Iowa Voter Guide, 2003

This Voter Guide is intended to help all eligible Iowans, regardless of health or physical disability, to register and vote on election day. This guide contains information on voter registration, voting accessibility, absentee voting and important election dates and deadlines. The Iowa Department for the Blind has an audio cassette version of this Voter Guide available for your convenience. NOTE: THIS VOTER GUIDE WAS VALID THROUGH 2003. IF YOU WANT THE CURRENT VOTER INFORMATION INCLUDING THE ABSENTEE BALLOT REQUEST FORM GO TO: http://www.sos.state.ia.us/elections/index.html

Labeling Regulations and Segregation of First- and, Second-Generation Genetically Modified Products: Innovation Incentives and Welfare Effects, April 2005

We review some of the most significant issues and results on the economic effects of genetically modified (GM) product innovation, with emphasis on the question of GM labeling and the need for costly segregation and identity preservation activities. The analysis is organized around an explicit model that can accommodate the features of both first-generation and second-generation GM products. The model accounts for the proprietary nature of GM innovations and for the critical role of consumer preferences vis-à-vis GM products, as well as for the impacts of segregation and identity preservation and the effects of a mandatory GM labeling regulation. We also investigate briefly a novel question in this setting, the choice of “research direction”when both cost-reducing and quality-enhancing GM innovations are feasible.

The Regulatory Choice between a Label and a Minimum-Quality Standard, 2005

This paper revisits the issue of the regulatory choice between a mandatory label and a minimum-quality standard. When the cost of regulation is relatively low, we show that the socially optimal choice depends on the producers’ cost structure for complying with regulation and improving quality. Under a marginal cost for improving quality, the mandatory labeling is sufficient for reaching the socially optimal level of quality. Under a fixed cost for improving quality, we show that each instrument or the combination of both instruments may emerge at the equilibrium.