Idiosyncratic volatility around information release date

Several papers document idiosyncratic volatility is time-varying and many attempts have been made to reveal whether idiosyncratic risk is priced. This research studies behavior of idiosyncratic volatility around information release dates and also its relation with return after public announcement. The results indicate that when a company discloses specific information to the market, firm’s specific volatility level shifts and short-horizon event-induced volatility vary significantly however, the category to which the announcement belongs is not important in magnitude of change. This event-induced volatility is not small in size and should not be downplayed in event studies. Moreover, this study shows stocks with higher contemporaneous realized idiosyncratic volatility earn lower return after public announcement consistent with “divergence of opinion hypothesis”. While no significant relation is found between EGARCH estimated idiosyncratic volatility and return and also between one-month lagged idiosyncratic volatility and return presumably due to significant jump around public announcement both may provide some signals regarding future idiosyncratic volatility through their correlations with contemporaneous realized idiosyncratic volatility. Finally, the study show that positive relation between return and idiosyncratic volatility based on under-diversification is inadequate to explain all different scenarios and this negative relation after public announcement may provide a useful trading rule.

Low-Volatility Anomaly in Helsinki Stock Exchange

International research shows that low-volatility stocks have beaten high-volatility stocks in terms of returns for decades on multiple markets. This abbreviation from traditional risk-return framework is known as low-volatility anomaly. This study focuses on explaining the anomaly and finding how strongly it appears in NASDAQ OMX Helsinki stock exchange. Data consists of all listed companies starting from 2001 and ending close to 2015. Methodology follows closely Baker and Haugen (2012) by sorting companies into deciles according to 3-month volatility and then calculating monthly returns for these different volatility groups. Annualized return for the lowest volatility decile is 8.85 %, while highest volatility decile destroys wealth at rate of -19.96 % per annum. Results are parallel also in quintiles that represent larger amount of companies and thus dilute outliers. Observation period captures financial crisis of 2007-2008 and European debt crisis, which embodies as low main index annual return of 1 %, but at the same time proves the success of low-volatility strategy. Low-volatility anomaly is driven by multiple reasons such as leverage constrained trading and managerial incentives which both prompt to invest in risky assets, but behavioral matters also have major weight in maintaining the anomaly.