Evaluation of the multicriteria approval method for timber-harvesting group decision support

Abstract

Interaktiivisen oppimisympäristön kehittäminen sähkötekniikan laboratoriotyöskentelyyn

Teklab is a manufacturer of electrical workstations. One major client group for the workstations is schools.Recently Teklab has started to concentrate on offering laboratory packages instead of single workstations. Laboratory packages include e.g. workstations, furniture, assembly and maintenance program. Teklab is looking for ideas to create more value for the laboratory package. One possibility is to design an educationalintroduction package to electric laboratories. In this thesis basic research isdone by studying the teaching methods in use today. Also modern education technology is presented. The thesis analyses different technologies for the laboratory introduction package. The technologies are analysed e.g. by applicability and feasibility. As a result of the work, the introduction has been done using an interactive presentation system. The presentation uses a software program and wireless student handsets designed by Dolphin Interactive. As a part of the work, also the recreation of the Teklab devices' instruction manuals has been started. For the future work, a digital learning object is under work, and a laboratory test is planned.

Omistus, kontrolli ja päämies-agentti- ongelmat osakeyhtiössä

Tutkielman tavoitteena on selvittää osakeyhtiön määräysvaltasuhteet ja miten päämies-agentti- ongelmat vaikeuttavat määräysvallan käyttöä. Tutkimusmetodi on lainopillinen ja lähestyminen aiheeseen tapahtuu sekä yhtiöoikeudellisesta, että oikeustaloustieteellisestä näkökulmasta. Aineistona tutkielmassa käytetään lähinnä voimassa olevaa lainsäädäntöä ja oikeuskirjallisuutta. Päämies-agentti- ongelmalla tarkoitetaan osakeyhtiössä määräysvallan osittaista luisumista omistajalta (päämies) yritysjohdolle (agentti) tai vähemmistöomistajalta (päämies) kontrolloivalle omistajalle (agentti). Tärkeimpiä ongelman lähteitä ovat epäsymmetrinen informaatio ja intressiristiriidat yhtiön johdon ja omistajien välillä tai toisaalta yhtiötä lähellä olevien omistajien ja muiden omistajien välillä. Epäsymmetrinen informaatio luo osaltaan puitteet agenttitahojen opportunistiselle käyttäytymiselle. Ratkaisuja päämies-agentti- ongelmiin ovat ennen kaikkea päämiestahoja suojaava lainsäädäntö ja ulkoiset yritysjohtajien käyttäytymistä ohjaavat keinot, kuten erilaiset kannustinjärjestelmät ja hyvät hallintotavat. Kontrolloivien omistajien käyttäytymistä on puolestaan vaikea ohjata ja erilaisilla määräysvaltaa keskittävillä omistusrakenteilla onkin taipumus voimistaa päämies-agentti- ongelmien vaikutusta. Erityisiä tilanteita osaltaan luovat myös luonteiltaan erilaiset omistajatahot, kuten institutionaaliset omistajat.

Eduskuntaryhmien äänestyskoheesio vuosien 1991-2006 valtiopäivillä

Abstract: Voting cohesion in the Finnish Parliament during 1991-2006

[Kirja-arvostelu]

Kirjallisuusarvostelu

Characterization of fiber and vessel elements in pulp suspension images

The thesis is related to the topic of image-based characterization of fibers in pulp suspension during the papermaking process. Papermaking industry is focusing on process control optimization and automatization, which makes it possible to manufacture highquality products in a resource-efficient way. Being a part of the process control, pulp suspension analysis allows to predict and modify properties of the end product. This work is a part of the tree species identification task and focuses on analysis of fiber parameters in the pulp suspension at the wet stage of paper production. The existing machine vision methods for pulp characterization were investigated, and a method exploiting direction sensitive filtering, non-maximum suppression, hysteresis thresholding, tensor voting, and curve extraction from tensor maps was developed. Application of the method to the microscopic grayscale pulp images made it possible to detect curves corresponding to fibers in the pulp image and to compute their morphological characteristics. Performance of the method was evaluated based on the manually produced ground truth data. An accuracy of fiber characteristics estimation, including length, width, and curvature, for the acacia pulp images was found to be 84, 85, and 60% correspondingly.

Competitive Effects of Non-Controlling Minority Acquisitions – Sufficient to merit further EU merger regulation?

Partial ownership interests are a widespread phenomenon in modern corporate environment. Unless minority shareholding affords the target to exercise control over the target, they do currently not have to be notified to the European Commission under EU merger regime. However, economic research has long suggested that when linking competing or non-horizontally positioned undertakings particularly in industries with few competitors, minority shareholdings even far below the majority of shares or voting rights could lead to higher prices or lower output volumes to the detriment of consumers. The Commission has recognized this issue and proceeded to suggest an extension of the merger regime to catch also certain non-controlling minority acquisitions. Horizontal non-controlling minority shareholdings create a positive correlation between the sales revenues of the partial acquirer and target. Through the equity interest the acquirer will internalise a fraction, proportional to the financial rights attached to the shareholding, of the profit of the target. This will incentivise the acquirer to contribute to increasing the target’s business profits by increasing its own sales price (horizontal unilateral effects). When a minority stake is held in a vertically related or a conglomerate company, the minority acquirer could be allowed to hamper or eliminate the target’s rivals’ access either to inputs (input foreclosure) or customers (customer foreclosure), depending on which level of the supply chain the parties are (vertical unilateral effects). Under certain circumstances minority share acquisitions could also lessen competition because they facilitate collusion between companies active in the market (coordinated effects). Economic theory confirms that non-controlling minority shareholdings may under certain circumstances create anti-competitive effects that are unlikely to be remedies by pro-competitive effects. However, they are likely to be of less significant nature than anticompetitive effects created by full mergers. This derives fore mostly from the fact that a minority share acquirer carries all the costs associated with its unilateral action but will internalise only a fraction of the lost profits. This is likely to limit the acquirer’s incentive to raise price and the profitability of such behavior. Having in mind that the number of potentially problematic cases is expected to be next to negligible, the limited potential competitive effects of non-controlling minority share acquisitions cannot be seen to clearly merit extension of the scope of the EUMR. The system suggested by the Commission is particularly ill-fitted for such purpose given the clear lack of legal certainty and considerable administrative burden associated with it.