Monetary policy strategies, financial institutions and financial markets in the Middle East and North Africa: an overview

Three polar types of monetary architecture are identified together with the institutional and market infrastructure required for each type and the kinds of monetary policy feasible in each case: a ‘basic’ architecture where there is little or no financial system as such but an elementary central bank which is able to fix the exchange rate, as a substitute for a proper monetary policy; a ‘modern’ monetary architecture with developed banks, financial markets and central bank where policy choices include types of inflation targeting; and an ‘intermediate’ monetary architecture where less market-based monetary policies involving less discretion are feasible. A range of data is used to locate the various MENA countries with respect to these polar types. Five countries (Iran, Libya, Sudan, Syria and Yemen) are identified as those with the least developed monetary architecture, while Bahrain and Jordan are identified as the group at the other end of the spectrum, reaching beyond the intermediate polar type in some dimensions but not others. The countries in between vary on different dimensions but all lie between basic and intermediate architectures. The key general findings are that the MENA countries are both less differentiated and less ‘developed’ than might have been expected. The paper ends by calling for research on the costs and benefits of different types of monetary architecture.

Does the euro dominate Central and Eastern European money markets?

The so-called German Dominance Hypothesis (GDH) claimed that Bundesbank policies were transmitted into other European Monetary System (EMS) interest rates during the pre-euro era. We reformulate this hypothesis for the Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries that are on the verge of accessing the eurozone. We test this \Euro Dominance Hypothesis (EDH)" in a novel way using a global vector autoregressive (GVAR) approach that combines country-speci c error correction models in a global system. We nd that euro area monetary policies are transmitted into CEE interest rates which provides evidence for monetary integration between the eurozone and CEE countries. Our framework also allows for introducing global monetary shocks to provide empirical evidence regarding the e ects of the recent nancial crisis on monetary integration in Europe.

Co-movements in Real Effective Exchange Rates: Evidence from the Dynamic Hierarchical Factor Model

We analyze and quantify co-movements in real effective exchange rates while considering the regional location of countries. More specifically, using the dynamic hierarchical factor model (Moench et al. (2011)), we decompose exchange rate movements into several latent components; worldwide and two regional factors as well as country-specific elements. Then, we provide evidence that the worldwide common factor is closely related to monetary policies in large advanced countries while regional common factors tend to be captured by those in the rest of the countries in a region. However, a substantial proportion of the variation in the real exchange rates is reported to be country-specific; even in Europe country-specific movements exceed worldwide and regional common factors.

Co-Movement, Spillovers and Excess Returns in Global Bond Markets

This paper investigates global term structure dynamics using a Bayesian hierarchical factor model augmented with macroeconomic fundamentals. More than half of the variation in bond yields of seven advanced economies is due to global co-movement, which is mainly attributed to shocks to non-fundamentals. Global fundamentals, especially global inflation, affect yields through a ‘policy channel’ and a ‘risk compensation channel’, but the effects through two channels are offset. This evidence explains the unsatisfactory performance of fundamentals-driven term structure models. Our approach delineates asymmetric spillovers in global bond markets connected to diverging monetary policies. The proposed model is robust as identified factors has significant explanatory power of excess returns. The finding that global inflation uncertainty is useful in explaining realized excess returns does not rule out regime changing as a source of non-fundamental fluctuations.

US Monetary and Fiscal Policies - Conflict or Cooperation?

Most of the literature estimating DSGE models for monetary policy analysis ignores fiscal policy and assumes that monetary policy follows a simple rule. In this paper we allow both fiscal and monetary policy to be described by rules and/or optimal policy which are subject to switches over time. We find that US monetary and fiscal policy have often been in conflict, and that it is relatively rare that we observe the benign policy combination of an conservative monetary policy paired with a debt stabilizing fiscal policy. In a series of counterfactuals, a conservative central bank following a time-consistent fiscal policy leader would come close to mimicking the cooperative Ramsey policy. However, if policy makers cannot credibly commit to such a regime, monetary accommodation of the prevailing fiscal regime may actually be welfare improving.

When is Monetary Policy All we Need?

We consider optimal monetary and scal policies in a New Keynesian model of a small open economy with sticky prices and wages. In this benchmark setting monetary policy is all we need - analytical results demonstrate that variations in government spending should play no role in the stabilization of shocks. In extensions we show, rstly, that this is even when true when allowing for in ation inertia through backward-looking rule-of-thumb price and wage-setting, as long as there is no discrepancy between the private and social evaluation of the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure. Secondly, the optimal neutrality of government spending is robust to the issuance of public debt. In the presence of debt government spending will deviate from the optimal steady-state but only to the extent required to cover the deficit, not to provide any additional macroeconomic stabilization. However, unlike government spending variations in tax rates can play a complementary role to monetary policy, as they change relative prices rather than demand.

Discretionary Policy in a Monetary Union with Sovereign Debt

This paper examines the interactions between multiple national fiscal policy- makers and a single monetary policy maker in response to shocks to government debt in some or all of the countries of a monetary union. We assume that national governments respond to excess debt in an optimal manner, but that they do not have access to a commitment technology. This implies that national fi scal policy gradually reduces debt: the lack of a commitment technology precludes a random walk in steady state debt, but the need to maintain national competitiveness avoids excessively rapid debt reduction. If the central bank can commit, it adjusts its policies only slightly in response to higher debt, allowing national fiscal policy to undertake most of the adjustment. However if it cannot commit, then optimal monetary policy involves using interest rates to rapidly reduce debt, with signifi cant welfare costs. We show that in these circumstances the central bank would do better to ignore national fiscal policies in formulating its policy.

Realised and Optimal Monetary Policy Rules in an Estimated Markov-Switching DSGE Model of the United Kingdom

This paper investigates underlying changes in the UK economy over the past thirtyfive years using a small open economy DSGE model. Using Bayesian analysis, we find UK monetary policy, nominal price rigidity and exogenous shocks, are all subject to regime shifting. A model incorporating these changes is used to estimate the realised monetary policy and derive the optimal monetary policy for the UK. This allows us to assess the effectiveness of the realised policy in terms of stabilising economic fluctuations, and, in turn, provide an indication of whether there is room for monetary authorities to further improve their policies.

Expectations, Learning and Monetary Policy: An Overview of Recent Research

Expectations about the future are central for determination of current macroeconomic outcomes and the formulation of monetary policy. Recent literature has explored ways for supplementing the benchmark of rational expectations with explicit models of expectations formation that rely on econometric learning. Some apparently natural policy rules turn out to imply expectational instability of private agents’ learning. We use the standard New Keynesian model to illustrate this problem and survey the key results about interest-rate rules that deliver both uniqueness and stability of equilibrium under econometric learning. We then consider some practical concerns such as measurement errors in private expectations, observability of variables and learning of structural parameters required for policy. We also discuss some recent applications including policy design under perpetual learning, estimated models with learning, recurrent hyperinflations, and macroeconomic policy to combat liquidity traps and deflation.

Optimal Monetary Policy in a New Keynesian Model with Habits in Consumption

While consumption habits have been utilised as a means of generating a humpshaped output response to monetary policy shocks in sticky-price New Keynesian economies, there is relatively little analysis of the impact of habits (particularly,external habits) on optimal policy. In this paper we consider the implications of external habits for optimal monetary policy, when those habits either exist at the level of the aggregate basket of consumption goods (‘superficial’ habits) or at the level of individual goods (‘deep’ habits: see Ravn, Schmitt-Grohe, and Uribe (2006)). External habits generate an additional distortion in the economy, which implies that the flex-price equilibrium will no longer be efficient and that policy faces interesting new trade-offs and potential stabilisation biases. Furthermore, the endogenous mark-up behaviour, which emerges when habits are deep, can also significantly affect the optimal policy response to shocks, as well as dramatically affecting the stabilising properties of standard simple rules.

Do political incentives matter for tax policies? Ideology, opportunism and the tax structure

This paper investigates the importance of political ideology and opportunism in the choice of the tax structure. In particular, we examine the effects of cabinet ideology and elections on the distribution of the tax burden across factors of production and consumption for 21 OECD countries over the period 1970-2000 by employing four alternative cabinet ideology measures and by using the methodology of effective tax rates. There is evidence of both opportunistic and partisan effects on tax policies. More precisely, we find that left-wing governments rely more on capital relative to labor income taxation and that they tend to increase consumption taxes. Moreover, we find that income tax rates (but not consumption taxes) tend to be reduced in preelectoral periods and that capital effective tax rates (defined broadly to include taxes on selfemployed income) are reduced by more than effective labor tax rates.

Avoidance Policies – A New Conceptual Framework

This paper develops a general theoretical framework within which a heterogeneous group taxpayers confront a market that supplies a variety of schemes for reducing tax liability, and uses this framework to explore the impact of a wide range of anti-avoidance policies. Schemes differ in their legal effectiveness and hence in the risks to which they expose taxpayers - risks which go beyond the risk of audit considered in the conventional literature on evasion. Given the individual taxpayer’s circumstances, the prices charged for the schemes and the policy environment, the model predicts (i) whether or not any given taxpayer will acquire a scheme, and (ii) if they do so, which type of scheme they will acquire. The paper then analyses how these decisions, and hence the tax gap, are influenced by four generic types of policy: Disclosure – earlier information leading to faster closure of loopholes; Penalties – introduction of penalties for failed avoidance; Policy Design – fundamental policy changes that design out opportunities for avoidance; Product Register - the introduction of GAARs or mini-GAARs that give greater clarity about how different types of scheme will be treated. The paper shows that when considering the indirect/behavioural effects of policies on the tax gap it is important to recognise that these operate on two different margins. First policies will have deterrence effects – their impact on the quantum of taxpayers choosing to acquire different types schemes as distinct to acquiring no scheme at all. There will be a range of such deterrence effects reflecting the range of schemes available in the market. But secondly, since different schemes generate different tax gaps, policies will also have switching effects as they induce taxpayers who previously acquired one type of scheme to acquire another. The first three types of policy generate positive deterrence effects but differ in the switching effects they produce. The fourth type of policy produces mixed deterrence effects.

Shocks, Monetary Policy and Institutions: Explaining Unemployment Persistence in Persistence in “Europe” and the United States

This paper examines the rise in European unemployment since the 1970s by introducing endogenous growth into an otherwise standard New Keynesian model with capital accumulation and unemployment. We subject the model to an uncorrelated cost push shock, in order to mimic a scenario akin to the one faced by central banks at the end of the 1970s. Monetary policy implements a disinfl ation by following an interest feedback rule calibrated to an estimate of a Bundesbank reaction function. 40 quarters after the shock has vanished, unemployment is still about 1.8 percentage points above its steady state. Our model also broadly reproduces cross country differences in unemployment by drawing on cross country differences in the size of cost push shock and the associated disinfl ation, the monetary policy reaction function and the wage setting structure.

Optimal Climate Change Policies When Governments Cannot Commit

This paper examines the optimal design of climate change policies in the context where governments want to encourage the private sector to undertake significant immediate investment in developing cleaner technologies, but the carbon taxes and other environmental policies that could in principle stimulate such investment will be imposed over a very long future. The conventional claim by environmental economists is that environmental policies alone are sufficient to induce firms to undertake optimal investment. However this argument requires governments to be able to commit to these future taxes, and it is far from clear that governments have this degree of commitment. We assume instead that governments cannot commit, and so both they and the private sector have to contemplate the possibility of there being governments in power in the future that give different (relative) weights to the environment. We show that this lack of commitment has a significant asymmetric effect. Compared to the situation where governments can commit it increases the incentive of the current government to have the investment undertaken, but reduces the incentive of the private sector to invest. Consequently governments may need to use additional policy instruments – such as R&D subsidies – to stimulate the required investment.

Monetary and Fiscal Policy under Deep Habits

Recent work on optimal policy in sticky price models suggests that demand management through fiscal policy adds little to optimal monetary policy. We explore this consensus assignment in an economy subject to ‘deep’ habits at the level of individual goods where the counter-cyclicality of mark-ups this implies can result in government spending crowding-in private consumption in the short run. We explore the robustness of this mechanism to the existence of price discrimination in the supply of goods to the public and private sectors. We then describe optimal monetary and fiscal policy in our New Keynesian economy subject to the additional externality of deep habits and explore the ability of simple (but potentially nonlinear) policy rules to mimic fully optimal policy.