4 resultados para General variable neighborhood search
em Scottish Institute for Research in Economics (SIRE) (SIRE), United Kingdom
Resumo:
This paper develops methods for Stochastic Search Variable Selection (currently popular with regression and Vector Autoregressive models) for Vector Error Correction models where there are many possible restrictions on the cointegration space. We show how this allows the researcher to begin with a single unrestricted model and either do model selection or model averaging in an automatic and computationally efficient manner. We apply our methods to a large UK macroeconomic model.
Resumo:
The Scottish Parliament has the authority to make a balanced-budget expansion or contraction in public expenditure, funded by corresponding local changes in the basic rate of income tax of up to 3p in the pound. This fiscal adjustment is known as the Scottish Variable Rate of income tax, though it has never, as yet, been used. In this paper we attempt to identify the impact on aggregate economic activity in Scotland of implementing these devolved fiscal powers. This is achieved through theoretical analysis and simulation using a Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model for Scotland. This analysis generalises the conventional Keynesian model so that negative balanced-budget multipliers values are possible, reflecting a regional “inverted Haavelmo effect”. Key parameters determining the aggregate economic impact are the extent to which the Scottish Government create local amenities valuable to the Scottish population and the extent to which this is incorporated into local wage bargaining.
Resumo:
This paper develops stochastic search variable selection (SSVS) for zero-inflated count models which are commonly used in health economics. This allows for either model averaging or model selection in situations with many potential regressors. The proposed techniques are applied to a data set from Germany considering the demand for health care. A package for the free statistical software environment R is provided.
Resumo:
In a market in which sellers compete by posting mechanisms, we study how the properties of the meeting technology affect the mechanism that sellers select. In general, sellers have incentive to use mechanisms that are socially efficient. In our environment, sellers achieve this by posting an auction with a reserve price equal to their own valuation, along with a transfer that is paid by (or to) all buyers with whom the seller meets. However, we define a novel condition on meeting technologies, which we call “invariance,” and show that the transfer is equal to zero if and only if the meeting technology satisfies this condition.