The de facto independence of regulatory agencies and its consequences for policy making and regulatory outcomes

This dissertation focuses on the practice of regulatory governance, throughout the study of the functioning of formally independent regulatory agencies (IRAs), with special attention to their de facto independence. The research goals are grounded on a "neo-positivist" (or "reconstructed positivist") position (Hawkesworth 1992; Radaelli 2000b; Sabatier 2000). This perspective starts from the ontological assumption that even if subjective perceptions are constitutive elements of political phenomena, a real world exists beyond any social construction and can, however imperfectly, become the object of scientific inquiry. Epistemologically, it follows that hypothetical-deductive theories with explanatory aims can be tested by employing a proper methodology and set of analytical techniques. It is thus possible to make scientific inferences and general conclusions to a certain extent, according to a Bayesian conception of knowledge, in order to update the prior scientific beliefs in the truth of the related hypotheses (Howson 1998), while acknowledging the fact that the conditions of truth are at least partially subjective and historically determined (Foucault 1988; Kuhn 1970). At the same time, a sceptical position is adopted towards the supposed disjunction between facts and values and the possibility of discovering abstract universal laws in social science. It has been observed that the current version of capitalism corresponds to the golden age of regulation, and that since the 1980s no government activity in OECD countries has grown faster than regulatory functions (Jacobs 1999). Following an apparent paradox, the ongoing dynamics of liberalisation, privatisation, decartelisation, internationalisation, and regional integration hardly led to the crumbling of the state, but instead promoted a wave of regulatory growth in the face of new risks and new opportunities (Vogel 1996). Accordingly, a new order of regulatory capitalism is rising, implying a new division of labour between state and society and entailing the expansion and intensification of regulation (Levi-Faur 2005). The previous order, relying on public ownership and public intervention and/or on sectoral self-regulation by private actors, is being replaced by a more formalised, expert-based, open, and independently regulated model of governance. Independent regulation agencies (IRAs), that is, formally independent administrative agencies with regulatory powers that benefit from public authority delegated from political decision makers, represent the main institutional feature of regulatory governance (Gilardi 2008). IRAs constitute a relatively new technology of regulation in western Europe, at least for certain domains, but they are increasingly widespread across countries and sectors. For instance, independent regulators have been set up for regulating very diverse issues, such as general competition, banking and finance, telecommunications, civil aviation, railway services, food safety, the pharmaceutical industry, electricity, environmental protection, and personal data privacy. Two attributes of IRAs deserve a special mention. On the one hand, they are formally separated from democratic institutions and elected politicians, thus raising normative and empirical concerns about their accountability and legitimacy. On the other hand, some hard questions about their role as political actors are still unaddressed, though, together with regulatory competencies, IRAs often accumulate executive, (quasi-)legislative, and adjudicatory functions, as well as about their performance.

Having Your Cake and Eating It, Too: Can Regulatory Agencies Be Both Independent and Accountable?

Independent regulatory agencies (IRAs) were created in various sectors and on different governmental levels to implement liberalization policies. This paper investigates the link between IRAs' independence, which is said to promote regulatory credibility and the use of technical expertise, and their accountability, which is related to the need for controlling and legitimizing independent regulators. The literature on the regulatory state anticipates a positive relation between the independence and accountability of IRAs, but systematic empirical evidence is still lacking. To tackle this question, this paper measures and compares the independence and the accountability of IRAs in three differentially liberalized sectors in Switzerland (telecommunications, electricity and railways). With the application of Social Network Analysis, this piece of research shows that IRAs can be de facto independent and accountable at the same time, but the two features do not necessarily co-evolve in the same direction.

The rewards of cooperation: The effects of membership in European regulatory networks

Networks famously epitomize the shift from 'government' to 'governance' as governing structures for exercising control and coordination besides hierarchies and markets. Their distinctive features are their horizontality, the interdependence among member actors and an interactive decision-making style. Networks are expected to increase the problem-solving capacity of political systems in a context of growing social complexity, where political authority is increasingly fragmented across territorial and functional levels. However, very little attention has been given so far to another crucial implication of network governance - that is, the effects of networks on their members. To explore this important question, this article examines the effects of membership in European regulatory networks on two crucial attributes of member agencies, which are in charge of regulating finance, energy, telecommunications and competition: organisational growth and their regulatory powers. Panel analysis applied to data on 118 agencies during a ten-year period and semi-structured interviews provide mixed support regarding the expectation of organisational growth while strongly confirming the positive effect of networks on the increase of the regulatory powers attributed to member agencies.

Social network architecture and the maintenance of deleterious cultural traits.

How have changes in communications technology affected the way that misinformation spreads through a population and persists? To what extent do differences in the architecture of social networks affect the spread of misinformation, relative to the rates and rules by which individuals transmit or eliminate different pieces of information (cultural traits)? Here, we use analytical models and individual-based simulations to study how a 'cultural load' of misinformation can be maintained in a population under a balance between social transmission and selective elimination of cultural traits with low intrinsic value. While considerable research has explored how network architecture affects percolation processes, we find that the relative rates at which individuals transmit or eliminate traits can have much more profound impacts on the cultural load than differences in network architecture. In particular, the cultural load is insensitive to correlations between an individual's network degree and rate of elimination when these quantities vary among individuals. Taken together, these results suggest that changes in communications technology may have influenced cultural evolution more strongly through changes in the amount of information flow, rather than the details of who is connected to whom.

Three essays on major trends in a slow clockspeed industry : the case of industrial automation

The motivation for this research initiated from the abrupt rise and fall of minicomputers which were initially used both for industrial automation and business applications due to their significantly lower cost than their predecessors, the mainframes. Later industrial automation developed its own vertically integrated hardware and software to address the application needs of uninterrupted operations, real-time control and resilience to harsh environmental conditions. This has led to the creation of an independent industry, namely industrial automation used in PLC, DCS, SCADA and robot control systems. This industry employs today over 200'000 people in a profitable slow clockspeed context in contrast to the two mainstream computing industries of information technology (IT) focused on business applications and telecommunications focused on communications networks and hand-held devices. Already in 1990s it was foreseen that IT and communication would merge into one Information and communication industry (ICT). The fundamental question of the thesis is: Could industrial automation leverage a common technology platform with the newly formed ICT industry? Computer systems dominated by complex instruction set computers (CISC) were challenged during 1990s with higher performance reduced instruction set computers (RISC). RISC started to evolve parallel to the constant advancement of Moore's law. These developments created the high performance and low energy consumption System-on-Chip architecture (SoC). Unlike to the CISC processors RISC processor architecture is a separate industry from the RISC chip manufacturing industry. It also has several hardware independent software platforms consisting of integrated operating system, development environment, user interface and application market which enables customers to have more choices due to hardware independent real time capable software applications. An architecture disruption merged and the smartphone and tablet market were formed with new rules and new key players in the ICT industry. Today there are more RISC computer systems running Linux (or other Unix variants) than any other computer system. The astonishing rise of SoC based technologies and related software platforms in smartphones created in unit terms the largest installed base ever seen in the history of computers and is now being further extended by tablets. An underlying additional element of this transition is the increasing role of open source technologies both in software and hardware. This has driven the microprocessor based personal computer industry with few dominating closed operating system platforms into a steep decline. A significant factor in this process has been the separation of processor architecture and processor chip production and operating systems and application development platforms merger into integrated software platforms with proprietary application markets. Furthermore the pay-by-click marketing has changed the way applications development is compensated: Three essays on major trends in a slow clockspeed industry: The case of industrial automation 2014 freeware, ad based or licensed - all at a lower price and used by a wider customer base than ever before. Moreover, the concept of software maintenance contract is very remote in the app world. However, as a slow clockspeed industry, industrial automation has remained intact during the disruptions based on SoC and related software platforms in the ICT industries. Industrial automation incumbents continue to supply systems based on vertically integrated systems consisting of proprietary software and proprietary mainly microprocessor based hardware. They enjoy admirable profitability levels on a very narrow customer base due to strong technology-enabled customer lock-in and customers' high risk leverage as their production is dependent on fault-free operation of the industrial automation systems. When will this balance of power be disrupted? The thesis suggests how industrial automation could join the mainstream ICT industry and create an information, communication and automation (ICAT) industry. Lately the Internet of Things (loT) and weightless networks, a new standard leveraging frequency channels earlier occupied by TV broadcasting, have gradually started to change the rigid world of Machine to Machine (M2M) interaction. It is foreseeable that enough momentum will be created that the industrial automation market will in due course face an architecture disruption empowered by these new trends. This thesis examines the current state of industrial automation subject to the competition between the incumbents firstly through a research on cost competitiveness efforts in captive outsourcing of engineering, research and development and secondly researching process re- engineering in the case of complex system global software support. Thirdly we investigate the industry actors', namely customers, incumbents and newcomers, views on the future direction of industrial automation and conclude with our assessments of the possible routes industrial automation could advance taking into account the looming rise of the Internet of Things (loT) and weightless networks. Industrial automation is an industry dominated by a handful of global players each of them focusing on maintaining their own proprietary solutions. The rise of de facto standards like IBM PC, Unix and Linux and SoC leveraged by IBM, Compaq, Dell, HP, ARM, Apple, Google, Samsung and others have created new markets of personal computers, smartphone and tablets and will eventually also impact industrial automation through game changing commoditization and related control point and business model changes. This trend will inevitably continue, but the transition to a commoditized industrial automation will not happen in the near future.

Introducing blended learning into a Master Program in Nursing Sciences: a first exploration of a holistic evaluation framework

This contribution presents the first stage of a project to assist the transition of a traditional to a blended program in higher nursing education. We shall describe the goals and context of this project, present the evaluation framework, discuss some early results and then discuss the usefulness of the first version of the evaluation framework.

Institutional change and the evolution of the regulatory state: evidence from the Swiss case

This article examines institutional change in a case that was expected to be particularly resilient but showed considerable structural transformation: the institutionalization of the regulatory state in Switzerland. This process is illustrated through the establishment of independent regulatory agencies (IRAs) in four areas: banking and finance; telecommunications; electricity; and competition. The theoretical framework developed by Streeck, Thelen and Mahoney is used to explore hypotheses about the modes of institutional change, with the methodology of diachronic within-case study. Results confirm only partially the expectations, pointing to layering and displacement as the prevalent modes of change. The concluding part discusses the type and the direction of change as additional explanatory factors.

Network governance and the domestic adoption of soft rules

European regulatory networks (ERNs) are in charge of producing and disseminating non-bindings standards, guidelines and recommendations in a number of important domains, such as banking and finance, electricity and gas, telecommunications, and competition regulation. The goal of these soft rules is to promote 'best practices', achieve co-ordination among regulatory authorities and ensure the consistent application of harmonized pro-competition rules across Europe. This contribution examines the domestic adoption of the soft rules developed within the four main ERNs. Different factors are expected to influence the process of domestic adoption: the resources of regulators; the existence of a review panel; and the interdependence of the issues at stake. The empirical analysis supports hypotheses about the relevance of network-level factors: monitoring and public reporting procedures increase the final level of adoption, while soft rules concerning highly interdependent policy areas are adopted earlier.

The Political Communication of Independent Regulatory Agencies

Since independent regulatory agencies (IRAs) became key actors in European regulatory governance in the 1990s, a significant share of policy-making has been carried out by organizations that are neither democratically elected nor directly accountable to elected politicians. In this context, public communication plays an important role. On the one hand, regulatory agencies might try to use communication to raise their accountability and thereby to mitigate their democratic deficit. On the other hand, communication may be used with the intent to steer the behavior of the regulated industry when more coercive regulatory means are unfeasible or undesirable. However, empirical research focusing directly on how regulators communicate is virtually non-existent. To fill this gap, this paper examines the public communication of IRAs in four countries (the United Kingdom, Germany, Ireland, and Switzerland) and three sectors (financial services, telecommunications, and broadcasting). The empirical analysis, based on qualitative interviews and a quantitative content analysis, indicates that the organization of the communication function follows a national pattern approach while a policy sector approach is helpful for understanding the use of communication as a soft tool of regulation.

The political economy of international regulatory convergence in public utilities

To what extent should public utilities regulation be expected to converge across countries? When it occurs, will it generate good outcomes? Building on the core proposition of the New Institutional Economics that similar regulations generate different outcomes depending on their fit with the underlying domestic institutions, we develop a simple model and explore its implications by examining the diffusion of local loop unbundling (LLU) regulations. We argue that: one should expect some convergence in public utility regulation but with still a significant degree of local experimentation; this process will have very different impacts of regulation.

Political market and regulatory uncertainty: Insights and implications for integrated strategy

Managers can craft effective integrated strategy by properly assessing regulatory uncertainty. Leveraging the existing political markets literature, we predict regulatory uncertainty from the novel interaction of demand and supply side rivalries across a range of political markets. We argue for two primary drivers of regulatory uncertainty: ideology-motivated interests opposed to the firm and a lack of competition for power among political actors supplying public policy. We align three, previously disparate dimensions of nonmarket strategy - profile level, coalition breadth, and pivotal target - to levels of regulatory uncertainty. Through this framework, we demonstrate how and when firms employ different nonmarket strategies. To illustrate variation in nonmarket strategy across levels of regulatory uncertainty, we analyze several market entry decisions of foreign firms operating in the global telecommunications sector.

The Political Communication of Independent Regulatory Agencies

Since independent regulatory agencies (IRAs) became key actors in European regulatory governance in the 1990s, a significant share of policy-making has been carried out by organizations that are neither democratically elected nor directly accountable to elected politicians. In this context, public communication plays an important role. On the one hand, regulatory agencies might try to use communication to raise their accountability and thereby to mitigate their democratic deficit. On the other hand, communication may be used with the intent to steer the behavior of the regulated industry when more coercive regulatory means are unfeasible or undesirable. However, empirical research focusing directly on how regulators communicate is virtually non-existent. To fill this gap, this paper examines the public communication of IRAs in four countries (the United Kingdom, Germany, Ireland, and Switzerland) and three sectors (financial services, telecommunications, and broadcasting). The empirical analysis, based on qualitative interviews and a quantitative content analysis, indicates that the organization of the communication function follows a national pattern approach while a policy sector approach is helpful for understanding the use of communication as a soft tool of regulation.