Influence d’une augmentation du taux de testostérone sur les décisions d’approvisionnement chez les diamants mandarins mâles (Taeniopygia guttata)

Un animal qui s’approvisionne en groupe peut rechercher soi-même sa nourriture (tactique producteur) ou tenter de se joindre à des parcelles déjà découvertes par un autre individu (tactique chapardeur). Bien que les modèles de jeu producteur-chapardeur partent du principe que les gains moyens à l’équilibre associés à chacune de ces tactiques sont égaux et ne dépendent pas des caractéristiques des individus, de plus en plus d’études démontrent que le gain de chaque tactique est influencé par certaines caractéristiques phénotypiques (agressivité, capacités d’apprentissage,…). Dans cette étude, nous nous intéressons aux effets de la testostérone sur le choix des tactiques d’approvisionnement chez les mâles de diamant mandarin (Taeniopygia guttata). La testostérone est connue pour influencer le développement du cerveau et l’agressivité, nous avons donc testé les effets d’une exposition prénatale à la testostérone ainsi que durant l’âge adulte sur le choix des tactiques d’approvisionnement lorsque la nourriture est cryptique ou défendable. Nous avons réalisé deux expériences : nous avons tout d’abord utilisé la longueur du tarse ainsi que la différence entre les longueurs des doigts 2 et 4 comme des indicateurs de l’exposition prénatale à la testostérone puis testé si ces différences morphologiques se traduisent par des différences dans le choix des tactiques dans une condition défendable et une condition cryptique. Nous avons trouvé que le choix des tactiques chez les diamants mandarins était limité par le phénotype. Une exposition précoce à la testostérone au cours du développement prénatal pourrait donc être la cause d’au moins une part de la variation observée dans le choix des tactiques d’approvisionnement. Ensuite, nous avons manipulé le taux de testostérone plasmatique chez des mâles adultes grâce à des implants hormonaux sous-cutanés puis comparé le comportement des individus lorsqu’ils portaient un implant hormonal et un implant contrôle et ce, dans chacune des deux conditions d’approvisionnement. Nous n’avons mis en évidence aucun effet du taux de testostérone plasmatique sur le choix des tactiques à l’âge adulte. Nos résultats sont en accord avec l’hypothèse que le choix des tactiques d’approvisionnement peut être influencé par les hormones. Notre conclusion est que les hormones stéroïdiennes peut affecter le choix des tactiques via l’existence d’effets maternels dans le jeu producteur-chapardeur.

Non-Deteriorating Choice

We analyze an alternative to the standard rationalizability requirement for observed choices by considering non-deteriorating selections. A selection function is a generalization of a choice function where selected alternatives may depend on a reference (or status quo) alternative in addition to the set of feasible options. A selection function is non-deteriorating if there exists an ordering over the universal set of alternatives such that the selected alternatives are at least as good as the reference option. We characterize non-deteriorating selection functions in an abstract framework and in an economic environment.

Rationalizability of Choice Functions on General Domains without Full Transitivity

The rationalizability of a choice function by means of a transitive relation has been analyzed thoroughly in the literature. However, not much seems to be known when transitivity is weakened to quasi-transitivity or acyclicity. We describe the logical relationships between the different notions of rationalizability involving, for example, the transitivity, quasi-transitivity, or acyclicity of the rationalizing relation. Furthermore, we discuss sufficient conditions and necessary conditions for rational choice on arbitrary domains. Transitive, quasi-transitive, and acyclical rationalizability are fully characterized for domains that contain all singletons and all two-element subsets of the universal set.

Efficient and Non-Deteriorating Choice

We analyze collective choice procedures with respect to their rationalizability by means of profiles of individual preference orderings. A selection function is a generalization of a choice function where selected alternatives may depend on a reference (or status quo) alternative in addition to the set of feasible options. Given the number of agents n, a selection function satisfies efficient and non-deteriorating n-rationalizability if there exists a profile of n orderings on the universal set of alternatives such that the selected alternatives are (i) efficient for that profile, and (ii) at least as good as the reference option according to each individual preference. We analyze efficient and non-deteriorating collective choice in a general abstract framework and provide a characterization result given a universal set domain.

Candidate Stability and Nonbinary Social Choice

A desirable property of a voting procedure is that it be immune to the strategic withdrawal of a candidate for election. Dutta, Jackson, and Le Breton (Econometrica, 2001) have established a number of theorems that demonstrate that this condition is incompatible with some other desirable properties of voting procedures. This article shows that Grether and Plott's nonbinary generalization of Arrow's Theorem can be used to provide simple proofs of two of these impossibility theorems.

Bureaucratic Corruption As a Constraint on Voter Choice

It Has Often Been Assumed That a Country's Tax Level, Tax Structure Progressivity and After-Tax Income Distribution Are Chosen by Voters Subject Only to Their Budget Constraints. This Paper Argues That At Certain Income Levels Voters' Decisions May Be Constrained by Bureaucratic Corruption. the Theoretical Arguments Are Developed in Asymmetry Limits the Capacity of the Fiscal System to Generate Revenues by Means of Direct Taxes. This Hypothesis Is Tested Witha Sample of International Data by Means of a Simultaneous Equation Model. the Distortions Resulting From Corruption Ar Captured Through Their Effects on a Latent Variable Defined As the Overall Fiscal Structure. Evidence Is Found of Causality Running From This Latent Variable to the Level of Taxes and the Degree of After Tax Inequality.

First-Degree Discrimination in a Competitive Setting: Pricing and Quality Choice

The paper investigates competition in price schedules among vertically differentiated dupolists. First order price discrimination is the unique Nash equilibrium of a sequential game in which firms determine first whether or not to commit to a uniform price, and then simultaneously choose either a single price of a price schedule. Whether the profits earned by both firms are larger or smaller under discrimination than under uniform pricing depends on the quality gap between firms, and on the disparity of consumer preferences. Firms engaged in first degree discrimination choose quality levels that are optimal from a welfare perspective. The paper also reflects on implications of these findings for pricing policies of an incumbent threatened by entry.

Rational Choice on Arbitrary Domains: A Comprehensive Treatment

The rationalizability of a choice function on arbitrary domains by means of a transitive relation has been analyzed thoroughly in the literature. Moreover, characterizations of various versions of consistent rationalizability have appeared in recent contributions. However, not much seems to be known when the coherence property of quasi-transitivity or that of P-acyclicity is imposed on a rationalization. The purpose of this paper is to fill this significant gap. We provide characterizations of all forms of rationalizability involving quasi-transitive or P-acyclical rationalizations on arbitrary domains.

Domain Closedness Conditions and Rational Choice

The rationalizability of a choice function on an arbitrary domain under various coherence properties has received a considerable amount of attention both in the long-established and in the recent literature. Because domain closedness conditions play an important role in much of rational choice theory, we examine the consequences of these requirements on the logical relationships among different versions of rationalizability. It turns out that closedness under intersection does not lead to any results differing from those obtained on arbitrary domains. In contrast, closedness under union allows us to prove an additional implication.

Social Choice: Recent Developments

In the past quarter century, there has been a dramatic shift of focus in social choice theory, with structured sets of alternatives and restricted domains of the sort encountered in economic problems coming to the fore. This article provides an overview of some of the recent contributions to four topics in normative social choice theory in which economic modelling has played a prominent role: Arrovian social choice theory on economic domains, variable-population social choice, strategy-proof social choice, and axiomatic models of resource allocation.