Interpersonal Comparisons of Well-Being

This paper, which is to be published as a chapter in the Oxford Handbook of Political Economy, provides an introduction to social-choice theory with interpersonal comparisons of well-being. We argue that the most promising route of escape from the negative conclusion of Arrow’s theorem is to use a richer informational environment than ordinal measurability and the absence of interpersonal comparability of well-being. We discuss welfarist social evaluation (which requires that the levels of individual well-being in two alternatives are the only determinants of their social ranking) and present characterizations of some important social-evaluation orderings.

Conséquences d'une redéfinition du concept de vie privée sur l'environnement informationnel propre aux étudiants fréquentant une institution d'enseignement supérieur

"Mémoire présenté à la Faculté des études supérieures en vue de l'obtention du grade de Maître en Droit des Technologies de l'Information"