Managing Quality under Heterogeneous Consumer Demand and Product Quality, October 2005

Based on accepted advances in the marketing, economics, consumer behavior, and satisfaction literatures, we develop a micro-foundations model of a firm that needs to manage the quality of a product that is inherently heterogeneous in the presence of varying customer tastes or expectations for quality. Our model blends elements of the returns to quality, customer lifetime value, and service profit chain approaches to marketing. The model is then used to explain several empirical results pertaining to the marketing literature by explicitly articulating the trade-offs between customer satisfaction and costs (including opportunity costs) of quality. In this environment firms will find it optimal to allow some customers to go unsatisfied. We show that the relationship between the expected number of repeated purchases by an individual customer is endogenous to the choice of quality by the firm, indicating that the number of purchases cannot be chosen freely to estimate a customer’s lifetime value.

A Consumer's Guide to Fair Housing, 2004

Booklet produced by the Iowa Civil Rights Commission

Labeling Regulations and Segregation of First- and, Second-Generation Genetically Modified Products: Innovation Incentives and Welfare Effects, April 2005

We review some of the most significant issues and results on the economic effects of genetically modified (GM) product innovation, with emphasis on the question of GM labeling and the need for costly segregation and identity preservation activities. The analysis is organized around an explicit model that can accommodate the features of both first-generation and second-generation GM products. The model accounts for the proprietary nature of GM innovations and for the critical role of consumer preferences vis-à-vis GM products, as well as for the impacts of segregation and identity preservation and the effects of a mandatory GM labeling regulation. We also investigate briefly a novel question in this setting, the choice of “research direction”when both cost-reducing and quality-enhancing GM innovations are feasible.

Vertical Product Differentiation, Entry-Deterrence Strategies, and Entry Qualities, September 2005

We analyze the entry of a new product into a vertically differentiated market in which an entrant and an incumbent compete in prices. Here the entry-deterrence strategies of the incumbent firm rely on “limit qualities.” With a sequential choice of quality, a quality-dependent marginal production cost, and a fixed entry cost, we relate the entry-quality decision and the entry-deterrence strategies to the level of entry cost and the degree of consumer heterogeneity. Quality-dependent marginal production costs in the model entail the possibility of inferior-quality entry as well as an incumbent’s aggressive entry-deterrence strategies of increasing its quality level toward potential entry. Welfare evaluation confirms that social welfare is not necessarily improved when entry is encouraged rather than deterred.

The Regulatory Choice between a Label and a Minimum-Quality Standard, 2005

This paper revisits the issue of the regulatory choice between a mandatory label and a minimum-quality standard. When the cost of regulation is relatively low, we show that the socially optimal choice depends on the producers’ cost structure for complying with regulation and improving quality. Under a marginal cost for improving quality, the mandatory labeling is sufficient for reaching the socially optimal level of quality. Under a fixed cost for improving quality, we show that each instrument or the combination of both instruments may emerge at the equilibrium.

Health Information and the Choice of Fish Species: An Experiment Measuring the Impact of Risk and Benefit Information, April 2006

An experiment was conducted in France to evaluate the impact of health information on consumers’ choice between two different types of fish. Successive messages revealing risks (methylmercury) and benefits (omega-3s) of consuming the fish, along with consumption recommendations, were delivered. Results show a significant difference of reaction according to the order and type of information. The information about risks had a larger marginal impact on change in willingness to pay (WTP) than did the information about benefits. While the results show that detailed messages on risks/benefits, including recommendations for nutrition behavior, matter in the modification of WTP, 40% of respondents did not change their initial choices after the revelation of health information.

The Minimum Safety Standard, Consumers’ Information, and Competition, February 2007

This paper explores the effects of a standard influencing care choice. Firm(s) may increase the probability of offering safe products by incurring a cost. Under duopoly, they compete either in prices or in quantities. Under perfect information about safety for consumers, the selected standard that corrects a safety underinvestment is always compatible with competition. Safety over investment only emerges under competition in quantities and relatively low values of the cost. Under imperfect information about safety for consumers, the standard leads to a monopoly situation. However, for relatively large values of the cost, a standard cannot impede the market failure coming from the lack of information.

Consumer Advisory Bulletin, Health Privacy Act Takes Effect April 14, April 2003

The Attorney General’s Consumer Protection Division receives hundreds of calls and consumer complaints every year. Follow these tips to avoid unexpected expense and disappointments. This record is about: Health Privacy Act Takes Effect April 14

Consumer Advisory Bulletin, Tips for Buying a Used Car, June 2007

The Attorney General’s Consumer Protection Division receives hundreds of calls and consumer complaints every year. Follow these tips to avoid unexpected expense and disappointments. This record is about: Tips for Buying a Used Car

Consumer Advisory Bulletin, Rapid Tax-Refund Loans A very costly way to gain just a few days on tax refunds, January 2008

The Attorney General’s Consumer Protection Division receives hundreds of calls and consumer complaints every year. Follow these tips to avoid unexpected expense and disappointments. This record is about: Rapid Tax-Refund Loans A very costly way to gain just a few days on tax refunds.

Consumer Advisory Bulletin, Con-artists cash in on people's false hopes and wishful thinking, August 2007

The Attorney General’s Consumer Protection Division receives hundreds of calls and consumer complaints every year. Follow these tips to avoid unexpected expense and disappointments. This record is about: Con-artists cash in on people's false hopes and wishful thinking.

Consumer Advisory Bulletin, Prevent Home Repair Scams and Disputes, May 2007

The Attorney General’s Consumer Protection Division receives hundreds of calls and consumer complaints every year. Follow these tips to avoid unexpected expense and disappointments. This record is about: New Iowa “Foreclosure Hotline”

Consumer Advisory Bulletin, Prevent Home Repair Scams and Disputes, May 2007

The Attorney General’s Consumer Protection Division receives hundreds of calls and consumer complaints every year. Follow these tips to avoid unexpected expense and disappointments. This record is about: Prevent Home Repair Scams and Disputes

Consumer Advisory Bulletin, Sweepstakes Mail Threatens Older Iowans, April 2007

The Attorney General’s Consumer Protection Division receives hundreds of calls and consumer complaints every year. Follow these tips to avoid unexpected expense and disappointments. This record is about: Warning: Sweepstakes Mail Threatens Older Iowans

Consumer Advisory Bulletin, Alert: Consumer Scams after Storms or Floods, August 2007

The Attorney General’s Consumer Protection Division receives hundreds of calls and consumer complaints every year. Follow these tips to avoid unexpected expense and disappointments. This record is about: Alert: Consumer Scams after Storms or Floods