Westory Fire Agency, June 30, 2003

Other Audit Reports

Westory Fire Agency, Independent Auditor's Reports, Financial Statement and Required Supplementary Information, Schedule of Findings, June 30, 2004

Other Audit Reports - 28E Organizations

Report on the Special Investigation of the City of Mt. Vernon Fire Department, For the Period January 1, 2003 through March 31, 2005

Other Audit Reports - Special Investigation

The Regulatory Choice between a Label and a Minimum-Quality Standard, 2005

This paper revisits the issue of the regulatory choice between a mandatory label and a minimum-quality standard. When the cost of regulation is relatively low, we show that the socially optimal choice depends on the producers’ cost structure for complying with regulation and improving quality. Under a marginal cost for improving quality, the mandatory labeling is sufficient for reaching the socially optimal level of quality. Under a fixed cost for improving quality, we show that each instrument or the combination of both instruments may emerge at the equilibrium.

Westory Fire Agency, Independent Auditor's Reports, Financial Statement and Required Supplementary Information, Schedule of Findings, June 30, 2005

Other Audit Reports - 28E Organizations

Audit report on the Westory Fire Agency for the year ended June 30, 2006.

Audit report on the Westory Fire Agency for the year ended June 30, 2006.

The Minimum Safety Standard, Consumers’ Information, and Competition, February 2007

This paper explores the effects of a standard influencing care choice. Firm(s) may increase the probability of offering safe products by incurring a cost. Under duopoly, they compete either in prices or in quantities. Under perfect information about safety for consumers, the selected standard that corrects a safety underinvestment is always compatible with competition. Safety over investment only emerges under competition in quantities and relatively low values of the cost. Under imperfect information about safety for consumers, the standard leads to a monopoly situation. However, for relatively large values of the cost, a standard cannot impede the market failure coming from the lack of information.

Special investigation of the Haverhill Volunteer Fire Department for the period January 1, 2003 through January 29, 2007

Special investigation of the Haverhill Volunteer Fire Department for the period January 1, 2003 through January 29, 2007

Audit report on the Westory Fire Agency for the year ended June 30, 2007

Audit report on the Westory Fire Agency for the year ended June 30, 2007

Special investigation of the Searsboro Volunteer Fire/EMS Department for the period February 8, 2005 through September 21, 2008

Special investigation of the Searsboro Volunteer Fire/EMS Department for the period February 8, 2005 through September 21, 2008

Audit report on the Westory Fire Agency for the year ended June 30, 2008

Audit report on the Westory Fire Agency for the year ended June 30, 2008

Report on the City of Hills Fire Department, also known as Hills Fire Fighters, for the period July 1, 2006 through September 30, 2009

Report on the City of Hills Fire Department, also known as Hills Fire Fighters, for the period July 1, 2006 through September 30, 2009

Report on a special investigation of the Rodman Volunteer Fire Department and Park and Recreation Department for the period January 1, 2006 through September 30, 2009

Report on a special investigation of the Rodman Volunteer Fire Department and Park and Recreation Department for the period January 1, 2006 through September 30, 2009

Audit report on the Westory Fire Agency for the year ended June 30, 2009

Audit report on the Westory Fire Agency for the year ended June 30, 2009

Audit report on the Westory Fire Agency for the year ended June 30, 2010

Audit report on the Westory Fire Agency for the year ended June 30, 2010