Beyond Equality of What: Sen and Neutrality

Based on a close reading of the debate between Rawls and Sen on primary goods versus capabilities, I argue that liberal theory cannot adequately respond to Sen’s critique within a conventionally neutralist framework. In support of the capability approach, I explain why and how it defends a more robust conception of opportunity and freedom, along with public debate on substantive questions about well-being and the good life. My aims are: (i) to show that Sen’s capability approach is at odds with Rawls’s political liberal version of neutrality; (ii) to carve out a third space in the neutrality debate; and (iii) to begin to develop, from Sen’s approach, the idea of public value liberalism as a position that falls within that third space.

Economic Incentives and Liberal Equality

In order to assess to the degree to which the provision of economic incentives can result in justified inequalities, we need to distinguish between compensatory incentive payments and non-compensatory incentive payments. From a liberal egalitarian perspective, economic inequalities traceable to the provision of compensatory incentive payments are generally justifiable. However, economic inequalities created by the provision of non-compensatory incentive payments are more problematic. I argue that in non-ideal circumstances justice may permit and even require the provision of non-compensatory incentives despite the fact that those who receive non-compensatory payments are not entitled to them. In some circumstances, justice may require us to accede to unreasonable demands for incentive payments by hard bargainers. This leads to a kind of paradox: from a systemic point of view, non-compensatory incentive payments can be justified even though those who receive them have no just claim to them.

Equality and Value-holism

Dans cet article je considère un récent défi à l’égalitarisme développé par Michael Huemer. Le challenge de Huemer prend la forme d’un dilemme : les égalitaristes peuvent être soit atomistes soit holistes en ce qui concerne la valeur de l’égalité. S’ils sont atomistes, alors ils doivent acceptés que l’égalité n’ait pas de valeur intrinsèque ; s’ils sont holistes, alors leur point ce vue est inconsistant avec une intuitive mais très plausible forme de conséquentialisme. Je montre que ce dilemme ne doit pas perturber les égalitaristes. Ils peuvent être holistes en ce qui concerne la valeur et adhérer en même temps au conséqeuntialisme.