Core Retionalizability in Two-Agent Exchange Economies.

We provide a characterization of selection correspondences in two-person exchange economies that can be core rationalized in the sense that there exists a preference profile with some standard properties that generates the observed choices as the set of core elements of the economy for any given initial endowment vector. The approach followed in this paper deviates from the standard rational choice model in that a rationalization in terms of a profile of individual orderings rather than in terms of a single individual or social preference relation is analyzed.

The Effect of Agricultural Zoning on Land Prices, Quebec, 1975-1981

Dans Ce Texte Nous Examinons les Effets de la Loi du Zonage Agricole du Quebec, Proclame En Decembre 1978 Sur le Prix du Sol Dans une Banlieu de Montreal. a L'aide de Donnees Sur les Transactions Normales Faites a Carignan et Saint-Mathias de 1975 a 1981, Nous Estimons, a L'aide des Moindres Carrees Ordinaires, une Equation de Determination du Prix Par Acre Avec Comme Variables Independantes la Dimension du Lot, la Distance de Montreal, les Services Disponibles (Egouts,...) et le Zonage Agricole (Ou Non) du Sol. Nos Resultats Nous Indiquent Que le Zonage Agricole Reduit le Prix D'un Acre de Sol.

Land Ownership, Working Capital, and the Agricultural Output: Egypt, 1913-1958.

A simple model is constructed in which short-term credit is needed to finance the purchase of inputs, in which there is bankruptcy risk, and in which we argue were important characteristics of Egyptian agriculture during the first half of this century, result in aggregate agricultural output being dependant on the distribution of land ownership. The main theorical insight is that aggregate agricultural output will be increased by a decrease in the inequality of the distribution of land ownership when returns to scale are decreasing. Testable short- and long-run empirical propositions are formulated and carefully tested on Egyptian data for the 1913-1958 period. We find that, controlling for factor inputs, there is no tradeoff between equity and efficiency for Egyptian agriculture - they go hand in hand in the short run.

Efficient Strategy-Proof Allocation Functions in Linear Production Economies

In a linear production model, we characterize the class of efficient and strategy-proof allocation functions, and the class of efficient and coalition strategy-proof allocation functions. In the former class, requiring equal treatment of equals allows us to identify a unique allocation function. This function is also the unique member of the latter class which satisfies uniform treatment of uniforms.

The Alberta Dilemma: Optimal Sharing of a Water Resource by an Agricultural and an Oil Sector

The purpose of this paper is to characterize the optimal time paths of production and water usage by an agricultural and an oil sector that have to share a limited water resource. We show that for any given water stock, if the oil stock is sufficiently large, it will become optimal to have a phase during which the agricultural sector is inactive. This may mean having an initial phase during which the two sectors are active, then a phase during which the water is reserved for the oil sector and the agricultural sector is inactive, followed by a phase during which both sectors are active again. The agricultural sector will always be active in the end as the oil stock is depleted and the demand for water from the oil sector decreases. In the case where agriculture is not constrained by the given natural inflow of water once there is no more oil, we show that oil extraction will always end with a phase during which oil production follows a pure Hotelling path, with the implicit price of oil net of extraction cost growing at the rate of interest. If the natural inflow of water does constitute a constraint for agriculture, then oil production never follows a pure Hotelling path, because its full marginal cost must always reflect not only the imputed rent on the finite oil stock, but also the positive opportunity cost of water.

Land Ownership, Working Capital, and the Agricultural Output: Egypt, 1913-1958.

A simple model is constructed in which short-term credit is needed to finance the purchase of inputs, in which there is bankruptcy risk, and in which we argue were important characteristics of Egyptian agriculture during the first half of this century, result in aggregate agricultural output being dependant on the distribution of land ownership. The main theorical insight is that aggregate agricultural output will be increased by a decrease in the inequality of the distribution of land ownership when returns to scale are decreasing. Testable short- and long-run empirical propositions are formulated and carefully tested on Egyptian data for the 1913-1958 period. We find that, controlling for factor inputs, there is no tradeoff between equity and efficiency for Egyptian agriculture - they go hand in hand in the short run.

Equal Factor Equivalence in Economies with Multiple Public Goods.

We consider the problem of provisioon and cost-sharing of multiple public goods. the efficient equal factor equivalent allocation rule makes every agent indifferent between what he receives and the opportunity of choosing the bundle of public goods subject to the constraint of paying r times its cost, where r is set as low as possible.

Dynamic linear economies with social interactions

Social interactions arguably provide a rationale for several important phenomena, from smoking and other risky behavior in teens to e.g., peer effects in school performance. We study social interactions in dynamic economies. For these economies, we provide existence (Markov Perfect Equilibrium in pure strategies), ergodicity, and welfare results. Also, we characterize equilibria in terms of agents' policy function, spatial equilibrium correlations and social multiplier effects, depending on the nature of interactions. Most importantly, we study formally the issue of the identification of social interactions, with special emphasis on the restrictions imposed by dynamic equilibrium conditions.

(Minimally) 'epsilon'-incentive compatible competitive equilibria in economies with indivisibilities

We consider competitive and budget-balanced allocation rules for problems where a number of indivisible objects and a fixed amount of money is allocated among a group of agents. In 'small' economies, we identify under classical preferences each agent's maximal gain from manipulation. Using this result we find the competitive and budget-balanced allocation rules which are minimally manipulable for each preference profile in terms of any agent's maximal gain. If preferences are quasi-linear, then we can find a competitive and budget-balanced allocation rule such that for any problem, the maximal utility gain from manipulation is equalized among all agents.

An algorithm for identifying agent-k-linked allocations in economies with indivisibilities

We consider envy-free (and budget-balanced) rules that are least manipulable with respect to agents counting or with respect to utility gains. Recently it has been shown that for any profile of quasi-linear preferences, the outcome of any such least manipulable envy-free rule can be obtained via agent-k-linked allocations. This note provides an algorithm for identifying agent-k-linked allocations.

Adaptation of agriculture to climate change in Quebec : the co-construction of agricultural policies in the RCM of Haut-Richelieu

Les facteurs climatiques ainsi bien que les facteurs non-climatiques doivent être pris en considération dans le processus d'adaptation de l'agriculture aux changements et à la variabilité climatiques (CVC). Ce changement de paradigme met l'agent humain au centre du processus d'adaptation, ce qui peut conduire à une maladaptation. Suite aux débats sur les changements climatiques qui ont attiré l'attention scientifique et publique dans les années 1980 et 1990, l'agriculture canadienne est devenue un des points focaux de plusieurs études pionnières sur les CVC, un phénomène principalement dû à l’effet anthropique. Pour faire face aux CVC, ce n’est pas seulement la mitigation qui est importante mais aussi l’adaptation. Quand il s'agit de l'adaptation, c'est plutôt la variabilité climatique qui nous intéresse que simplement les augmentations moyennes des températures. L'objectif général de ce mémoire de maîtrise est d'améliorer la compréhension des processus d'adaptation et de construction de la capacité d'adaptation ai niveau de la ferme et de la communauté agricole à travers un processus ascendant, c’est-à-dire en utilisant l'approche de co-construction (qui peut également être considéré comme une stratégie d'adaptation en soi), pour développer une gestion et des outils de planification appropriés aux parties prenantes pour accroître ainsi la capacité d'adaptation de la communauté agricole. Pour y arriver, l'approche grounded theory est utilisée. Les résultats consistent de cinq catégories interdépendantes de codes élargis, conceptuellement distinctes et avec un plus grand niveau d'abstraction. La MRC du Haut-Richelieu a été choisie comme étude de cas en raison de plusieurs de ses dimensions agricoles, à part de ses conditions biophysiques favorables. 15 entrevues ont été menées avec les agriculteurs. Les résultats montrent que si certains agriculteurs ont reconnu les côtés positifs et négatifs des CVC, d’autres sont très optimistes à ce sujet comme se ils ne voient que le côté positif; d'où la nécessité de voir les deux côtés des CVC. Aussi, il y a encore une certaine incertitude liée aux CVC, qui vient de la désinformation et la désensibilisation des agriculteurs principalement en ce qui concerne les causes des CVC ainsi que la nature des événements climatiques. En outre, et compte tenu du fait que l'adaptation a plusieurs caractéristiques et types, il existe de nombreux types d'adaptation qui impliquent à la fois l'acteur privé et le gouvernement. De plus, les stratégies d'adaptation doivent être élaborées conjointement par les agriculteurs en concert avec d'autres acteurs, à commencer par les agronomes, car ils servent en tant que relais important entre les agriculteurs et d'autres parties prenantes telles que les institutions publiques et les entreprises privées.