Democratic Deliberation in a Multinational Federation

Democratic deliberation is an aspiration that, in the most favorable conditions, remains difficult to achieve. In divided or multinational societies, the requirements of democratic theory appear particularly daunting. This essay surveys the Canadian debate about democratization and constitutional politics to better understand the significance of democratic deliberation in a concrete case, when principles are evoked in a context where institutions, interests, identities and power also matter. The article proposes to think of deliberation and power politics as closely intertwined and, in fact impossible to separate. Even in the best conditions, multinational deliberations always remain imperfect exercises in practical reason.

Souveraineté, démocratie et gouvernance mondiale chez David Held : le problème de la démocratie au-delà de l’État national

Dans le contexte de la mondialisation contemporaine, le développement d’une structure de gouvernance à plusieurs niveaux nous oblige à revoir notre compréhension de la souveraineté de l’État et de l’exercice de la démocratie. Notre objectif consiste à présenter la pensée de David Held au sujet des conséquences de ces transformations de la gouvernance politique sur la théorie démocratique. Dans un premier temps, nous analyserons les conséquences de l’atténuation de la souveraineté de l’État, dorénavant partagée avec diverses organisations supranationales, sur la théorie de l’État démocratique moderne. Nous verrons comment Held répond au déficit démocratique constaté au sein de ces organisations, en adaptant le principe de subsidiarité au système de gouvernance multicouche émergeant, et ce, afin de rétablir la congruence entre les décideurs et les destinataires de leurs décisions, caractéristique de l’activité (libérale) démocratique. Dans un deuxième temps, nous présenterons les fondements normatifs du modèle théorique qu’il préconise pour assurer la démocratisation de ce nouveau système de gouvernance. Nous verrons pourquoi, selon Held, la poursuite de l’idéal démocratique exige aujourd’hui la mise en oeuvre d’une variété de droits, inspirés des valeurs sociales-démocrates, qu’il faut enchâsser dans le cadre constitutionnel de toutes les institutions de gouvernance du monde contemporain. De plus, nous dégagerons les objectifs institutionnels qu’il faut atteindre afin de parvenir à la réalisation d’une social-démocratie mondiale. Nous conclurons avec une brève analyse critique de son interprétation du principe de subsidiarité et de son approche “du haut vers le bas” (top-down) des processus conduisant à la démocratisation des institutions supranationales.

Investors Impacts on Currency Returns: Theory versus Practice.

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Innis Lecture: Can the Theory of Incentives Explain Decentralization?

This survey presents within a single model three theories of decentralization of decision-making within organizations based on private information and incentives. Renegotiation, collusion, and limits on communication are three sufficient conditions for decentralization to be optimal.

Some Additional Specification Tests for Generalized Method of Moments Estimators with Macro-Economic Applications Part I : Theory

In This Paper Several Additional Gmm Specification Tests Are Studied. a First Test Is a Chow-Type Test for Structural Parameter Stability of Gmm Estimates. the Test Is Inspired by the Fact That \"Taste and Technology\" Parameters Are Uncovered. the Second Set of Specification Tests Are Var Encompassing Tests. It Is Assumed That the Dgp Has a Finite Var Representation. the Moment Restrictions Which Are Suggested by Economic Theory and Exploited in the Gmm Procedure Represent One Possible Characterization of the Dgp. the Var Is a Different But Compatible Characterization of the Same Dgp. the Idea of the Var Encompassing Tests Is to Compare Parameter Estimates of the Euler Conditions and Var Representations of the Dgp Obtained Separately with Parameter Estimates of the Euler Conditions and Var Representations Obtained Jointly. There Are Several Ways to Construct Joint Systems Which Are Discussed in the Paper. Several Applications Are Also Discussed.

A Theory of Random Consumer Demand

This paper presents a new theory of random consumer demand. The primitive is a collection of probability distributions, rather than a binary preference. Various assumptions constrain these distributions, including analogues of common assumptions about preferences such as transitivity, monotonicity and convexity. Two results establish a complete representation of theoretically consistent random demand. The purpose of this theory of random consumer demand is application to empirical consumer demand problems. To this end, the theory has several desirable properties. It is intrinsically stochastic, so the econometrician can apply it directly without adding extrinsic randomness in the form of residuals. Random demand is parsimoniously represented by a single function on the consumption set. Finally, we have a practical method for statistical inference based on the theory, described in McCausland (2004), a companion paper.

Bayesian Analysis for a Theory of Random Consumer Demand: The Case of Indivisible Goods

McCausland (2004a) describes a new theory of random consumer demand. Theoretically consistent random demand can be represented by a \"regular\" \"L-utility\" function on the consumption set X. The present paper is about Bayesian inference for regular L-utility functions. We express prior and posterior uncertainty in terms of distributions over the indefinite-dimensional parameter set of a flexible functional form. We propose a class of proper priors on the parameter set. The priors are flexible, in the sense that they put positive probability in the neighborhood of any L-utility function that is regular on a large subset bar(X) of X; and regular, in the sense that they assign zero probability to the set of L-utility functions that are irregular on bar(X). We propose methods of Bayesian inference for an environment with indivisible goods, leaving the more difficult case of indefinitely divisible goods for another paper. We analyse individual choice data from a consumer experiment described in Harbaugh et al. (2001).

Pecking Order Theory et structure de contrôle des grandes sociétés canadiennes.

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Toward a Political Theory of Environmental Policy.

This paper makes some steps toward a formal political economy of environmental policy. Economists' quasi-unanimous preferences for sophisticated incentive regulation is reconsidered. First, we recast the question of instrument choice in the general mechanism literature and provide an incomplete contract approach to political economy. Then, in various settings, we show why constitutional constraints on the instruments of environmental policy may be desirable, even though they appear inefficient from a purely standard economic viewpoint.