How Much Inflation is Necessary to Grease the Wheels?

This paper studies Tobin's proposition that inflation "greases" the wheels of the labor market. The analysis is carried out using a simple dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with asymmetric wage adjustment costs. Optimal inflation is determined by a benevolent government that maximizes the households' welfare. The Simulated Method of Moments is used to estimate the nonlinear model based on its second-order approximation. Econometric results indicate that nominal wages are downwardly rigid and that the optimal level of grease inflation for the U.S. economy is about 1.2 percent per year, with a 95% confidence interval ranging from 0.2 to 1.6 percent.

Do Inflation-Targeting Central Banks Implicitly Target the Price Level?

This paper reports graphical and statistical evidence that the inflation targeting regimes in Canada and the UK - but not in Australia, New Zealand, or Sweden - actually resemble price-level targeting. In particular, the price level closely tracks the path implied by the inflation target, and the time-series predictions of the "bygones-are-bygones" version of inflation targeting are rejected by the data in favor of those implied by price-level targeting. These results indicate heterogeneity in the actual application of inflation targeting across countries and, for Canada and the UK, imply that the characterization of inflation targeting as a policy where shocks are accommodated is at odds with the data. Moreover, up to extent that their current policies already resemble price-level targeting, the welfare gains of replacing inflation with (explicit) price-level targeting are likely to be small.

La fiscalité et l'inflation au Rwanda: Une analyse empirique basée sur le modèle à correction d'erreur.

Rapport de recherche présenté à la Faculté des arts et des sciences en vue de l'obtenion du grade de Maîtrise en sciences économiques.

International Business Cycles: What Are the Facts?

Modern business cycle theory involves developing models that explain stylized facts. For this strategy to be successful, these facts should be well established. In this paper, we focus on the stylized facts of international business cycles. We use the generalized method of moments and quarterly data from nineteen industrialized countries to estimate pairwise cross-country and within-country correlations of macroeconomic aggregates. We calculate standard errors of the statistics for our unique panel of data and test hypotheses about the relative sizes of these correlations. We find a lower cross-country correlation of all aggregates and especially of consumption than in previous studies. The cross-country correlations of consumption, output and Solow residuals are not significantly different from one another over the whole sample, but there are significant differences in the post-1973 subsample.

International Transmission of the Business Cycle in a Multi-Sector Model.

Multi-country models have not been very successful in replicating important features of the international transmission of business cycles. Standard models predict cross-country correlations of output and consumption which are respectively too low and too high. In this paper, we build a multi-country model of the business cycle with multiple sectors in order to analyze the role of sectoral shocks in the international transmission of the business cycle. We find that a model with multiple sectors generates a higher cross-country correlation of output than standard one-sector models, and a lower cross-country correlation of consumption. In addition, it predicts cross-country correlations of employment and investment that are closer to the data than the standard model. We also analyze the relative effects of multiple sectors, trade in intermediate goods, imperfect substitution between domestic and foreign goods, home preference, capital adjustment costs, and capital depreciation on the international transmission of the business cycle.

A Prudent Central Banker

This paper studies monetary policy in an economy where the central banker's preferences are asymmetric around optimal inflation. In particular, positive deviations from the optimum can be weighted more, or less, severely than negative deviations in the policy maker's loss function. It is shown that under asymmetric preferences, uncertainty can induce a prudent behavior on the part of the central banker. Since the prudence motive can be large enough to override the inflation bias, optimal monetary policy could be implemented even in the absence of rules, reputation, or contractual mechanisms. For certain parameter values, a deflationary bias can arise in equilibrium.

La Theorie Generale du Markup: une Critique des Post-Keynesiens Americains

Cet Article Se Divise En Trois Sections: la Premiere Contient une Critique de Certains Post-Keynesiens, Notamment Americains, Concernant Leur Hypothese de la Rigidite du Markup Dans la Relation Prix-Salaires. Contrairement a Kalecki Qui Admettait Volontiers la Flexibilite du Markup Face a la Rigidite des Prix et des Salaires, on Demontre Que la Position des Post-Keynesiens Americains N'est Qu'une Variante de L'approche Monetariste. la Deuxieme Section Contient une Generalisation de L'hypothese de la Variabilite du Markup Causee Par Tous les Facteurs de Production, Notamment la Variabilite Provenant des Mouvements de Capital Reel et Financier. En Utilisant les Donnees Annuelles Pour L'ensemble des Industries Canadienne Entre 1973 et 1982, on Estime Dans la Derniere Section Que les Couts Salariaux au Canada Ne Sont Responsables Que de 16% de L'inflation au Cours de la Derniere Decennie Alors Que les Couts du Capital Reel et Financier Compte Pour 84% de la Hausse des Prix.

Termes de l'échange endogènes et cycles économiques réels : une application à la Côte-d'Ivoire

À l’aide d’un modèle de cycles réels, la présente étude vise à expliquer, de façon endogène, les fluctuations des termes de l’échange en Côte-d’Ivoire. Pour ce faire, nous cherchons principalement à répondre aux deux questions suivantes : les chocs d’offre et de demande sur le marché d’exportation suffisent-ils à expliquer les variations des termes de l’échange? Et quelle est leur importance relative dans la dynamique des termes de l’échange? Les résultats montrent que les deux chocs considérés expliquent bien la volatilité des termes de l’échange. Nous avons noté que ces deux sources d’impulsions ont un impact significatif sur les fluctuations économiques en Côte-d’Ivoire.

Étude de l'efficacité de la dévaluation du franc CFA au Bénin

This paper examines the effectiveness of CFA franc devaluation in Benin. Our results show that the nominal devaluation generate a real exchange depreciation, thanks to strict anti-inflation measures implemented.

Credibility and Signaling in Disinflation- a Cross Country Examination

This paper develops a model of money demand where the opportunity cost of holding money is subject to regime changes. The regimes are fully characterized by the mean and variance of inflation and are assumed to be the result of alternative government policies. Agents are unable to directly observe whether government actions are indeed consistent with the inflation rate targeted as part of a stabilization program but can construct probability inferences on the basis of available observations of inflation and money growth. Government announcements are assumed to provide agents with additional, possibly truthful information regarding the regime. This specification is estimated and tested using data from the Israeli and Argentine high inflation periods. Results indicate the successful stabilization program implemented in Israel in July 1985 was more credible than either the earlier Israeli attempt in November 1984 or the Argentine programs. Government’s signaling might substantially simplify the inference problem and increase the speed of learning on the part of the agents. However, under certain conditions, it might increase the volatility of inflation. After the introduction of an inflation stabilization plan, the welfare gains from a temporary increase in real balances might be high enough to induce agents to raise their real balances in the short-term, even if they are uncertain about the nature of government policy and the eventual outcome of the stabilization attempt. Statistically, the model restrictions cannot be rejected at the 1% significance level.