Spécifier pour mieux protéger? : l’évolution de la notion d’orientation sexuelle comme critère de discrimination au sein du droit international

Le présent travail s’interroge quant au niveau de protection offert par la structure actuelle du droit international à l’ensemble de la population LGBT en vertu des normes juridiques de non-discrimination. Il questionne par le fait même la nécessité de créer une convention internationale spécifique contre la discrimination faite en fonction de l’orientation sexuelle au sein du système onusien des droits de la personne. Afin de le déterminer, une analyse bipartite est proposée. L’évolution de la notion d’orientation sexuelle au sein du droit international de 1975 à aujourd’hui expose dans un premier temps l’applicabilité de la norme de non-discrimination à l’ensemble de la population, et ce, malgré la polarisation de la communauté internationale sur la question. Par la suite, la jurisprudence du Comité des droits de l’homme en matière d’orientation sexuelle illustre la mise sur pied d’un régime de protection des minorités sexuelles modulé par les tractations politiques présentes sur la scène internationale. Ce mémoire conclut que la protection de la population LGBT ne nécessite pas la création une convention internationale contre la discrimination faite en fonction de l’orientation sexuelle, mais plutôt l’imposition d’une garantie universellement applicable de la norme juridique de non-discrimination à tous les droits fondamentaux reconnus par le système des traités des Nations Unies.

Does IMF Induce Political Business Cycles? An Empirical Analysis on Latin America's Indebted Countries.

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On the Political Economy of Sequential Reforms

This paper proposes an explanation for why efficient reforms are not carried out when losers have the power to block their implementation, even though compensating them is feasible. We construct a signaling model with two-sided incomplete information in which a government faces the task of sequentially implementing two reforms by bargaining with interest groups. The organization of interest groups is endogenous. Compensations are distortionary and government types differ in the concern about distortions. We show that, when compensations are allowed to be informative about the government’s type, there is a bias against the payment of compensations and the implementation of reforms. This is because paying high compensations today provides incentives for some interest groups to organize and oppose subsequent reforms with the only purpose of receiving a transfer. By paying lower compensations, governments attempt to prevent such interest groups from organizing. However, this comes at the cost of reforms being blocked by interest groups with relatively high losses.

Political Influence, Economic Interests and Endogenous Tax Structure in a Computable Equilibrium Framework: with Applicatioon to the United States, 1973 and 1983

A full understanding of public affairs requires the ability to distinguish between the policies that voters would like the government to adopt, and the influence that different voters or group of voters actually exert in the democratic process. We consider the properties of a computable equilibrium model of a competitive political economy in which the economic interests of groups of voters and their effective influence on equilibrium policy outcomes can be explicitly distinguished and computed. The model incorporates an amended version of the GEMTAP tax model, and is calibrated to data for the United States for 1973 and 1983. Emphasis is placed on how the aggregation of GEMTAP households into groups within which economic and political behaviour is assumed homogeneous affects the numerical representation of interests and influence for representative members of each group. Experiments with the model suggest that the changes in both interests and influence are important parts of the story behind the evolution of U.S. tax policy in the decade after 1973.

Inter-temporal Price Discrimination when Imports are Restricted by Quotas

A dominant firm holding import quota engages in inter-temporal price discrimination when facing a competitive fringe engaged in seasonal production. This causes a welfare loss that comes in addition the loss attributable to limitation of imports below the free trade level.

First-Degree Discrimination in a Competitive Setting: Pricing and Quality Choice

The paper investigates competition in price schedules among vertically differentiated dupolists. First order price discrimination is the unique Nash equilibrium of a sequential game in which firms determine first whether or not to commit to a uniform price, and then simultaneously choose either a single price of a price schedule. Whether the profits earned by both firms are larger or smaller under discrimination than under uniform pricing depends on the quality gap between firms, and on the disparity of consumer preferences. Firms engaged in first degree discrimination choose quality levels that are optimal from a welfare perspective. The paper also reflects on implications of these findings for pricing policies of an incumbent threatened by entry.

La discrimination salariale dans la ligue nationale de Hockey.

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L'influence du risque spécifique des travailleurs sur les firmes: une explication de la discrimination salariale.

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ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL INIFICATION OF GERMANY: 1815-1871. PART 1: THE ZOLLVEREIN AND RAILWAYS..

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ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL UNIFICATION OF GERMANY: 1815-1871. PART 2: THE SHARE OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR IN THE ECONOMY..

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La discrimination economique dans le sport professionnel.

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La discrimination sur le marché du travail italien. Une comparaison des différentes méthodes d'estimation.

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