Non-Deteriorating Choice

We analyze an alternative to the standard rationalizability requirement for observed choices by considering non-deteriorating selections. A selection function is a generalization of a choice function where selected alternatives may depend on a reference (or status quo) alternative in addition to the set of feasible options. A selection function is non-deteriorating if there exists an ordering over the universal set of alternatives such that the selected alternatives are at least as good as the reference option. We characterize non-deteriorating selection functions in an abstract framework and in an economic environment.

Ranking Sets of Objects

We provide a survey of the literature on ranking sets of objects. The interpretations of those set rankings include those employed in the theory of choice under complete uncertainty, rankings of opportunity sets, set rankings that appear in matching theory, and the structure of assembly preferences. The survey is prepared for the Handbook of Utility Theory, vol. 2, edited by Salvador Barberà, Peter Hammond, and Christian Seidl, to be published by Kluwer Academic Publishers. The chapter number is provisional.

What Is a Commody? Two Axiomatic Anwers

We identify conditions under which preferences over sets of consumption opportunities can be reduced to preferences over bundles of \"commodities\". We distinguish ordinal bundles, whose coordinates are defined up to monotone transformations, from cardinal bundles, whose coordinates are defined up to positive linear transformations only.

Logique et tests d'hypotheses: reflexions sur les problemes mal poses en econometrie

Dans ce texte, nous analysons les développements récents de l’économétrie à la lumière de la théorie des tests statistiques. Nous revoyons d’abord quelques principes fondamentaux de philosophie des sciences et de théorie statistique, en mettant l’accent sur la parcimonie et la falsifiabilité comme critères d’évaluation des modèles, sur le rôle de la théorie des tests comme formalisation du principe de falsification de modèles probabilistes, ainsi que sur la justification logique des notions de base de la théorie des tests (tel le niveau d’un test). Nous montrons ensuite que certaines des méthodes statistiques et économétriques les plus utilisées sont fondamentalement inappropriées pour les problèmes et modèles considérés, tandis que de nombreuses hypothèses, pour lesquelles des procédures de test sont communément proposées, ne sont en fait pas du tout testables. De telles situations conduisent à des problèmes statistiques mal posés. Nous analysons quelques cas particuliers de tels problèmes : (1) la construction d’intervalles de confiance dans le cadre de modèles structurels qui posent des problèmes d’identification; (2) la construction de tests pour des hypothèses non paramétriques, incluant la construction de procédures robustes à l’hétéroscédasticité, à la non-normalité ou à la spécification dynamique. Nous indiquons que ces difficultés proviennent souvent de l’ambition d’affaiblir les conditions de régularité nécessaires à toute analyse statistique ainsi que d’une utilisation inappropriée de résultats de théorie distributionnelle asymptotique. Enfin, nous soulignons l’importance de formuler des hypothèses et modèles testables, et de proposer des techniques économétriques dont les propriétés sont démontrables dans les échantillons finis.

La finance islamique: fondements, theorie et realite.

L’Islam interdit le riba , mot arabe signifiant à la fois usure et intérêt. L’interdiction du rib figure dans la loi islamique, née dans l’Arabie du Moyen Âge. Elle est à la base de la finance islamique qui connut une expansion remarquable durant la deuxième moitié du XX e siècle. Nous nous interrogeons sur les origines de cette interdiction, sur les problèmes que connaît actuellement la finance islamique et sur ses perspectives d’avenir.

On the Political Economy of Sequential Reforms

This paper proposes an explanation for why efficient reforms are not carried out when losers have the power to block their implementation, even though compensating them is feasible. We construct a signaling model with two-sided incomplete information in which a government faces the task of sequentially implementing two reforms by bargaining with interest groups. The organization of interest groups is endogenous. Compensations are distortionary and government types differ in the concern about distortions. We show that, when compensations are allowed to be informative about the government’s type, there is a bias against the payment of compensations and the implementation of reforms. This is because paying high compensations today provides incentives for some interest groups to organize and oppose subsequent reforms with the only purpose of receiving a transfer. By paying lower compensations, governments attempt to prevent such interest groups from organizing. However, this comes at the cost of reforms being blocked by interest groups with relatively high losses.

Mesure du Progres Technique: Theories et Methodes

Ce Texte Constitue un Survol des Differentes Approches Destines a Mesurer le Progres Technique. Nous Utilisons une Notation Uniforme Tout au Long des Demonstrations Mathematiques et Nous Faisons Ressortir les Hypotheses Qui Rendent L'application des Methodes Proposees Envisageable et Qui En Limitent la Portee. les Diverses Approches Sont Regroupees D'apres une Classification Suggeree Par Diewert (1981) Selon Laquelle Deux Groupes Sont a Distinguer. le Premier Groupe Contient Toutes les Methodes Definissant le Progres Technique Comme le Taux de Croissance D'un Indice des Outputs Divise Par un Indice des Inputs (Approche de Divisia). L'autre Groupe Inclut Toutes les Methodes Definissant le Progres Technique Comme Etant le Deplacement D'une Fonction Representant la Technologie (Production, Cout, Distance). Ce Second Groupe Est Subdivise Entre L'approche Econometrique,La Theorie des Nombres Indices et L 'Approche Non Parametrique. une Liste des Pricipaux Economistes a Qui L'on Doit les Diverses Approches Est Fournie. Cependant Ce Survol Est Suffisamment Detaille Pour Etre Lu Sans Se Referer aux Articles Originaux.

The Transformation Problem : an Aleternative Solution with an Identical Aggregate Profit Rate in the Labor value and the Monetary Space.

The aim of this paper is to demonstrate that, even if Marx's solution to the transformation problem can be modified, his basic conclusions remain valid. the proposed alternative solution which is presented hare is based on the constraint of a common general profit rate in both spaces and a money wage level which will be determined simultaneously with prices.

The Wage Rate and the Profit Rate in the Price of Production Equation: a New Solution to an Old Problem

The aim of this paper is to demonstrate that, even if Marx's solution to the transformation problem can be modified, his basic concusions remain valid.

Reported Job Satisfaction : What Does It Mean?

By reporting his satisfaction with his job or any other experience, an individual does not communicate the number of utils that he feels. Instead, he expresses his posterior preference over available alternatives conditional on acquired knowledge of the past. This new interpretation of reported job satisfaction restores the power of microeconomic theory without denying the essential role of discrepancies between one’s situation and available opportunities. Posterior human wealth discrepancies are found to be the best predictor of reported job satisfaction. Static models of relative utility and other subjective well-being assumptions are all unambiguously rejected by the data, as well as an \"economic\" model in which job satisfaction is a measure of posterior human wealth. The \"posterior choice\" model readily explains why so many people usually report themselves as happy or satisfied, why both younger and older age groups are insensitive to current earning discrepancies, and why the past weighs more heavily than the present and the future.

Heterodox Inflation Stabilization in Argentina, Brazil, and Israel. A Historical Review and Some Stylized Facts

This article presents a review of the stabilization attempts in Argentina, Brazil, and Israel during the 1980’s. Earlier research is summarized and complemented with additional sources of contemporaneous information and a detailed analysis of institutional features. The examination of these episodes underscores the strong economic and empirical relationship between the governments’ fiscal policy and the rate of inflation.

Rigidité normale, dévaluation et équilibre général intertemporel

La présente étude analyse les effets dynamiques de la dévaluation du franc CFA, à l’aide d’un modèle monétaire d’équilibre général, intertemporel et multisectoriel. L’accent est particulièrement mis sur les interactions entre dévaluation et accumulation du capital. Dans le modèle, les effets du changement de parité passent par le marché du travail qui se caractérise par l’inertie du salaire nominal. Les résultats montrent que la dévaluation relance l’investissement, avec des effets expansionnistes sur l’activité économique. Le choc monétaire n’a eu qu’un impact limité sur les soldes budgétaire et commercial. Une mesure d’accompagnement telle que la réduction des salaires de la fonction publique améliore ces deux soldes mais déclenche un processus récessif.

Credibility and Signaling in Disinflation- a Cross Country Examination

This paper develops a model of money demand where the opportunity cost of holding money is subject to regime changes. The regimes are fully characterized by the mean and variance of inflation and are assumed to be the result of alternative government policies. Agents are unable to directly observe whether government actions are indeed consistent with the inflation rate targeted as part of a stabilization program but can construct probability inferences on the basis of available observations of inflation and money growth. Government announcements are assumed to provide agents with additional, possibly truthful information regarding the regime. This specification is estimated and tested using data from the Israeli and Argentine high inflation periods. Results indicate the successful stabilization program implemented in Israel in July 1985 was more credible than either the earlier Israeli attempt in November 1984 or the Argentine programs. Government’s signaling might substantially simplify the inference problem and increase the speed of learning on the part of the agents. However, under certain conditions, it might increase the volatility of inflation. After the introduction of an inflation stabilization plan, the welfare gains from a temporary increase in real balances might be high enough to induce agents to raise their real balances in the short-term, even if they are uncertain about the nature of government policy and the eventual outcome of the stabilization attempt. Statistically, the model restrictions cannot be rejected at the 1% significance level.

Political Influence, Economic Interests and Endogenous Tax Structure in a Computable Equilibrium Framework: with Applicatioon to the United States, 1973 and 1983

A full understanding of public affairs requires the ability to distinguish between the policies that voters would like the government to adopt, and the influence that different voters or group of voters actually exert in the democratic process. We consider the properties of a computable equilibrium model of a competitive political economy in which the economic interests of groups of voters and their effective influence on equilibrium policy outcomes can be explicitly distinguished and computed. The model incorporates an amended version of the GEMTAP tax model, and is calibrated to data for the United States for 1973 and 1983. Emphasis is placed on how the aggregation of GEMTAP households into groups within which economic and political behaviour is assumed homogeneous affects the numerical representation of interests and influence for representative members of each group. Experiments with the model suggest that the changes in both interests and influence are important parts of the story behind the evolution of U.S. tax policy in the decade after 1973.

Semi-Parametric Weak Instrument Regressions with an Application to the Risk-Return Trade-off

Recent work shows that a low correlation between the instruments and the included variables leads to serious inference problems. We extend the local-to-zero analysis of models with weak instruments to models with estimated instruments and regressors and with higher-order dependence between instruments and disturbances. This makes this framework applicable to linear models with expectation variables that are estimated non-parametrically. Two examples of such models are the risk-return trade-off in finance and the impact of inflation uncertainty on real economic activity. Results show that inference based on Lagrange Multiplier (LM) tests is more robust to weak instruments than Wald-based inference. Using LM confidence intervals leads us to conclude that no statistically significant risk premium is present in returns on the S&P 500 index, excess holding yields between 6-month and 3-month Treasury bills, or in yen-dollar spot returns.