defense of neutrality. On the constructivist view, by contrast, “sharing reasons” is understood as a kind of activity, and the reasons we must share are just those reasons that make this activity possible. I argue that the constructivist conception of sharing reasons yields a better defense of the principle of neutrality.

An Epistemic Argument in Support of Liberal Neutrality

My aim in the present paper is to develop a new kind of argument in support of the ideal of liberal neutrality. This argument combines some basic moral principles with a thesis about the relationship between the correct standards of justification for a belief/action and certain contextual factors. The idea is that the level of importance of what is at stake in a specific context of action determines how demanding the correct standards to justify an action based on a specific set of beliefs ought to be. In certain exceptional contexts –where the seriousness of harm in case of mistake and the level of an agent’s responsibility for the outcome of his action are specially high– a very small probability of making a mistake should be recognized as a good reason to avoid to act based on beliefs that we nonetheless affirm with a high degree of confidence and that actually justify our action in other contexts. The further steps of the argument consist in probing 1) that the fundamental state’s policies are such a case of exceptional context, 2) that perfectionist policies are the type of actions we should avoid, and 3) that policies that satisfy neutral standards of justification are not affected by the reasons which lead to reject perfectionist policies.

Are Cities Illiberal? Municipal Jurisdictions and the Scope of Liberal Neutrality

One of the main characteristics of today’s democratic societies is their pluralism. As a result, liberal political philosophers often claim that the state should remain neutral with respect to different conceptions of the good. Legal and social policies should be acceptable to everyone regardless of their culture, their religion or their comprehensive moral views. One might think that this commitment to neutrality should be especially pronounced in urban centres, with their culturally diverse populations. However, there are a large number of laws and policies adopted at the municipal level that contradict the liberal principle of neutrality. In this paper, I want to suggest that these perfectionistlaws and policies are legitimate at the urban level. Specifically, I will argue that the principle of neutrality applies only indirectly to social institutions within the broader framework of the nation-state. This is clear in the case of voluntary associations, but to a certain extent this rationale applies also to cities. In a liberal regime, private associations are allowed to hold and defend perfectionist views, focused on a particular conception of the good life. One problem is to determine the limits of this perfectionism at the urban level, since cities, unlike private associations, are publicinstitutions. My aim here is therefore to give a liberal justification to a limited form of perfectionism of municipal laws and policies.

Economic Incentives and Liberal Equality

In order to assess to the degree to which the provision of economic incentives can result in justified inequalities, we need to distinguish between compensatory incentive payments and non-compensatory incentive payments. From a liberal egalitarian perspective, economic inequalities traceable to the provision of compensatory incentive payments are generally justifiable. However, economic inequalities created by the provision of non-compensatory incentive payments are more problematic. I argue that in non-ideal circumstances justice may permit and even require the provision of non-compensatory incentives despite the fact that those who receive non-compensatory payments are not entitled to them. In some circumstances, justice may require us to accede to unreasonable demands for incentive payments by hard bargainers. This leads to a kind of paradox: from a systemic point of view, non-compensatory incentive payments can be justified even though those who receive them have no just claim to them.

Four Stages In Assessing Liberal Neutrality

La notion de neutralité, bien que référent central au sein d’un État libéral, est souvent invoquée de manière imprécise et contradictoire dans le discours public. Proposant que cela résulte en partie des limites inhérentes à une compréhension abstraite et uniforme de ce concept, le présent article exposera comment l’idéal de neutralité libérale doit plutôt s’inscrire et s’évaluer par le biais de quatre étapes successives. Les quatre étapes en question dépassent la simple herméneutique philosophique du libéralisme en trouvant déjà des assises dans le droit ; elles seront dès lors illustrées tout au long du texte à l’aide des décisions pertinentes de la Cour Suprême du Canada.

The Rationality of Revolution.

Did the recent transition to liberal democracy in Eastern Europe consitute revolutions? Here, game theory is used to structure an explanation of institutional change proposed by Harold Innis (1950).

Les régimes providentiels à l'ère post-industrielle: reconfiguration ou résilience ?

L'approche des régimes providentiels élaborée par Esping-Andersen dans les années 1990 présente un grand intérêt dans l'appréhension des lignes directrices de la protection sociale: elle met en relief le jeu d'interrelations entre différents piliers de bien-être (l'État, le marché et la famille) dans la production et la distribution du bien-être. Esping-Andersen a identifié à cet effet trois types de régimes providentiels: les régimes social-démocrate, libéral et conservateur (qui correspondent respectivement aux pays nordiques, anglo-saxons et d'Europe continentale) auxquels certains observateurs ont rajouté le type latin, qui correspond aux pays d'Europe du Sud (Espagne, Grèce, Italie, Portugal). Ces régimes se sont consolidés dans un contexte industriel d'après-guerre et on peut se demander s'ils peuvent tenir la route à l'ère post-industrielle. En effet, le jeu d'interrelations entre l'État, le marché et la famille est appelé à connaître des reconfigurations, pour répondre plus adéquatement aux divers risques nouveaux qu'encourent les individus. La résilience des régimes providentiels est donc mise à l'épreuve et doit composer avec de nouvelles réalités sociales et économiques qui peuvent l'amener vers des terrains qui lui étaient jusque là inconnus. Notre examen s'intéresse à l'évolution des régimes providentiels à l'ère post-industrielle. Nous cherchons à caractériser et à différencier vingt pays de l'OCDE sur la base d'indicateurs quantitatifs de dépenses publiques et de situations socio-économiques couvrant la période de 1985 aux années 2000. Au moyen de l'analyse factorielle des correspondances et de l'analyse de classification hiérarchique, nous avons pu dégager des regroupements de pays qui correspondent assez fidèlement à la typologie d'Esping-Andersen et à ses développements subséquents et à mettre en relief différentes formes de protection sociale à l'ère post-industrielle: soit "l'activation laissée au marché" dans les pays anglo-saxons, "l'activation comme projet en devenir" dans les pays d'Europe continentale et, finalement, "la faible référence à l'activation" dans les pays d'Europe du Sud.

Les obligations du franchiseur : étude du droit civil et du guide d'Unidroit sur les accords internationaux de franchise principale

"Mémoire présenté à la Faculté des études supérieures en vue de l'obtention du grade de Maîtrise en droit (LL.M.)". Ce mémoire a été accepté à l'unanimité et classé parmi les 15% des mémoires de la discipline.

L'utilisation des cellules souches embryonnaires à des fins thérapeutiques

"Mémoire présenté à la Faculté des études supérieures en vue de l'obtention du grade de Maîtrise en droit (L.L.M.) Option recherche"