Payoff levels, loss avoidance, and equilibrium selection in the Stag Hunt: an experimental study

Game theorists typically assume that changing a game’s payoff levels—by adding the same constant to, or subtracting it from, all payoffs—should not affect behavior. While this invariance is an implication of the theory when payoffs mirror expected utilities, it is an empirical question when the “payoffs” are actually money amounts. In particular, if individuals treat monetary gains and losses differently, then payoff–level changes may matter when they result in positive payoffs becoming negative, or vice versa. We report the results of a human–subjects experiment designed to test for two types of loss avoidance: certain–loss avoidance (avoiding a strategy leading to a sure loss, in favor of an alternative that might lead to a gain) and possible–loss avoidance (avoiding a strategy leading to a possible loss, in favor of an alternative that leads to a sure gain). Subjects in the experiment play three versions of Stag Hunt, which are identical up to the level of payoffs, under a variety of treatments. We find differences in behavior across the three versions of Stag Hunt; these differences are hard to detect in the first round of play, but grow over time. When significant, the differences we find are in the direction predicted by certain– and possible–loss avoidance. Our results carry implications for games with multiple equilibria, and for theories that attempt to select among equilibria in such games.

Expert Information and Majority Decisions

This paper studies dichotomous majority voting in common interest committees where each member receives not only a private signal but also a public signal observed by all of them. The public signal represents, e.g. expert information presented to an entire committee and its quality is higher than that of each individual private signal. We identify two informative symmetric strategy equilibria, namely i) the mixed strategy equilibrium where each member randomizes between following the private and public signals should they disagree; and ii) the pure strategy equilibrium where they follow the public signal for certain. The former outperforms the latter. The presence of the public signal precludes the equilibrium where every member follows their own signal, which is an equilibrium in the absence of the public signal. The mixed strategy equilibrium in the presence of the public signal outperforms the sincere voting equilibrium without the public signal, but the latter may be more efficient than the pure strategy equilibrium in the presence of the public signal. We suggest that whether expert information improves committee decision making depends on equilibrium selection.

Expectations Traps and Coordination Failures with Discretionary Policymaking

Discretionary policymakers cannot manage private-sector expectations and cannot coordinate the actions of future policymakers. As a consequence, expectations traps and coordination failures can occur and multiple equilibria can arise. To utilize the explanatory power of models with multiple equilibria it is first necessary to understand how an economy arrives to a particular equilibrium. In this paper we employ notions of learnability and self-enforceability to motivate and identify equilibria of particular interest. Central among these criteria are whether the equilibrium is learnable by private agents and jointly learnable by private agents and the policymaker. We use two New Keynesian policy models to identify the strategic interactions that give rise to multiple equilibria and to illustrate our methods for identifying equilibria of interest. Importantly, unless the Pareto-preferred equilibrium is learnable by private agents, we find little reason to expect coordination on that equilibrium.

Efficient Nash Equilibrium under Adverse Selection

This paper revisits the problem of adverse selection in the insurance market of Rothschild and Stiglitz [28]. We propose a simple extension of the game-theoretic structure in Hellwig [14] under which Nash-type strategic interaction between the informed customers and the uninformed firms results always in a particular separating equilibrium. The equilibrium allocation is unique and Pareto-efficient in the interim sense subject to incentive-compatibility and individual rationality. In fact, it is the unique neutral optimum in the sense of Myerson [22].

Baysian Model Averaging, Learning and Model Selection

Agents have two forecasting models, one consistent with the unique rational expectations equilibrium, another that assumes a time-varying parameter structure. When agents use Bayesian updating to choose between models in a self-referential system, we find that learning dynamics lead to selection of one of the two models. However, there are parameter regions for which the non-rational forecasting model is selected in the long-run. A key structural parameter governing outcomes measures the degree of expectations feedback in Muth's model of price determination.

Can Migrants save Greece from Ageing? A Computable General Equilibrium Approach using G-AMOS.

The population of Greece is projected to age in the course of the next three decades. This paper combines demographic projections with a multi-period economic Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) modelling framework to assess the macroeconomic impact of these future demographic trends. The simulation strategy adopted in Lisenkova et. al. (2008) is also employed here. The size and age composition of the population in the future depends on current and future values of demographic parameters such as the fertility, mortality rates and the level of annual net migration. We use FIV-FIV software in order to project population changes for 30 years. Total population and working age population changes are introduced to the GAMOS modelling framework calibrated for the Greek economy for the year 2004. Positive net migration is able to cancel the negative impacts of an ageing population that would otherwise occur as a result of the shrinking of the labour force. The policy implication is that a viable, long-lasting migration policy should be implemented, while the importance of policies that could increase fertility should also be considered.

A computable general equilibrium analysis of the relative price sensitivity required to induce rebound effects in response to an improvement in energy efficiency in the UK economy

In recent years there has been extensive debate in the energy economics and policy literature on the likely impacts of improvements in energy efficiency. This debate has focussed on the notion of rebound effects. Rebound effects occur when improvements in energy efficiency actually stimulate the direct and indirect demand for energy in production and/or consumption. This phenomenon occurs through the impact of the increased efficiency on the effective, or implicit, price of energy. If demand is stimulated in this way, the anticipated reduction in energy use, and the consequent environmental benefits, will be partially or possibly even more than wholly (in the case of ‘backfire’ effects) offset. A recent report published by the UK House of Lords identifies rebound effects as a plausible explanation as to why recent improvements in energy efficiency in the UK have not translated to reductions in energy demand at the macroeconomic level, but calls for empirical investigation of the factors that govern the extent of such effects. Undoubtedly the single most important conclusion of recent analysis in the UK, led by the UK Energy Research Centre (UKERC) is that the extent of rebound and backfire effects is always and everywhere an empirical issue. It is simply not possible to determine the degree of rebound and backfire from theoretical considerations alone, notwithstanding the claims of some contributors to the debate. In particular, theoretical analysis cannot rule out backfire. Nor, strictly, can theoretical considerations alone rule out the other limiting case, of zero rebound, that a narrow engineering approach would imply. In this paper we use a computable general equilibrium (CGE) framework to investigate the conditions under which rebound effects may occur in the Scottish regional and UK national economies. Previous work has suggested that rebound effects will occur even where key elasticities of substitution in production are set close to zero. Here, we carry out a systematic sensitivity analysis, where we gradually introduce relative price sensitivity into the system, focusing in particular on elasticities of substitution in production and trade parameters, in order to determine conditions under which rebound effects become a likely outcome. We find that, while there is positive pressure for rebound effects even where (direct and indirect) demand for energy is very price inelastic, this may be partially or wholly offset by negative income and disinvestment effects, which also occur in response to falling energy prices.

Labour Market Imperfections, International Integration and Selection

Although a large body of literature has focused on the effects of intra-firm differences on export performance, relatively little attention has been devoted to the interaction between firms' selection and international performance and labour market institutions - in contrast with the centrality of the latter to current policy and public debates on the implications of economic globalisation for national policies and institutions. In this paper, we study the effects of labour market unionisation on the process of competitive selection between heterogeneous firms and analyse how the interaction between the two is affected by trade liberalisation between countries with different unionisation patterns.

A comparison of results from MRIO and interregional computable general equilibrium (CGE) analyses of the impacts of a positive demand shock on the ‘CO2 trade balance’ between Scotland and the rest of the UK

In previous work we have applied the environmental multi-region input-output (MRIO) method proposed by Turner et al (2007) to examine the ‘CO2 trade balance’ between Scotland and the Rest of the UK. In McGregor et al (2008) we construct an interregional economy-environment input-output (IO) and social accounting matrix (SAM) framework that allows us to investigate methods of attributing responsibility for pollution generation in the UK at the regional level. This facilitates analysis of the nature and significance of environmental spillovers and the existence of an environmental ‘trade balance’ between regions. While the existence of significant data problems mean that the quantitative results of this study should be regarded as provisional, we argue that the use of such a framework allows us to begin to consider questions such as the extent to which a devolved authority like the Scottish Parliament can and should be responsible for contributing to national targets for reductions in emissions levels (e.g. the UK commitment to the Kyoto Protocol) when it is limited in the way it can control emissions, particularly with respect to changes in demand elsewhere in the UK. However, while such analysis is useful in terms of accounting for pollution flows in the single time period that the accounts relate to, it is limited when the focus is on modelling the impacts of any marginal change in activity. This is because a conventional demand-driven IO model assumes an entirely passive supply-side in the economy (i.e. all supply is infinitely elastic) and is further restricted by the assumption of universal Leontief (fixed proportions) technology implied by the use of the A and multiplier matrices. In this paper we argue that where analysis of marginal changes in activity is required, a more flexible interregional computable general equilibrium approach that models behavioural relationships in a more realistic and theory-consistent manner, is more appropriate and informative. To illustrate our analysis, we compare the results of introducing a positive demand stimulus in the UK economy using both IO and CGE interregional models of Scotland and the rest of the UK. In the case of the latter, we demonstrate how more theory consistent modelling of both demand and supply side behaviour at the regional and national levels affect model results, including the impact on the interregional CO2 ‘trade balance’.

Outsourcing versus FDI in oligopoly equilibrium

We consider the make-or-buy decision of oligopolistic firms in an industry in which final good production requires specialised inputs. Factor price considerations dictate that firms acquire the intermediate abroad, by either producing it in a wholly owned subsidiary or outsourcing it to a supplier who must make a relationship specific investment. Firms’ internationalisation mode depends on cost and strategic considerations. Crucially, asymmetric equilibria emerge, with firms choosing different modes of internationalisation, even when they are ex-ante identical. With ex-ante asymmetries, lower cost producers have a stronger incentive to vertically integrate (FDI), while higher cost firms are more likely to outsource.

Stochastic Search Variable Selection in Vector Error Correction Models with an Application to a Model of the UK Macroeconomy

This paper develops methods for Stochastic Search Variable Selection (currently popular with regression and Vector Autoregressive models) for Vector Error Correction models where there are many possible restrictions on the cointegration space. We show how this allows the researcher to begin with a single unrestricted model and either do model selection or model averaging in an automatic and computationally efficient manner. We apply our methods to a large UK macroeconomic model.

Harmful competition in the insurance markets

There is a general presumption that competition is a good thing. In this paper we show that competition in the insurance markets can be bad and that adverse selection is in general worse under competition than under monopoly. The reason is that monopoly can exploit its market power to relax incentive constraints by cross-subsidization between different risk types. Cream-skimming behavior, on the contrary, prevents competitive firms from using implicit transfers. In effect monopoly is shown to provide better coverage to those buying insurance but at the cost of limiting participation to insurance. Performing simulation for di erent distributions of risk, we find that monopoly in general performs (much) better than competition in terms of the realization of the gains from trade across all traders in equilibrium. However, most of the surplus is retained by the firm and, as a result, most individuals prefer competitive markets notwithstanding their performance is generally poorer than monopoly.

What Belongs Where? Variable Selection for Zero-Inflated Count Models with an Application to the Demand for Health Care

This paper develops stochastic search variable selection (SSVS) for zero-inflated count models which are commonly used in health economics. This allows for either model averaging or model selection in situations with many potential regressors. The proposed techniques are applied to a data set from Germany considering the demand for health care. A package for the free statistical software environment R is provided.

The Rebound Effect with Energy Production: A Partial Equilibrium Analysis

Rebound is the extent to which improvements in energy efficiency fail to translate fully into reductions in energy use because of the implicit fall in the price of energy, when measured in efficiency units. This paper discusses aspects of the rebound effect that are introduced once energy is considered as a domestically produced commodity. A partial equilibrium approach is adopted in order to incorporate both energy use and production in a conceptually tractable way. The paper explores analytically two interesting results revealed in previous numerical simulations. The first is the possibility that energy use could fall by more than the implied improvement in efficiency. This corresponds to negative rebound. The second is the finding that the short-run rebound value can be greater than the corresponding long-run value.

Equilibrium Exchange Rate Determination and Multiple Structural Changes

The large appreciation and depreciation of the US dollar in the 1980s stimulated an important debate on the usefulness of unit root tests in the presence of structural breaks. In this paper, we propose a simple model to describe the evolution of the real exchange rate. We then propose a more general smooth transition (STR) function than has hitherto been employed, which is able to capture structural changes along the (long-run) equilibrium path, and show that this is consistent with our economic model. Our framework allows for a gradual adjustment between regimes and allows for under- and/or over-valued exchange rate adjustments. Using monthly and quarterly data for up to twenty OECD countries, we apply our methodology to investigate the univariate time series properties of CPI-based real exchange rates with both the U.S. dollar and German mark as the numeraire currencies. The empirical results show that, for more than half of the quarterly series, the evidence in favour of the stationarity of the real exchange rate was clearer in the sub-sample period post-1980.