Domain Closedness Conditions and Rational Choice

The rationalizability of a choice function on an arbitrary domain under various coherence properties has received a considerable amount of attention both in the long-established and in the recent literature. Because domain closedness conditions play an important role in much of rational choice theory, we examine the consequences of these requirements on the logical relationships among different versions of rationalizability. It turns out that closedness under intersection does not lead to any results differing from those obtained on arbitrary domains. In contrast, closedness under union allows us to prove an additional implication.

Rational Choice on Arbitrary Domains: A Comprehensive Treatment

The rationalizability of a choice function on arbitrary domains by means of a transitive relation has been analyzed thoroughly in the literature. Moreover, characterizations of various versions of consistent rationalizability have appeared in recent contributions. However, not much seems to be known when the coherence property of quasi-transitivity or that of P-acyclicity is imposed on a rationalization. The purpose of this paper is to fill this significant gap. We provide characterizations of all forms of rationalizability involving quasi-transitive or P-acyclical rationalizations on arbitrary domains.

Toward a rational-choice foundation of non-additive theories

A classical argument of de Finetti holds that Rationality implies Subjective Expected Utility (SEU). In contrast, the Knightian distinction between Risk and Ambiguity suggests that a rational decision maker would obey the SEU paradigm when the information available is in some sense good, and would depart from it when the information available is not good. Unlike de Finetti's, however, this view does not rely on a formal argument. In this paper, we study the set of all information structures that might be availabe to a decision maker, and show that they are of two types: those compatible with SEU theory and those for which SEU theory must fail. We also show that the former correspond to "good" information, while the latter correspond to information that is not good. Thus, our results provide a formalization of the distinction between Risk and Ambiguity. As a consequence of our main theorem (Theorem 2, Section 8), behavior not-conforming to SEU theory is bound to emerge in the presence of Ambiguity. We give two examples of situations of Ambiguity. One concerns the uncertainty on the class of measure zero events, the other is a variation on Ellberg's three-color urn experiment. We also briefly link our results to two other strands of literature: the study of ambiguous events and the problem of unforeseen contingencies. We conclude the paper by re-considering de Finetti's argument in light of our findings.

Outsourcing the nation-state : a rational choice framework for the provision of public goods

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Population Ethics, Social Choice Theory, and Two problems in the Measurement of Economic Poverty

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Rationality, External Norms and the Epistemic Value of Menus

Ever since Sen’s (1993; 1997) criticism on the notion of internal consistency or menu independence of choice, there exists a widespread perception that the standard revealed preference approach to the theory of rational choice has difficulties in coping with the existence of external norms, or the information a menu of choice might convey to a decision-maker, viz., the epistemic value of a menu. This paper provides a brief survey of possible responses to these criticisms of traditional rational choice theory. It is shown that a novel concept of norm-conditional rationalizability can neatly accommodate external norms within the standard framework of rationalizability theory. Furthermore, we illustrate that there are several ways of incorporating considerations regarding the epistemic value of opportunity sets into a generalized model of rational choice theory.

Théories du choix rationnel : perspectives et implications en design institutionnel

En raison de sa force explicative et opérationnelle, la théorie du choix rationnel est utilisée au sein de plusieurs disciplines des sciences sociales. Alors que la majorité des économistes conçoivent la théorie du choix rationnel comme un processus de maximisation de l’utilité, la portée de ce modèle est le sujet de nombreuses critiques. Pour plusieurs, certaines préférences ne peuvent être modulées à l’intérieur de ce cadre. Dans ce mémoire, trois conceptions alternatives de la théorie du choix rationnel sont présentées : la rationalité comme présence virtuelle, la rationalité comme mécanisme intentionnel et la rationalité en tant que science du choix. Une analyse critique de celles-ci est effectuée. En design institutionnel, ces trois conceptions de la rationalité offrent des perspectives distinctes. La première met l’emphase sur les motivations non-égocentriques. La seconde mise sur l’aspect adaptatif du processus. La rationalité jouant un rôle privilégié, mais non exclusif, les mécanismes causaux doivent également être considérés. La troisième implique de formuler des règles institutionnels différentes dépendamment du modèle de l’agent rationnel qui est mis de l’avant. L’établissement de règles institutionnelles varie en fonction de la conception adoptée parmi ces théories du choix rationnel.

La mise en présence dans l'acte d'achat : là où la consommation engendre le scénario

Le présent travail de recherche analyse l’acte d’achat et fait une brèche dans la relation mystérieuse que nous développons avec les biens de consommation. En microéconomie et en sociologie de la consommation, on considère que le consommateur fait des choix rationnels, et ce à travers un processus d’achat (Langlois, 2002). Ce processus est divisé en cinq étapes : la reconnaissance du problème, la recherche d’informations, l’évaluation des alternatives en concurrence, le choix et l’analyse post-achat (Brée, 2004). Bien que l’étape du choix soit certainement l’étape charnière du processus, car elle détermine le choix final menant à l’achat, elle est souvent comprise comme l’aboutissement de calculs préalables et non comme un moment régi par ses propres dynamiques. Le paradigme dominant en matière de choix, la théorie du choix rationnel, avance que nous formulons nos choix en recourant à des calculs d’utilité. Nous évaluons rationnellement les options afin d’optimiser notre situation en sélectionnant le choix qui nous rapporte le plus en nous coûtant le moins (Abell, 1991). Par contre, certains critiques de la théorie du choix rationnel allèguent que la multiplicité de choix encouragée par notre société engendre un stress lors de l’achat qui embrouille le jugement menant au choix. Cela invite à considérer la singularité du moment menant au choix. Que se passe-t-il chez le consommateur lorsqu’il est mis en présence d’un objet? En vérité, les disciplines qui s’intéressent au comportement du consommateur éludent la présence de l’objet comme forme d’influence sur le jugement. Dans le cadre de cette recherche, nous entendons par la mise en présence le moment où un individu est en présence d’un objet spécifique ou d’une représentation d’un objet. Lorsque mis en présence de l’objet, le consommateur fera un jugement qui sera potentiellement relatif aux sensations de beauté (Hutcheson, 1991) et aux émotions provoquées par un objet spécifique. Ainsi, les sens « externes » (la vue, l’ouïe, l’odorat, le goût, le toucher) stimulent un sens « esthétique » : le sens interne de la beauté (Hutcheson, 1991). De plus, il peut survenir, en consommation, lors de la mise en présence que l’émotion prenne la forme d’un jugement (Nussbaum, 2001). On définit les émotions comme un état affectif situationnel dirigé vers une chose (Desmet, 2002). C’est ainsi que la recherche s’est articulé autour de l’hypothèse suivante : de quelle manière la mise en présence influence le jugement du consommateur pendant le processus d’achat? Nous avons mené une enquête inspirée d’une approche qualitative auprès de consommateurs dont les résultats sont ici exposés et discutés. L’enquête tente dans un premier temps de cerner l’impact de la mise en présence dans le processus d’achat. Puis, le récit de magasinage de quatre participants est analysé à l’aide d’éléments tels les critères de choix, les facteurs, les influences et les contraintes. L’enquête montre notamment que la mise en présence intervient et modifie le jugement du consommateur. L’analyse des entretiens met en avant une tendance chez nos participants à la scénarisation tout au long du processus d’achat et particulièrement lors des moments de mise en présence. Nous avons observé que les moments de mise en présence alimentent le scénario imaginé par le consommateur et lui permet de créer des scénarios de vie future en interaction avec certains biens de consommation.

Inclusive fitness maximization: an axiomatic approach

Kin selection theorists argue that evolution in social contexts will lead organisms to behave as if maximizing their inclusive, as opposed to personal, fitness. The inclusive fitness concept allows biologists to treat organisms as akin to rational agents seeking to maximize a utility function. Here we develop this idea and place it on a firm footing by employing a standard decision-theoretic methodology. We show how the principle of inclusive fitness maximization and a related principle of quasi-inclusive fitness maximization can be derived from axioms on an individual’s ‘as if preferences’ (binary choices). Our results help integrate evolutionary theory and rational choice theory, help draw out the behavioural implications of inclusive fitness maximization, and point to a possible way in which evolution could lead organisms to implement it.

Rationalizability of Choice Functions on General Domains without Full Transitivity

The rationalizability of a choice function by means of a transitive relation has been analyzed thoroughly in the literature. However, not much seems to be known when transitivity is weakened to quasi-transitivity or acyclicity. We describe the logical relationships between the different notions of rationalizability involving, for example, the transitivity, quasi-transitivity, or acyclicity of the rationalizing relation. Furthermore, we discuss sufficient conditions and necessary conditions for rational choice on arbitrary domains. Transitive, quasi-transitive, and acyclical rationalizability are fully characterized for domains that contain all singletons and all two-element subsets of the universal set.

Social Norms and Rationality of Choice

Ever since Sen (1993) criticized the notion of internal consistency of choice, there exists a wide spread perception that the standard rationalizability approach to the theory of choice has difficulties coping with the existence of external social norms. This paper introduces a concept of norm-conditional rationalizability and shows that external social norms can be accommodated so as to be compatible with norm-conditional rationalizability by means of suitably modified revealed preference axioms in the theory of rational choice on general domains à la Richter (1966;1971) and Hansson (1968)

Non-Deteriorating Choice without Full Transitivity

Although the theory of greatest-element rationalizability and maximal-element rationalizability under general domains and without full transitivity of rationalizing relations is well-developed in the literature, these standard notions of rational choice are often considered to be too demanding. An alternative definition of rationality of choice is that of non-deteriorating choice, which requires that the chosen alternatives must be judged at least as good as a reference alternative. In game theory, this definition is well-known under the name of individual rationality when the reference alternative is construed to be the status quo. This alternative form of rationality of individual and social choice is characterized in this paper on general domains and without full transitivity of rationalizing relations.

Revealed Preference and Choice under Uncertainty

We employ the theory of rational choice to examine whether observable choices from feasible sets of prospects can be generated by the optimization of some underlying decision criterion under uncertainty. Rather than focusing on a specific theory of choice, our objective is to formulate a general approach that is designed to cover the various decision criteria that have been proposed in the literature. We use a mild dominance property to define a class of suitable choice criteria. In addition to rationalizability per se, we characterize transitive and Suzumura consistent rationalizability in the presence of dominance.

Social Choice: Recent Developments

In the past quarter century, there has been a dramatic shift of focus in social choice theory, with structured sets of alternatives and restricted domains of the sort encountered in economic problems coming to the fore. This article provides an overview of some of the recent contributions to four topics in normative social choice theory in which economic modelling has played a prominent role: Arrovian social choice theory on economic domains, variable-population social choice, strategy-proof social choice, and axiomatic models of resource allocation.

Multi-Profile Intergenerational Social Choice

Ferejohn and Page transplanted a stationarity axiom from Koopmans’ theory of impatience into Arrow’s social choice theory with an infinite horizon and showed that the Arrow axioms and stationarity lead to a dictatorship by the first generation. We prove that the negative implications of their stationarity axiom are more far-reaching: there is no Arrow social welfare function satisfying their stationarity axiom. We propose a more suitable stationarity axiom, and show that an Arrow social welfare function satisfies this modified version if and only if it is a lexicographic dictatorship where the generations are taken into consideration in chronological order.