Social Norms and Rationality of Choice

Ever since Sen (1993) criticized the notion of internal consistency of choice, there exists a wide spread perception that the standard rationalizability approach to the theory of choice has difficulties coping with the existence of external social norms. This paper introduces a concept of norm-conditional rationalizability and shows that external social norms can be accommodated so as to be compatible with norm-conditional rationalizability by means of suitably modified revealed preference axioms in the theory of rational choice on general domains à la Richter (1966;1971) and Hansson (1968)

Infinite-Horizon Choice Functions

We analyze infinite-horizon choice functions within the setting of a simple linear technology. Time consistency and efficiency are characterized by stationary consumption and inheritance functions, as well as a transversality condition. In addition, we consider the equity axioms Suppes-Sen, Pigou-Dalton, and resource monotonicity. We show that Suppes-Sen and Pigou-Dalton imply that the consumption and inheritance functions are monotone with respect to time—thus justifying sustainability—while resource monotonicity implies that the consumption and inheritance functions are monotone with respect to the resource. Examples illustrate the characterization results.

A Characterization of Consistent Collective Choice Rules

We characterize a class of collective choice rules such that collective preference relations are consistent. Consistency is a weakening of transitivity and a strengthening of acyclicity requiring that there be no cycles with at least one strict preference. The properties used in our characterization are unrestricted domain, strong Pareto, anonymity and neutrality. If there are at most as many individuals as there are alternatives, the axioms provide an alternative characterization of the Pareto rule. If there are more individuals than alternatives, however, further rules become available.

Non-Deteriorating Choice without Full Transitivity

Although the theory of greatest-element rationalizability and maximal-element rationalizability under general domains and without full transitivity of rationalizing relations is well-developed in the literature, these standard notions of rational choice are often considered to be too demanding. An alternative definition of rationality of choice is that of non-deteriorating choice, which requires that the chosen alternatives must be judged at least as good as a reference alternative. In game theory, this definition is well-known under the name of individual rationality when the reference alternative is construed to be the status quo. This alternative form of rationality of individual and social choice is characterized in this paper on general domains and without full transitivity of rationalizing relations.

Single-Peaked Choice

Single-peaked preferences have played an important role in the literature ever since they were used by Black (1948) to formulate a domain restriction that is sufficient for the exclusion of cycles according to the majority rule. In this paper, we approach single-peakedness from a choice-theoretic perspective. We show that the well-known axiom independence of irrelevant alternatives (a form of contraction consistency) and a weak continuity requirement characterize a class of single-peaked choice functions. Moreover, we examine the rationalizability and the rationalizability-representability of these choice functions.

Self-Selective Social Choice Functions

It is not uncommon that a society facing a choice problem has also to choose the choice rule itself. In such situation voters’ preferences on alternatives induce preferences over the voting rules. Such a setting immediately gives rise to a natural question concerning consistency between these two levels of choice. If a choice rule employed to resolve the society’s original choice problem does not choose itself when it is also used in choosing the choice rule, then this phenomenon can be regarded as inconsistency of this choice rule as it rejects itself according to its own rationale. Koray (2000) proved that the only neutral, unanimous universally self-selective social choice functions are the dictatorial ones. Here we in troduce to our society a constitution, which rules out inefficient social choice rules. When inefficient social choice rules become unavailable for comparison, the property of self-selectivity becomes weaker and we show that some non-trivial self-selective social choice functions do exist. Under certain assumptions on the constitution we describe all of them.

Multi-Profile Intergenerational Social Choice

Ferejohn and Page transplanted a stationarity axiom from Koopmans’ theory of impatience into Arrow’s social choice theory with an infinite horizon and showed that the Arrow axioms and stationarity lead to a dictatorship by the first generation. We prove that the negative implications of their stationarity axiom are more far-reaching: there is no Arrow social welfare function satisfying their stationarity axiom. We propose a more suitable stationarity axiom, and show that an Arrow social welfare function satisfies this modified version if and only if it is a lexicographic dictatorship where the generations are taken into consideration in chronological order.

Toward a rational-choice foundation of non-additive theories

A classical argument of de Finetti holds that Rationality implies Subjective Expected Utility (SEU). In contrast, the Knightian distinction between Risk and Ambiguity suggests that a rational decision maker would obey the SEU paradigm when the information available is in some sense good, and would depart from it when the information available is not good. Unlike de Finetti's, however, this view does not rely on a formal argument. In this paper, we study the set of all information structures that might be availabe to a decision maker, and show that they are of two types: those compatible with SEU theory and those for which SEU theory must fail. We also show that the former correspond to "good" information, while the latter correspond to information that is not good. Thus, our results provide a formalization of the distinction between Risk and Ambiguity. As a consequence of our main theorem (Theorem 2, Section 8), behavior not-conforming to SEU theory is bound to emerge in the presence of Ambiguity. We give two examples of situations of Ambiguity. One concerns the uncertainty on the class of measure zero events, the other is a variation on Ellberg's three-color urn experiment. We also briefly link our results to two other strands of literature: the study of ambiguous events and the problem of unforeseen contingencies. We conclude the paper by re-considering de Finetti's argument in light of our findings.

School Choice with Control

Controlled choice over public schools is a common policy of school boards in the United States. It attempts giving choice to parents while maintaining racial and ethnic balance at schools. This paper provides a foundation for controlled school choice programs. We develop a natural notion of fairness and show that assignments, which are fair for same type students and constrained non-wasteful, always exist in controlled choice problems; a "controlled" version of the student proposing deferred acceptance algorithm (CDAA) always finds such an assignment which is also weakly Pareto-optimal. CDAA provides a practical solution for controlled school choice programs.

Exploring food choice as social practice : appreciating the context of family feeding in Kahnawake, Québec, Canada

De nous jours, les modèles se référant aux comportements individuels représentent la pensée dominante pour comprendre les choix alimentaires dans le domaine de la nutrition en santé publique. Ces modèles conceptualisent les choix alimentaires comme un comportement de consommation décidé de façon rationnelle par des individus, en réponse aux multiples déterminants personnels et environnementaux. Même si ces modèles sont utiles pour décrire les déterminants des comportements individuels d’alimentation, ils ne peuvent expliquer les choix alimentaires en tant que processus social façonné en fonction des individus et des lieux, dans des contextes diversifiés. Cette thèse élabore le Cadre Conceptuel sur la Pratique des Choix Alimentaires afin d’explorer les choix alimentaires comme phénomène social. En utilisant le concept de pratique sociale, les choix alimentaires des individus symbolisent une relation récursive entre la structure sociale et l’agence. Ce cadre conceptuel nous donne un moyen d’identifier les choix alimentaires comme des activités sociales modelées sur la vie de tous les jours et la constituant. Il offre des concepts pour identifier la manière dont les structures sociales renforcent les activités routinières menant aux choix alimentaires. La structure sociale est examinée en utilisant les règles et les ressources de Giddens et est opérationnalisée de la façon suivante : systèmes de significations partagées, normes sociales, ressources matérielles et ressources d'autorité qui permettent ou empêchent les choix alimentaires désirés. Les résultats empiriques de deux études présentées dans cette thèse appuient la proposition que les choix alimentaires sont des pratiques sociales. La première étude examine les pratiques de choix alimentaires au sein des familles. Nous avons identifié les choix alimentaires comme cinq activités routinières distinctes intégrées dans la vie familiale de tous les jours à partir d’analyses réalisées sur les activités d’alimentation habituelles de 20 familles avec de jeunes enfants. Notre seconde étude a élaboré les règles et les ressources des pratiques alimentaires à partir des familles de l’étude. Ensuite, nous avons analysé la façon dont les règles et les ressources pouvaient expliquer les pratiques de choix alimentaires qui sont renforcées ou limitées au sein des familles lors de la routine spécifique à la préparation des repas et de la collation. Les ressources matérielles et d'autorité suffisantes ont permis d’expliquer les pratiques de choix alimentaires qui étaient facilitées, alors que les défis pouvaient être compris comme etant reliés à des ressources limitées. Les règles pouvaient empêcher ou faciliter les pratiques de choix alimentaires par l’entremise de normes ou de significations associées à la préparation de repas. Les données empiriques provenant de cette thèse appuient les choix alimentaires comme étant des activités routinières qui sont structurées socialement et qui caractérisent les familles. Selon la théorie de la structuration de Giddens, les pratiques routinières qui persistent dans le temps forment les institutions sociales. Ainsi, les pratiques routinières de choix alimentaires façonnent les styles d’habitudes alimentaires familiales et contribuent par ailleurs à la constitution des familles elles-mêmes. Cette compréhension identifie de nouvelles directions concernant la façon dont les choix alimentaires sont conceptualisés en santé publique. Les programmes de promotion de la santé destinés à améliorer la nutrition sont des stratégies clés pour prévenir les maladies chroniques et pour améliorer la santé populationnelle. Les choix alimentaires peuvent être abordés comme des activités partagées qui décrivent des groupes sociaux et qui sont socialement structurés par des règles et des ressources présentes dans les contextes de pratiques de choix alimentaires.

Revealed Preference and Choice under Uncertainty

We employ the theory of rational choice to examine whether observable choices from feasible sets of prospects can be generated by the optimization of some underlying decision criterion under uncertainty. Rather than focusing on a specific theory of choice, our objective is to formulate a general approach that is designed to cover the various decision criteria that have been proposed in the literature. We use a mild dominance property to define a class of suitable choice criteria. In addition to rationalizability per se, we characterize transitive and Suzumura consistent rationalizability in the presence of dominance.