In Search of Advice for Physicians in Entry-Level Medical Markets

We consider entry-level medical markets for physicians in the United Kingdom. These markets experienced failures which led to the adoption of centralized market mechanisms in the 1960's. However, different regions introduced different centralized mechanisms. We advise physicians who do not have detailed information about the rank-order lists submitted by the other participants. We demonstrate that in each of these markets in a low information environment it is not beneficial to reverse the true ranking of any two acceptable hospital positions. We further show that (i) in the Edinburgh 1967 market, ranking unacceptable matches as acceptable is not profitable for any participant and (ii) in any other British entry-level medical market, it is possible that only strategies which rank unacceptable positions as acceptable are optimal for a physician.

Von Neumann-Morgenstern Stable Sets in Matching Problems

The following properties of the core of a one well-known: (i) the core is non-empty; (ii) the core is a lattice; and (iii) the set of unmatched agents is identical for any two matchings belonging to the core. The literature on two-sided matching focuses almost exclusively on the core and studies extensively its properties. Our main result is the following characterization of (von Neumann-Morgenstern) stable sets in one-to-one matching problem only if it is a maximal set satisfying the following properties : (a) the core is a subset of the set; (b) the set is a lattice; (c) the set of unmatched agents is identical for any two matchings belonging to the set. Furthermore, a set is a stable set if it is the unique maximal set satisfying properties (a), (b) and (c). We also show that our main result does not extend from one-to-one matching problems to many-to-one matching problems.

Distortionary Taxation and Labor Supply: Evidence from Canada.

This paper examines empirically the effects of distortionary taxation on labor supply using a general equilibrium framework. The long-term relations predicted by the model are derived and tested using Canadian data between 1966 and 1993. While the cointegrating predictions of the model without taxation are rejected, the ones of the model with labor taxation are not. Persistent labor tax rate increases appear to play an important role in the observed downward trend in hours worked.

Labor Market Institutions and Gender Differences in Wage Inequality.

In this paper, we present graphical and quantitative evidence on the important role played by changes in labor market institutions on the rise in wage inequality in the United States during the 1980s. We show that the decline in the real value of the minimium wage and in the rate of unionization explains over a third of the rise in inequality among men.

The Transformation Problem : an Aleternative Solution with an Identical Aggregate Profit Rate in the Labor value and the Monetary Space.

The aim of this paper is to demonstrate that, even if Marx's solution to the transformation problem can be modified, his basic conclusions remain valid. the proposed alternative solution which is presented hare is based on the constraint of a common general profit rate in both spaces and a money wage level which will be determined simultaneously with prices.

Wage Flexibility and Contract Structure in Germany

In this paper, we look at how labor market conditions at different points during the tenure of individuals with firms are correlated with current earnings. Using data on individuals from the German Socioeconomic Panel for the 1985-1994 period, we find that both the contemporaneous unemployment rate and prior values of the unemployment rate are significantly correlated with current earnings, contrary to results for the American labor market. Estimated elasticities vary between 9 and 15 percent for the elasticity of earnings with respect to current unemployment rates, and between 6 and 10 percent with respect to unemployment rates at the start of current firm tenure. Moreover, whereas local unemployment rates determine levels of earnings, national rates influence contemporaneous variations in earnings. We interpret this result as evidence that German unions do, in fact, bargain over wages and employment, but that models of individualistic contracts, such as the implicit contract model, may explain some of the observed wage drift and longer-term wage movements reasonably well. Furthermore, we explore the heterogeneity of contracts over a variety of worker and job characteristics. In particular, we find evidence that contracts differ across firm size and worker type. Workers of large firms are remarkably more insulated from the job market than workers for any other type of firm, indicating the importance of internal job markets.

The Transformation Problem : an Aleternative Solution with an Identical Aggregate Profit Rate in the Labor value and the Monetary Space.

The aim of this paper is to demonstrate that, even if Marx's solution to the transformation problem can be modified, his basic conclusions remain valid. the proposed alternative solution which is presented hare is based on the constraint of a common general profit rate in both spaces and a money wage level which will be determined simultaneously with prices.

Essays in labor and public economics

Dans ma thèse, je me sers de modèles de recherche solides pour répondre à des questions importantes de politique publique. Mon premier chapitre évalue l’impact causal de l’allégeance partisane (républicain ou démocrate) des gouverneurs américains sur le marché du travail. Dans ce chapitre, je combine les élections des gouverneurs avec les données du March CPS pour les années fiscales 1977 à 2008. En utilisant un modèle de régression par discontinuité, je trouve que les gouverneurs démocrates sont associés à de plus faibles revenus individuels moyens. Je mets en évidence que cela est entrainée par un changement dans la composition de la main-d’oeuvre à la suite d’une augmentation de l’emploi des travailleurs à revenus faibles et moyens. Je trouve que les gouverneurs démocrates provoquent une augmentation de l’emploi des noirs et de leurs heures travaillées. Ces résultats conduisent à une réduction de l’écart salarial entre les travailleurs noir et blanc. Mon deuxième chapitre étudie l’impact causal des fusillades qui se produisent dans les écoles secondaires américaines sur les performances des éléves et les résultats des écoles tels que les effectifs et le nombre d’enseignants recruté, a l’aide d’une stratégie de différence-en-différence. Le chapitre est coécrit avec Dongwoo Kim. Nous constatons que les fusillades dans les écoles réduisent significativement l’effectif des élèves de 9e année, la proportion d’élèves ayant un niveau adéquat en anglais et en mathématiques. Nous examinons aussi l’effet hétérogene des tueries dans les écoles secondaires entre les crimes et les suicides. Nous trouvons que les fusillades de natures criminelles provoquent la diminution du nombre d’inscriptions et de la proportion d’élèves adéquats en anglais et mathématiques. En utilisant des données sur les élèves en Californie, nous confirmons qu’une partie de l’effet sur la performance des élèves provient des étudiants inscrits et ce n’est pas uniquement un effet de composition. Mon troisième chapitre étudie l’impact des cellulaires sur la performance scolaire des élèves. Le chapitre est coécrit avec Richard Murphy. Dans ce chapitre, nous combinons une base de données unique contenant les politiques de téléphonie mobile des écoles obtenues à partir d’une enquète auprès des écoles dans quatre villes en Angleterre avec des données administratives sur la performance scolaire des éleves. Nous étudions ainsi l’impact de l’introduction d’une interdiction de téléphonie mobile sur le rendement des éleves. Nos résultats indiquent qu’il y a une augmentation du rendement des éleves après l’instauration de l’interdiction des cellulaires à l’école, ce qui suggère que les téléphones mobiles sont sources de distraction pour l’apprentissage et l’introduction d’une interdiction à l’école limite ce problème.

Rank Regressions, Wage Distributions and the Gender Gap.

In this paper, we model the interactions between the distribution of male and female wages under the assumption that any change in the wage distribution of women must be offset by an opposite change in the wage distribution of men.