The influence of physical attractiveness and gender on perceived competence of sportscasters

The media tends to represent female athletes as women first and athletes second (Koivula, 1 999). The present study investigated whether this same trend was present for female sportscasters, using a self-presentational framework. Self-presentation is the process by which people try to control how others see them (Leary, 1995). One factor that may influence the type of image they try to project is their roles held in society, including gender roles. The gender roles for a man include dominance, assertiveness, and masculinity, while the gender roles for a woman include nurturer, femininity, and attractiveness (Deaux & Major, 1 987). By contrast, sports broadcasters are expected to be knowledgeable, assertive, and competent. Research suggests that female sports broadcasters are seen as less competent and less persuasive than male sports broadcasters (Mitrook & Dorr, 2001; Ordman & Zillmann, 1994, Toro, 2005). One reason for this difference may be that the gender roles for a man are much more similar to those of a sportscaster, compared to those of a woman. Thus, there may be a conflict between the two roles for women. The present study investigated whether the gender and perceived attractiveness of sportscasters influenced the audience's perceptions of the level of competence that a sportscaster demonstrates. Two hundred and four male (n =75) and female (n =129) undergraduate students were recruited from a southern Ontario university to participate in the study. The average age of the male participants was 21 .23 years {SD =1 .60), and the average age for female participants was 20.67 years {SD = 1 .31). The age range for all participants was from 19 to 30 years {M = 20.87 years, SD = 1 .45). Af^er providing informed consent, participants randomly received one of four possible questionnaire packages. The participants answered the demographic questionnaire, and then proceeded to view the picture and read the script of a sports newscast. Next, based on the picture and script, the participants answered the competence questionnaire, assessing the general, sport specific, and overall competence of the sportscaster. Once participants had finished, they returned the package to the researcher and were thanked for their time. Data was analyzed using an ANOVA to determine if general sport competence differs with respect to gender and attractiveness of the sportscaster. Overall, the ANOVA was non-significant (p > .05), indicating no differences on the dependent variable based on gender (F (3, 194) = .631, p = .426), attractiveness (F (3, 194) = .070, p = .791), or the interaction of the two {F (3, 194) = .043,/? = .836). Although none of the study hypotheses were supported, the study provided some insight to the perceived competence of female sportscasters. It is possible that female sportscasters are now seen as competent in the area of sports. Sample characteristics could also have influenced these results; the participants in the current study were primarily physical education and kinesiology students, who had experience participating in physical activity with both men and women. Future research should investigate this issue further by using a video sportscast. It is possible that delivery characteristics such as voice quality or eye contact may also impact perceptions of sportscasters.

An investigation of the nature and role of historicality in the thought of Dilthey and Heidegger

Introduction The question of the meaning, methods and philosophical manifestations of history is currently rife with contention. The problem that I will address in an exposition of the thought of Wilhelm Dilthey and Martin Heidegger, centers around the intersubjectivity of an historical world. Specifically, there are two interconnected issues. First, since all knowledge occurs to a person from within his or her historical age how can any person in any age make truth claims? In order to answer this concern we must understand the essence and role of history. Yet how can we come to an individual understanding ofwhat history is when the meanings that we use are themselves historically enveloped? But can we, we who are well aware of the knowledge that archaeology has dredged up from old texts or even from 'living' monuments of past ages, really neglect to notice these artifacts that exist within and enrich our world? Charges of wilful blindness would arise if any attempt were made to suggest that certain things of our world did not come down to us from the past. Thus it appears more important 2 to determine what this 'past' is and therefore how history operates than to simply derail the possibility for historical understanding. Wilhelm Dilthey, the great German historicist from the 19th century, did not question the existence of historical artifacts as from the past, but in treating knowledge as one such artifact placed the onus on knowledge to show itself as true, or meaningful, in light ofthe fact that other historical periods relied on different facts and generated different truths or meanings. The problem for him was not just determining what the role of history is, but moreover to discover how knowledge could make any claim as true knowledge. As he stated, there is a problem of "historical anarchy"!' Martin Heidegger picked up these two strands of Dilthey's thought and wanted to answer the problem of truth and meaning in order to solve the problem of historicism. This problem underscored, perhaps for the first time, that societal presuppositions about the past and present oftheir era are not immutable. Penetrating to the core of the raison d'etre of the age was an historical reflection about the past which was now conceived as separated both temporally and attitudinally from the present. But further than this, Heidegger's focus on asking the question of the meaning of Being meant that history must be ontologically explicated not merely ontically treated. Heidegger hopes to remove barriers to a genuine ontology by II 1 3 including history into an assessment ofprevious philosophical systems. He does this in order that the question of Being be more fully explicated, which necessarily for him includes the question of the Being of history. One approach to the question ofwhat history is, given the information that we get from historical knowledge, is whether such knowledge can be formalized into a science. Additionally, we can approach the question of what the essence and role of history is by revealing its underlying characteristics, that is, by focussing on historicality. Thus we will begin with an expository look at Dilthey's conception of history and historicality. We will then explore these issues first in Heidegger's Being and Time, then in the third chapter his middle and later works. Finally, we shall examine how Heidegger's conception may reflect a development in the conception of historicality over Dilthey's historicism, and what such a conception means for a contemporary historical understanding. The problem of existing in a common world which is perceived only individually has been philosophically addressed in many forms. Escaping a pure subjectivist interpretation of 'reality' has occupied Western thinkers not only in order to discover metaphysical truths, but also to provide a foundation for politics and ethics. Many thinkers accept a solipsistic view as inevitable and reject attempts at justifying truth in an intersubjective world. The problem ofhistoricality raises similar problems. We 4 -. - - - - exist in a common historical age, presumably, yet are only aware ofthe historicity of the age through our own individual thoughts. Thus the question arises, do we actually exist within a common history or do we merely individually interpret this as communal? What is the reality of history, individual or communal? Dilthey answers this question by asserting a 'reality' to the historical age thus overcoming solipsism by encasing individual human experience within the historical horizon of the age. This however does nothing to address the epistemological concern over the discoverablity of truth. Heidegger, on the other hand, rejects a metaphysical construel of history and seeks to ground history first within the ontology ofDasein, and second, within the so called "sending" of Being. Thus there can be no solipsism for Heidegger because Dasein's Being is necessarily "cohistorical", Being-with-Others, and furthermore, this historical-Being-in-the-worldwith- Others is the horizon of Being over which truth can appear. Heidegger's solution to the problem of solipsism appears to satisfy that the world is not just a subjective idealist creation and also that one need not appeal to any universal measures of truth or presumed eternal verities. Thus in elucidating Heidegger's notion of history I will also confront the issues ofDasein's Being-alongside-things as well as the Being of Dasein as Being-in-the-world so that Dasein's historicality is explicated vis-a-vis the "sending of Being" (die Schicken des S eins).

X-ray diffraction from Al powder using energy dispersive technique

Using the energy dispersive x ...ray diffraction (EDXD) technique, the room temperature diffraction pattern of Al powder was obtained at diffraction angles ~ 30° and 50°. From the small angle diffraction pattern the average relative intensities (IR) of the (111), (200), and (220) lines were measured to be equal to 100, 62, and 32 respectively. From the large diffraction angle IR for the (220), (311+222), (400), (331+420), and (422) lines were measured to be 100,201,17,90, and 19.5 respectively. The diffraction pattern at those two angles were obtained at several higher temperatures to measure the change in the intensities of the Al lines. From the intensity changes the increase of the Debye- Waller temperature factor, i.e ~B(T), with respect to the value at room temperature was determined to be 0.6+0.1 at 250°C, 1.10+0.15 at 350°C, 1.45+0.20 at 450°C, and 2.20±0.35 at 550°C.