Non-Commitment and Savings in Dynamic Risk-Sharing Contracts

We characterize the solution to a model of consumption smoothing using financing under non-commitment and savings. We show that, under certain conditions, these two different instruments complement each other perfectly. If the rate of time preference is equal to the interest rate on savings, perfect smoothing can be achieved in finite time. We also show that, when random revenues are generated by periodic investments in capital through a concave production function, the level of smoothing achieved through financial contracts can influence the productive investment efficiency. As long as financial contracts cannot achieve perfect smoothing, productive investment will be used as a complementary smoothing device.

La liberté contractuelle des conjoints de fait réaffirmée par la cour d'appel... un avant-goût des jugements à venir.

Article publié avec l'autorisation de la Chambre des notaires du Québec

La schizophrénie des théories éthiques contemporaines

Parution originale sous le titre « The Schizophrenia of Modern Ethical Theories », The Journal of Philosohy, vol. 73, no 14, On Motives and Morals. (August 12, 1976), pp. 453-456. Traduit par Julien Corriveau, révisé par Christine Tappolet. Nous aimerions remercier Michael Stocker pour avoir relu cette traduction.

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