Cooperative VS. Non-cooperative Truels: Little Agreement, but Does that Matter?

It is well-known that non-cooperative and cooperative game theory may yield different solutions to games. These differences are particularly dramatic in the case of truels, or three-person duels, in which the players may fire sequentially or simultaneously, and the games may be one-round or n-round. Thus, it is never a Nash equilibrium for all players to hold their fire in any of these games, whereas in simultaneous one-round and n-round truels such cooperation, wherein everybody survives, is in both the a -core and ß -core. On the other hand, both cores may be empty, indicating a lack of stability, when the unique Nash equilibrium is one survivor. Conditions under which each approach seems most applicable are discussed. Although it might be desirable to subsume the two approaches within a unified framework, such unification seems unlikely since the two approaches are grounded in fundamentally different notions of stability.

Efficiency in Uncertain Cooperative Games

A contingent contract in a transferable utility game under uncertainty specifies an outcome for each possible state. It is assumed that coalitions evaluate these contracts by considering the minimal possible excesses. A main question of the paper concerns the existence and characterization of efficient contracts. It is shown that they exist if and only if the set of possible coalitions contains a balanced subset. Moreover, a characterization of values that result in efficient contracts in the case of minimally balanced collections is provided.

The Effect of Agricultural Zoning on Land Prices, Quebec, 1975-1981

Dans Ce Texte Nous Examinons les Effets de la Loi du Zonage Agricole du Quebec, Proclame En Decembre 1978 Sur le Prix du Sol Dans une Banlieu de Montreal. a L'aide de Donnees Sur les Transactions Normales Faites a Carignan et Saint-Mathias de 1975 a 1981, Nous Estimons, a L'aide des Moindres Carrees Ordinaires, une Equation de Determination du Prix Par Acre Avec Comme Variables Independantes la Dimension du Lot, la Distance de Montreal, les Services Disponibles (Egouts,...) et le Zonage Agricole (Ou Non) du Sol. Nos Resultats Nous Indiquent Que le Zonage Agricole Reduit le Prix D'un Acre de Sol.

Land Ownership, Working Capital, and the Agricultural Output: Egypt, 1913-1958.

A simple model is constructed in which short-term credit is needed to finance the purchase of inputs, in which there is bankruptcy risk, and in which we argue were important characteristics of Egyptian agriculture during the first half of this century, result in aggregate agricultural output being dependant on the distribution of land ownership. The main theorical insight is that aggregate agricultural output will be increased by a decrease in the inequality of the distribution of land ownership when returns to scale are decreasing. Testable short- and long-run empirical propositions are formulated and carefully tested on Egyptian data for the 1913-1958 period. We find that, controlling for factor inputs, there is no tradeoff between equity and efficiency for Egyptian agriculture - they go hand in hand in the short run.

The Alberta Dilemma: Optimal Sharing of a Water Resource by an Agricultural and an Oil Sector

The purpose of this paper is to characterize the optimal time paths of production and water usage by an agricultural and an oil sector that have to share a limited water resource. We show that for any given water stock, if the oil stock is sufficiently large, it will become optimal to have a phase during which the agricultural sector is inactive. This may mean having an initial phase during which the two sectors are active, then a phase during which the water is reserved for the oil sector and the agricultural sector is inactive, followed by a phase during which both sectors are active again. The agricultural sector will always be active in the end as the oil stock is depleted and the demand for water from the oil sector decreases. In the case where agriculture is not constrained by the given natural inflow of water once there is no more oil, we show that oil extraction will always end with a phase during which oil production follows a pure Hotelling path, with the implicit price of oil net of extraction cost growing at the rate of interest. If the natural inflow of water does constitute a constraint for agriculture, then oil production never follows a pure Hotelling path, because its full marginal cost must always reflect not only the imputed rent on the finite oil stock, but also the positive opportunity cost of water.

Analyse comparative des decisions d'emploi en incertitude de la cooperative de travailleurs et de la firme capitaliste traditionnelle a proprietaire unique.

Rapport de recherche

Cooperative of Noncooperative Behavior?

In an abstract two-agent model, we show that every deterministic joint choice function compatible with the hypothesis that agents act noncooperatively is also compatible with the hypothesis that they act cooperatively. the converse is false.

Land Ownership, Working Capital, and the Agricultural Output: Egypt, 1913-1958.

A simple model is constructed in which short-term credit is needed to finance the purchase of inputs, in which there is bankruptcy risk, and in which we argue were important characteristics of Egyptian agriculture during the first half of this century, result in aggregate agricultural output being dependant on the distribution of land ownership. The main theorical insight is that aggregate agricultural output will be increased by a decrease in the inequality of the distribution of land ownership when returns to scale are decreasing. Testable short- and long-run empirical propositions are formulated and carefully tested on Egyptian data for the 1913-1958 period. We find that, controlling for factor inputs, there is no tradeoff between equity and efficiency for Egyptian agriculture - they go hand in hand in the short run.

Production externalities : cooperative and non-cooperative approaches

Thèse numérisée par la Division de la gestion de documents et des archives de l'Université de Montréal

Adaptation of agriculture to climate change in Quebec : the co-construction of agricultural policies in the RCM of Haut-Richelieu

Les facteurs climatiques ainsi bien que les facteurs non-climatiques doivent être pris en considération dans le processus d'adaptation de l'agriculture aux changements et à la variabilité climatiques (CVC). Ce changement de paradigme met l'agent humain au centre du processus d'adaptation, ce qui peut conduire à une maladaptation. Suite aux débats sur les changements climatiques qui ont attiré l'attention scientifique et publique dans les années 1980 et 1990, l'agriculture canadienne est devenue un des points focaux de plusieurs études pionnières sur les CVC, un phénomène principalement dû à l’effet anthropique. Pour faire face aux CVC, ce n’est pas seulement la mitigation qui est importante mais aussi l’adaptation. Quand il s'agit de l'adaptation, c'est plutôt la variabilité climatique qui nous intéresse que simplement les augmentations moyennes des températures. L'objectif général de ce mémoire de maîtrise est d'améliorer la compréhension des processus d'adaptation et de construction de la capacité d'adaptation ai niveau de la ferme et de la communauté agricole à travers un processus ascendant, c’est-à-dire en utilisant l'approche de co-construction (qui peut également être considéré comme une stratégie d'adaptation en soi), pour développer une gestion et des outils de planification appropriés aux parties prenantes pour accroître ainsi la capacité d'adaptation de la communauté agricole. Pour y arriver, l'approche grounded theory est utilisée. Les résultats consistent de cinq catégories interdépendantes de codes élargis, conceptuellement distinctes et avec un plus grand niveau d'abstraction. La MRC du Haut-Richelieu a été choisie comme étude de cas en raison de plusieurs de ses dimensions agricoles, à part de ses conditions biophysiques favorables. 15 entrevues ont été menées avec les agriculteurs. Les résultats montrent que si certains agriculteurs ont reconnu les côtés positifs et négatifs des CVC, d’autres sont très optimistes à ce sujet comme se ils ne voient que le côté positif; d'où la nécessité de voir les deux côtés des CVC. Aussi, il y a encore une certaine incertitude liée aux CVC, qui vient de la désinformation et la désensibilisation des agriculteurs principalement en ce qui concerne les causes des CVC ainsi que la nature des événements climatiques. En outre, et compte tenu du fait que l'adaptation a plusieurs caractéristiques et types, il existe de nombreux types d'adaptation qui impliquent à la fois l'acteur privé et le gouvernement. De plus, les stratégies d'adaptation doivent être élaborées conjointement par les agriculteurs en concert avec d'autres acteurs, à commencer par les agronomes, car ils servent en tant que relais important entre les agriculteurs et d'autres parties prenantes telles que les institutions publiques et les entreprises privées.