Ethical and legal perspectives on inherited cancer susceptibility

Il existe des interactions complexes entre les perceptions du public, les demandes et les attentes envers les professionnels de la santé par rapport au dépistage des gènes de susceptibilité au cancer et aux services médicaux offerts. Ce chapitre étudie les aspects éthiques et juridiques de ces interactions avec une emphase sur le consentement, la confidentialité, l’emploi, l’assurance et le dépistage chez les mineurs et les majeurs inaptes. Ce chapitre conclu sur la prise en compte d’enjeux entourant la propriété de l’information génétique et les brevets et propose des principes pouvant servir de base pour une responsabilité partagée quant à la participation des patients dans le développement de lignes directrices encadrant le dépistage des gènes de susceptibilité au cancer.

Sharing a River

A group of agents located along a river have quasi-linear preferences over water and money. We ask how the water should be allocated and what money transfers should be performed. We are interested in efficiency, stability (in the sense of the core), and fairness (in a sense to be defined). We first show that the cooperative game associated with our problem is convex : its core is therefore large and easily described. Next, we propose the following fairness requirement : no group of agents should enjoy a welfare higher than what it could achieve in the absence of the remaining agents. We prove that only one welfare vector in the core satisfies this condition : it is the marginal contribution vector corresponding to the ordering of the agents along the river. We discuss how it could be decentralized or implemented.

Information Sharing and the Stability of Cooperation in Research Joint Ventures.

The model studies information sharing and the stability of cooperation in cost reducing Research Joint Ventures (RJVs). In a four-stage game-theoretic framework, firms decide on participation in a RJV, information sharing, R&D expenditures, and output. An important feature of the model is that voluntary information sharing between cooperating firms increases information leakage from the RJV to outsiders. It is found that it is the spillover from the RJV to outsiders which determines the decision of insiders whether to share information, while it is the spillover affecting all firms which determines the level of information sharing within the RJV. RJVs representing a larger portion of firms in the industry are more likely to share information. It is also found that when sharing information is costless, firms never choose intermediate levels of information sharing : they share all the information or none at all. The size of the RJV is found to depend on three effects : a coordination effect, an information sharing effect, and a competition effect. Depending on the relative magnitudes of these effects, the size of the RJV may increase or decrease with spillovers. The effect of information sharing on the profitability of firms as well as on welfare is studied.

On the Political Economy of Sequential Reforms

This paper proposes an explanation for why efficient reforms are not carried out when losers have the power to block their implementation, even though compensating them is feasible. We construct a signaling model with two-sided incomplete information in which a government faces the task of sequentially implementing two reforms by bargaining with interest groups. The organization of interest groups is endogenous. Compensations are distortionary and government types differ in the concern about distortions. We show that, when compensations are allowed to be informative about the government’s type, there is a bias against the payment of compensations and the implementation of reforms. This is because paying high compensations today provides incentives for some interest groups to organize and oppose subsequent reforms with the only purpose of receiving a transfer. By paying lower compensations, governments attempt to prevent such interest groups from organizing. However, this comes at the cost of reforms being blocked by interest groups with relatively high losses.

Reported Job Satisfaction : What Does It Mean?

By reporting his satisfaction with his job or any other experience, an individual does not communicate the number of utils that he feels. Instead, he expresses his posterior preference over available alternatives conditional on acquired knowledge of the past. This new interpretation of reported job satisfaction restores the power of microeconomic theory without denying the essential role of discrepancies between one’s situation and available opportunities. Posterior human wealth discrepancies are found to be the best predictor of reported job satisfaction. Static models of relative utility and other subjective well-being assumptions are all unambiguously rejected by the data, as well as an \"economic\" model in which job satisfaction is a measure of posterior human wealth. The \"posterior choice\" model readily explains why so many people usually report themselves as happy or satisfied, why both younger and older age groups are insensitive to current earning discrepancies, and why the past weighs more heavily than the present and the future.

Political Influence, Economic Interests and Endogenous Tax Structure in a Computable Equilibrium Framework: with Applicatioon to the United States, 1973 and 1983

A full understanding of public affairs requires the ability to distinguish between the policies that voters would like the government to adopt, and the influence that different voters or group of voters actually exert in the democratic process. We consider the properties of a computable equilibrium model of a competitive political economy in which the economic interests of groups of voters and their effective influence on equilibrium policy outcomes can be explicitly distinguished and computed. The model incorporates an amended version of the GEMTAP tax model, and is calibrated to data for the United States for 1973 and 1983. Emphasis is placed on how the aggregation of GEMTAP households into groups within which economic and political behaviour is assumed homogeneous affects the numerical representation of interests and influence for representative members of each group. Experiments with the model suggest that the changes in both interests and influence are important parts of the story behind the evolution of U.S. tax policy in the decade after 1973.

Non-Commitment and Savings in Dynamic Risk-Sharing Contracts

We characterize the solution to a model of consumption smoothing using financing under non-commitment and savings. We show that, under certain conditions, these two different instruments complement each other perfectly. If the rate of time preference is equal to the interest rate on savings, perfect smoothing can be achieved in finite time. We also show that, when random revenues are generated by periodic investments in capital through a concave production function, the level of smoothing achieved through financial contracts can influence the productive investment efficiency. As long as financial contracts cannot achieve perfect smoothing, productive investment will be used as a complementary smoothing device.

Coherent Cost-Sharing Rules

We reconsider the discrete version of the axiomatic cost-sharing model. We propose a condition of (informational) coherence requiring that not all informational refinements of a given problem be solved differently from the original problem. We prove that strictly coherent linear cost-sharing rules must be simple random-order rules.

Environmental Risk: Should Banks Be Liable?

This paper studies the impact of banks' liability for environmental damages caused by their borrowers. Laws or court decisions that declare banks liable for environmental damages have two objectives : (1) finding someone to pay for the damages and (2) exerting a pressure on a firm's stakeholders to incite them to invest in environmental risk prevention. We study the effect that such legal decisions can have on financing relationships and especially on the incentives to reduce environmental risk in an environment where banks cannot commit to refinance the firm in all circumstances. Following an environmental accident, liable banks more readily agree to refinance the firm. We then show that bank liability effectively makes refinancing more attractive to banks, therefore improving the firm's risk-sharing possibilities. Consequently, the firm's incentives to invest in environmental risk reduction are weakened compared to the (bank) no-liability case. We also show that, when banks are liable, the firm invests at the full-commitment optimal level of risk reduction investment. If there are some externalities such that some damages cannot be accounted for, the socially efficient level of investment is greater than the privately optimal one. in that case, making banks non-liable can be socially desirable.

Modèles d'administration des tribunaux judiciaires

Conseil canadien de la magistrature

Le transfert informel des connaissances tacites chez les gestionnaires municipaux en situation de coordination

Ce rapport de recherche porte sur une étude s’intéressant au transfert des connaissances tacites chez les gestionnaires, c’est-à-dire le partage de ces connaissances et leur utilisation informelle, durant une situation de coordination dans un service municipal. La thèse est articulée autour des questions suivantes : Quelles sont les situations de coordination vécues par les gestionnaires municipaux? Quelles sont les sources de connaissances tacites partagées et utilisées? Quelles sont les relations de connaissances mobilisées de façon informelle lors du transfert des connaissances tacites? Quels sont les facteurs encourageant ou inhibant le transfert informel des connaissances tacites? À partir d’un modèle basé sur une approche situationnelle (Taylor, 1989 et 1991), nous avons revu la documentation touchant nos questions de recherche. Nous avons défini notamment la récursivité des connaissances et le réseau de connaissances, de même que présenté le modèle de la conversion des connaissances (Nonaka, 1994) et celui de l’actualisation de soi (St-Arnaud, 1996). Nous avons questionné 22 répondants à l’aide d’instruments de mesure qui combinent les techniques de l’incident critique, de l’entrevue cognitive et réflexive, le questionnement sur les réseaux organisationnels et l’observation participante. Tels des filets, ces instruments ont permis de traquer et d’obtenir des données d’une grande richesse sur les connaissances tacites et les comportements informels durant le transfert de connaissances en situation de coordination. Ces données ont été analysées selon une approche méthodologique essentiellement qualitative combinant l’analyse de contenu, la schématisation heuristique et l’analyse des réseaux sociaux. Nos résultats montrent que la complexité d’une situation de coordination conditionne le choix des mécanismes de coordination. De plus, les sources de connaissances sont, du point de vue individuel, le gestionnaire et ses artefacts, de même que son réseau personnel avec ses propres artefacts. Du point de vue collectif, ces sources sont réifiées dans le réseau de connaissances. Les connaissances clés d’une situation de coordination sont celles sur le réseau organisationnel, le contexte, les expériences en gestion et en situation complexe de coordination, la capacité de communiquer, de négocier, d’innover et celle d’attirer l’attention. Individuellement, les gestionnaires privilégient l’actualisation de soi, l’autoformation et la formation contextualisée et, collectivement, la coprésence dans l’action, le réseautage et l’accompagnement. Cette étude fournit un modèle valide du transfert contextualisé des connaissances qui est un cas de coordination complexe d’activités en gestion des connaissances. Ce transfert est concomitant à d’autres situations de coordination. La nature tacite des connaissances prévaut, de même que le mode informel, les médias personnels et les mécanismes d’ajustement mutuel. Les connaissances tacites sont principalement transférées au début des processus de gestion de projet et continuellement durant la rétroaction et le suivi des résultats. Quant aux connaissances explicites, les gestionnaires les utilisent principalement comme un symbole à la fin des processus de gestion de projet. Parmi les personnes et les groupes de personnes d’une situation de transfert contextualisé des connaissances, 10 % jouent des rôles clés, soit ceux d’experts et d’intermédiaires de personnes et d’artefacts. Les personnes en périphérie possèdent un potentiel de structuration, c’est-à-dire de connexité, pour assurer la continuité du réseau de connaissances organisationnel. Notre étude a élargi le modèle général de la complexité d’une situation (Bystrom, 1999; Choo, 2006; Taylor, 1986 et 1991), la théorie de la coordination (Malone et Crowston, 1994), le modèle de la conversion des connaissances (Nonaka, 1994), celui de l’actualisation de soi (St-Arnaud, 1996) et la théorie des réseaux de connaissances (Monge et Contractor, 2003). Notre modèle réaffirme la concomitance de ces modèles généraux selon une approche constructiviste (Giddens, 1987) où la dualité du structurel et la compétence des acteurs sont confirmées et enrichies.

L’arrêt Baker : Le rôle des règles administratives dans la réception du droit international des droits de la personne en droit interne

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La filiation homoparentale : Esquisse d'une réforme précipitée

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Le testateur et son clone inavoué, le juge : clone difforme ou conforme dans la recherche des intentions du testateur : le juge et l’interprétation des volontés du testateur

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Convergences et divergences entre fédéralisme et protection des droits et libertés : l’exemple des Etats-Unis et du Canada

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