Arbitrage-Based Pricing when Volatility is Stochastic.

The paper investigates the pricing of derivative securities with calendar-time maturities.

Toward a Political Theory of Environmental Policy.

This paper makes some steps toward a formal political economy of environmental policy. Economists' quasi-unanimous preferences for sophisticated incentive regulation is reconsidered. First, we recast the question of instrument choice in the general mechanism literature and provide an incomplete contract approach to political economy. Then, in various settings, we show why constitutional constraints on the instruments of environmental policy may be desirable, even though they appear inefficient from a purely standard economic viewpoint.

Les déterminants des faillites bancaires dans les pays en développement: le cas des pays de l'Union économique et monétaire Ouest-africaine (UEMOA)

L’objectif de ce papier est de déterminer les facteurs susceptibles d’expliquer les faillites bancaires au sein de l’Union économique et monétaire ouest-africaine (UEMOA) entre 1980 et 1995. Utilisant le modèle logit conditionnel sur des données en panel, nos résultats montrent que les variables qui affectent positivement la probabilité de faire faillite des banques sont : i) le niveau d’endettement auprès de la banque centrale; ii) un faible niveau de comptes disponibles et à vue; iii) les portefeuilles d’effets commerciaux par rapport au total des crédits; iv) le faible montant des dépôts à terme de plus de 2 ans à 10 ans par rapport aux actifs totaux; et v) le ratio actifs liquides sur actifs totaux. En revanche, les variables qui contribuent positivement sur la vraisemblance de survie des banques sont les suivantes : i) le ratio capital sur actifs totaux; ii) les bénéfices nets par rapport aux actifs totaux; iii) le ratio crédit total sur actifs totaux; iv) les dépôts à terme à 2 ans par rapport aux actifs totaux; et v) le niveau des engagements sous forme de cautions et avals par rapport aux actifs totaux. Les ratios portefeuilles d’effets commerciaux et actifs liquides par rapport aux actifs totaux sont les variables qui expliquent la faillite des banques commerciales, alors que ce sont les dépôts à terme de plus de 2 ans à 10 ans qui sont à l’origine des faillites des banques de développement. Ces faillites ont été considérablement réduites par la création en 1989 de la commission de réglementation bancaire régionale. Dans l’UEMOA, seule la variable affectée au Sénégal semble contribuer positivement sur la probabilité de faire faillite.

Sharing a River

A group of agents located along a river have quasi-linear preferences over water and money. We ask how the water should be allocated and what money transfers should be performed. We are interested in efficiency, stability (in the sense of the core), and fairness (in a sense to be defined). We first show that the cooperative game associated with our problem is convex : its core is therefore large and easily described. Next, we propose the following fairness requirement : no group of agents should enjoy a welfare higher than what it could achieve in the absence of the remaining agents. We prove that only one welfare vector in the core satisfies this condition : it is the marginal contribution vector corresponding to the ordering of the agents along the river. We discuss how it could be decentralized or implemented.

Vertical R&D Sprillovers, Cooperation, Market Structure, and Innovation.

This paper studies vertical R&D spillovers between upstream and downstream firms. The model incorporates two vertically related industries, with horizontal spillovers within each industry and vertical spillovers between the two industries. Four types of R&D cooperation are studied : no cooperation, horizontal cooperation, vertical cooperation, and simultaneous horizontal and vertical cooperation. Vertical spillovers always increase R&D and welfare, while horizontal spillovers may increase or decrease them. The comparison of cooperative settings in terms of R&D shows that no setting uniformly dominates the others. Which type of cooperation yields more R&D depends on horizontal and vertical spillovers, and market structure. The ranking of cooperative structures hinges on the signs and magnitudes of three competitive externalities (vertical, horizontal, and diagonal) which capture the effect of the R&D of a firm on the profits of other firms. One of the basic results of the strategic investment literature is that cooperation between competitors increases (decreases) R&D when horizontal spillovers are high (low); the model shows that this result does not necessarily hold when vertical spillovers and vertical cooperation are taken into account. The paper proposes a theory of innovation and market structure, showing that the relation between innovation and competition depends on horizontal spillovers, vertical spillovers, and cooperative settings. The private incentives for R&D cooperation are addressed. It is found that buyers and sellers have divergent interests regarding the choice of cooperative settings and that spillovers increase the likelihood of the emergence of cooperation in a decentralized equilibrium.

Empirical Assessment of an Intertemporal Option Pricing Model with Latent variables

This paper assesses the empirical performance of an intertemporal option pricing model with latent variables which generalizes the Hull-White stochastic volatility formula. Using this generalized formula in an ad-hoc fashion to extract two implicit parameters and forecast next day S&P 500 option prices, we obtain similar pricing errors than with implied volatility alone as in the Hull-White case. When we specialize this model to an equilibrium recursive utility model, we show through simulations that option prices are more informative than stock prices about the structural parameters of the model. We also show that a simple method of moments with a panel of option prices provides good estimates of the parameters of the model. This lays the ground for an empirical assessment of this equilibrium model with S&P 500 option prices in terms of pricing errors.

Rationalizability of Choice Functions on General Domains without Full Transitivity

The rationalizability of a choice function by means of a transitive relation has been analyzed thoroughly in the literature. However, not much seems to be known when transitivity is weakened to quasi-transitivity or acyclicity. We describe the logical relationships between the different notions of rationalizability involving, for example, the transitivity, quasi-transitivity, or acyclicity of the rationalizing relation. Furthermore, we discuss sufficient conditions and necessary conditions for rational choice on arbitrary domains. Transitive, quasi-transitive, and acyclical rationalizability are fully characterized for domains that contain all singletons and all two-element subsets of the universal set.

La finance islamique: fondements, theorie et realite.

L’Islam interdit le riba , mot arabe signifiant à la fois usure et intérêt. L’interdiction du rib figure dans la loi islamique, née dans l’Arabie du Moyen Âge. Elle est à la base de la finance islamique qui connut une expansion remarquable durant la deuxième moitié du XX e siècle. Nous nous interrogeons sur les origines de cette interdiction, sur les problèmes que connaît actuellement la finance islamique et sur ses perspectives d’avenir.

On the Political Economy of Sequential Reforms

This paper proposes an explanation for why efficient reforms are not carried out when losers have the power to block their implementation, even though compensating them is feasible. We construct a signaling model with two-sided incomplete information in which a government faces the task of sequentially implementing two reforms by bargaining with interest groups. The organization of interest groups is endogenous. Compensations are distortionary and government types differ in the concern about distortions. We show that, when compensations are allowed to be informative about the government’s type, there is a bias against the payment of compensations and the implementation of reforms. This is because paying high compensations today provides incentives for some interest groups to organize and oppose subsequent reforms with the only purpose of receiving a transfer. By paying lower compensations, governments attempt to prevent such interest groups from organizing. However, this comes at the cost of reforms being blocked by interest groups with relatively high losses.

Investment Under Demand Uncertainty: the Newsboy Problem Revisited.

In this article we study the effect of uncertainty on an entrepreneur who must choose the capacity of his business before knowing the demand for his product. The unit profit of operation is known with certainty but there is no flexibility in our one-period framework. We show how the introduction of global uncertainty reduces the investment of the risk neutral entrepreneur and, even more, that the risk averse one. We also show how marginal increases in risk reduce the optimal capacity of both the risk neutral and the risk averse entrepreneur, without any restriction on the concave utility function and with limited restrictions on the definition of a mean preserving spread. These general results are explained by the fact that the newsboy has a piecewise-linear, and concave, monetary payoff witha kink endogenously determined at the level of optimal capacity. Our results are compared with those in the two literatures on price uncertainty and demand uncertainty, and particularly, with the recent contributions of Eeckhoudt, Gollier and Schlesinger (1991, 1995).

Statistical Inference for Computable General Equilibrium Models with Application to a Model of the Moroccan Economy

We study the problem of measuring the uncertainty of CGE (or RBC)-type model simulations associated with parameter uncertainty. We describe two approaches for building confidence sets on model endogenous variables. The first one uses a standard Wald-type statistic. The second approach assumes that a confidence set (sampling or Bayesian) is available for the free parameters, from which confidence sets are derived by a projection technique. The latter has two advantages: first, confidence set validity is not affected by model nonlinearities; second, we can easily build simultaneous confidence intervals for an unlimited number of variables. We study conditions under which these confidence sets take the form of intervals and show they can be implemented using standard methods for solving CGE models. We present an application to a CGE model of the Moroccan economy to study the effects of policy-induced increases of transfers from Moroccan expatriates.

Tests of Conditional Asset Pricing Models in the Brazilian Stock Market

In this paper, we test a version of the conditional CAPM with respect to a local market portfolio, proxied by the Brazilian stock index during the 1976-1992 period. We also test a conditional APT model by using the difference between the 30-day rate (Cdb) and the overnight rate as a second factor in addition to the market portfolio in order to capture the large inflation risk present during this period. The conditional CAPM and APT models are estimated by the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) and tested on a set of size portfolios created from a total of 25 securities exchanged on the Brazilian markets. The inclusion of this second factor proves to be crucial for the appropriate pricing of the portfolios.

Coherent Cost-Sharing Rules

We reconsider the discrete version of the axiomatic cost-sharing model. We propose a condition of (informational) coherence requiring that not all informational refinements of a given problem be solved differently from the original problem. We prove that strictly coherent linear cost-sharing rules must be simple random-order rules.