5 resultados para Median voter
em Université de Montréal, Canada
Resumo:
This paper studies the theoretical and empirical implications of monetary policy making by committee under three different voting protocols. The protocols are a consensus model, where super-majority is required for a policy change; an agenda-setting model, where the chairman controls the agenda; and a simple majority model, where policy is determined by the median member. These protocols give preeminence to different aspects of the actual decision making process and capture the observed heterogeneity in formal procedures across central banks. The models are estimated by Maximum Likehood using interest rate decisions by the committees of five central banks, namely the Bank of Canada, the Bank of England, the European Central Bank, the Swedish Riksbank, and the U.S. Federal Reserve. For all central banks, results indicate that the consensus model is statically superior to the alternative models. This suggests that despite institutionnal differences, committees share unwritten rules and informal procedures that deliver observationally equivalent policy decisions.
Resumo:
It Has Often Been Assumed That a Country's Tax Level, Tax Structure Progressivity and After-Tax Income Distribution Are Chosen by Voters Subject Only to Their Budget Constraints. This Paper Argues That At Certain Income Levels Voters' Decisions May Be Constrained by Bureaucratic Corruption. the Theoretical Arguments Are Developed in Asymmetry Limits the Capacity of the Fiscal System to Generate Revenues by Means of Direct Taxes. This Hypothesis Is Tested Witha Sample of International Data by Means of a Simultaneous Equation Model. the Distortions Resulting From Corruption Ar Captured Through Their Effects on a Latent Variable Defined As the Overall Fiscal Structure. Evidence Is Found of Causality Running From This Latent Variable to the Level of Taxes and the Degree of After Tax Inequality.
Resumo:
Mémoire numérisé par la Division de la gestion de documents et des archives de l'Université de Montréal
Resumo:
Ce mémoire porte sur l’efficacité des campagnes sociales sur Internet afin d’encourager les jeunes adultes à voter. La constatation du déclin de la participation électorale des jeunes adultes nous a poussés à vouloir comprendre quels sont les enjeux qui touchent à cette problématique et comment les campagnes sociales incitatives au vote peuvent répondre à un certain besoin. La campagne électorale des élections générales canadiennes du 2 mai 2011, durant laquelle plusieurs outils Internet ont été développés pour inciter la population à voter, le plus connu étant la Boussole électorale, a constitué un contexte clé pour nous permettre d’explorer le sujet. À l’aide des théories sur l’influence des médias et de celles de la persuasion, nous allons mieux comprendre les possibilités qu’offre le Web pour la mobilisation sociale. Deux cueillettes de données ont été faites, soit une première quantitative par questionnaire pour voir le niveau de pénétration de ces outils Internet ainsi que leur appréciation, soit une deuxième qualitative par groupe de discussion afin d’approfondir la problématique de la désaffection politique et d’analyser la pertinence des campagnes sociales incitatives au vote. La mise en commun des résultats nous a permis de comprendre, entre autres, que les campagnes sociales sur Internet peuvent constituer un outil de conscientisation politique dans certaines circonstances et qu’elles peuvent bénéficier des réseaux sociaux comme Facebook et Twitter. Toutefois, le besoin d’éducation civique demeure une solution récurrente lorsqu’on parle d’encourager les jeunes adultes à voter.
Resumo:
Theories of economic voting have a long tradition in political science and continue to inspire a large group of scholars. Classical economic voting theory assumes a reward-and-punishment mechanism (Key, 1966). This mechanism implies that incumbents are more likely to stay in power under a good economy, but are cast out under a bad economy (Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier, 2000). The economy has repeatedly been shown to be a major determinant of electoral behavior (see especially the recent book by Duch and Stevenson, 2008), but the current economic crisis seems to provide a marked illustration of how the economy affects voting. In recent elections across the Western industrialized world, most ruling coalitions lost their majority. Opposition parties, on the other hand, whether right wing or left wing, have appeared to benefit from the economic downturn.