Revisiting the Dollar-Euro Permanent Equilibrium Exchange Rate: Evidence from Multivariate Unobserved Components Models

We propose an alternative approach to obtaining a permanent equilibrium exchange rate (PEER), based on an unobserved components (UC) model. This approach offers a number of advantages over the conventional cointegration-based PEER. Firstly, we do not rely on the prerequisite that cointegration has to be found between the real exchange rate and macroeconomic fundamentals to obtain non-spurious long-run relationships and the PEER. Secondly, the impact that the permanent and transitory components of the macroeconomic fundamentals have on the real exchange rate can be modelled separately in the UC model. This is important for variables where the long and short-run effects may drive the real exchange rate in opposite directions, such as the relative government expenditure ratio. We also demonstrate that our proposed exchange rate models have good out-of sample forecasting properties. Our approach would be a useful technique for central banks to estimate the equilibrium exchange rate and to forecast the long-run movements of the exchange rate.

Does the euro dominate Central and Eastern European money markets?

The so-called German Dominance Hypothesis (GDH) claimed that Bundesbank policies were transmitted into other European Monetary System (EMS) interest rates during the pre-euro era. We reformulate this hypothesis for the Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries that are on the verge of accessing the eurozone. We test this \Euro Dominance Hypothesis (EDH)" in a novel way using a global vector autoregressive (GVAR) approach that combines country-speci c error correction models in a global system. We nd that euro area monetary policies are transmitted into CEE interest rates which provides evidence for monetary integration between the eurozone and CEE countries. Our framework also allows for introducing global monetary shocks to provide empirical evidence regarding the e ects of the recent nancial crisis on monetary integration in Europe.

The Forward Premium Puzzle and The Euro

This paper evaluates the forward premium puzzle using the Euro exchange rate. Unlike previous studies, our analysis utilizes time-varying parameter methods and is based on two approaches for evaluation of the puzzle; the traditional approach analyzing the sensitivity of interest rate differentials to the forward premium, and the other looking into deviations from the covered interest rate parity (CIRP) condition. Then we provide evidence that the forward premium puzzle indeed became more prominent around the time of the recent crisis periods such as the Lehman Shock and the Euro crisis. This is also shown to be consistent with a deterioration in the CIRP.

On the real effects of financial pressure: Evidence from euro area firm-level employment during the recent financial crisis.

Using a large panel of unquoted euro-area firms over the period 2003-11, this paper examines the impact of financial pressure on firms’ employment. The analysis finds evidence that financial pressure negatively affects firms’ employment decisions. This effect is stronger during the 2007-2009 financial crisis, especially for firms in the periphery area compared to their counterparts in the core European economies. We also find that impact of financial pressure on employment is more potent for firms classified as financially constrained and operating in periphery economies during the financial crisis.

An Empirical Assessment of Optimal Monetary Policy Delegation in the Euro Area

We estimate a New Keynesian DSGE model for the Euro area under alternative descriptions of monetary policy (discretion, commitment or a simple rule) after allowing for Markov switching in policy maker preferences and shock volatilities. This reveals that there have been several changes in Euro area policy making, with a strengthening of the anti-inflation stance in the early years of the ERM, which was then lost around the time of German reunification and only recovered following the turnoil in the ERM in 1992. The ECB does not appear to have been as conservative as aggregate Euro-area policy was under Bundesbank leadership, and its response to the financial crisis has been muted. The estimates also suggest that the most appropriate description of policy is that of discretion, with no evidence of commitment in the Euro-area. As a result although both ‘good luck’ and ‘good policy’ played a role in the moderation of inflation and output volatility in the Euro-area, the welfare gains would have been substantially higher had policy makers been able to commit. We consider a range of delegation schemes as devices to improve upon the discretionary outcome, and conclude that price level targeting would have achieved welfare levels close to those attained under commitment, even after accounting for the existence of the Zero Lower Bound on nominal interest rates.

Measuring the Euro-Dollar Permanent Equilibrium Exchange Rate using the Unobserved Components Model

This paper employs an unobserved component model that incorporates a set of economic fundamentals to obtain the Euro-Dollar permanent equilibrium exchange rates (PEER) for the period 1975Q1 to 2008Q4. The results show that for most of the sample period, the Euro-Dollar exchange rate closely followed the values implied by the PEER. The only significant deviations from the PEER occurred in the years immediately before and after the introduction of the single European currency. The forecasting exercise shows that incorporating economic fundamentals provides a better long-run exchange rate forecasting performance than a random walk process.

An Empirical Assessment of Optimal Monetary Policy Delegation in the Euro Area

We estimate a New Keynesian DSGE model for the Euro area under alternative descriptions of monetary policy (discretion, commitment or a simple rule) after allowing for Markov switching in policy maker preferences and shock volatilities. This reveals that there have been several changes in Euro area policy making, with a strengthening of the anti-inflation stance in the early years of the ERM, which was then lost around the time of German reunification and only recovered following the turnoil in the ERM in 1992. The ECB does not appear to have been as conservative as aggregate Euro-area policy was under Bundesbank leadership, and its response to the financial crisis has been muted. The estimates also suggest that the most appropriate description of policy is that of discretion, with no evidence of commitment in the Euro-area. As a result although both ‘good luck’ and ‘good policy’ played a role in the moderation of inflation and output volatility in the Euro-area, the welfare gains would have been substantially higher had policy makers been able to commit. We consider a range of delegation schemes as devices to improve upon the discretionary outcome, and conclude that price level targeting would have achieved welfare levels close to those attained under commitment, even after accounting for the existence of the Zero Lower Bound on nominal interest rates.

The EMU sovereign-debt crisis: Fundamentals, expectations and contagion

We offer a detailed empirical investigation of the European sovereign debt crisis based on the theoretical model by Arghyrou and Tsoukalas (2010). We find evidence of a marked shift in market pricing behaviour from a ‘convergence-trade’ model before August 2007 to one driven by macro-fundamentals and international risk thereafter. The majority of EMU countries have experienced contagion from Greece. There is no evidence of significant speculation effects originating from CDS markets. Finally, the escalation of the Greek debt crisis since November 2009 is confirmed as the result of an unfavourable shift in countryspecific market expectations. Our findings highlight the necessity of structural, competitiveness-inducing reforms in periphery EMU countries and institutional reforms at the EMU level enhancing intra-EMU economic monitoring and policy co-ordination.

Estimating Phillips Curves in Turbulent Times using the ECB’s Survey of Professional Forecasters

This paper uses forecasts from the European Central Bank's Survey of Professional Forecasters to investigate the relationship between inflation and inflation expectations in the euro area. We use theoretical structures based on the New Keynesian and Neoclassical Phillips curves to inform our empirical work. Given the relatively short data span of the Survey of Professional Forecasters and the need to control for many explanatory variables, we use dynamic model averaging in order to ensure a parsimonious econometric speci cation. We use both regression-based and VAR-based methods. We find no support for the backward looking behavior embedded in the Neo-classical Phillips curve. Much more support is found for the forward looking behavior of the New Keynesian Phillips curve, but most of this support is found after the beginning of the financial crisis.

The determinants of sovereign bond yield spreads in the EMU

We use a panel of euro area countries to assess the determinants of long-term sovereign bond yield spreads over the period 1999.01-2010.12. We find that, unlike the period preceding the global financial crisis, European government bond yield spreads are wellexplained by macro- and fiscal fundamentals over the crisis period. We also find that the menu of macro and fiscal risks priced by markets has been significantly enriched since March 2009, including the risk of the crisis’ transmission among EMU member states, international risk and liquidity risk. Finally, we find that sovereign credit ratings are statistically significant in explaining spreads, yet compared to macro- and fiscal fundamentals their role is limited.

Central banks and house prices in the run-up to the crisis

The financial crisis and the role played within it by fluctuations in house prices has reopened the debate about whether monetary policy should respond to asset prices. This paper investigates how the central banks of the euro area, the UK and the US considered, understood and responded to the trends in house prices in the six or seven years preceding the crisis, and how they have analysed those developments since the crisis. It suggests that these central banks, particularly the Anglo-Saxon ones, might have been able to take some useful action if they had devoted more intellectual resources to analysing the possible misalignments of house prices and been willing to act on them.

On the time-varying relationship between EMU sovereign spreads and their determinants

We use a dynamic multipath general-to-specific algorithm to capture structural instability in the link between euro area sovereign bond yield spreads against Germany and their underlying determinants over the period January 1999 – August 2011. We offer new evidence suggesting a significant heterogeneity across countries, both in terms of the risk factors determining spreads over time as well as in terms of the magnitude of their impact on spreads. Our findings suggest that the relationship between euro area sovereign risk and the underlying fundamentals is strongly timevarying, turning from inactive to active since the onset of the global financial crisis and further intensifying during the sovereign debt crisis. As a general rule, the set of financial and macro spreads’ determinants in the euro area is rather unstable but generally becomes richer and stronger in significance as the crisis evolves.

The Spillover Effects of Monitoring: A Field Experiment.

We provide field experimental evidence of the effects of monitoring in a context where productivity is multi-dimensional and only one dimension is monitored and incentivised. We hire students to do a job for us. The job consists of identifying euro coins. We study the effects of monitoring and penalising mistakes on work quality, and evaluate spillovers on non- incentivised dimensions of productivity (punctuality and theft). We .nd that monitoring improves work quality only if incentives are large, but reduces punctuality substantially irrespectively of the size of incentives. Monitoring does not affect theft, with ten per cent of participants stealing overall. Our setting also allows us to disentangle between possible theoretical mechanisms driving the adverse effects of monitoring. Our .ndings are supportive of a reciprocity mechanism, whereby workers retaliate for being distrusted.

Model Uncertainty in Panel Vector Autoregressive Models.

We develop methods for Bayesian model averaging (BMA) or selection (BMS) in Panel Vector Autoregressions (PVARs). Our approach allows us to select between or average over all possible combinations of restricted PVARs where the restrictions involve interdependencies between and heterogeneities across cross-sectional units. The resulting BMA framework can find a parsimonious PVAR specification, thus dealing with overparameterization concerns. We use these methods in an application involving the euro area sovereign debt crisis and show that our methods perform better than alternatives. Our findings contradict a simple view of the sovereign debt crisis which divides the euro zone into groups of core and peripheral countries and worries about financial contagion within the latter group.

Model Uncertainty in Panel Vector Autoregressive Models.

We develop methods for Bayesian model averaging (BMA) or selection (BMS) in Panel Vector Autoregressions (PVARs). Our approach allows us to select between or average over all possible combinations of restricted PVARs where the restrictions involve interdependencies between and heterogeneities across cross-sectional units. The resulting BMA framework can find a parsimonious PVAR specification, thus dealing with overparameterization concerns. We use these methods in an application involving the euro area sovereign debt crisis and show that our methods perform better than alternatives. Our findings contradict a simple view of the sovereign debt crisis which divides the euro zone into groups of core and peripheral countries and worries about financial contagion within the latter group.