154 resultados para institutional theory
em Université de Lausanne, Switzerland
Resumo:
Every time another corporate scandal captures media headlines, the 'bad apple vs. bad barrel' discussion starts anew. Yet this debate overlooks the influence of the broader societal context on organizational behavior. In this article, we argue that misbehaviors of organizations (the 'barrels') and their members (the 'apples') cannot be addressed properly without a clear understanding of their broader context (the 'larder'). Whereas previously, a strong societal framework dampened the practical application of the Homo economicus concept (business actors as perfectly rational and egocentric utility-maximizing agents without any moral concern), specialization, individualization and globalization led to a business world disembedded from broader societal norms. This emancipated business world promotes a literal interpretation of Homo economicus among business organizations and their members. Consequently, we argue that the first step toward 'healthier' apples and barrels is to sanitize the larder, that is, adapt the framework in which organizations and their members evolve.Chaque fois qu'un nouveau scandale fait la une des médias, la question de savoir si le problème se situe au niveau des individus (des 'pommes isolées') ou au niveau des organisations (les 'caisses de pommes') refait surface. Ce débat tend néanmoins à sous-estimer l'influence du contexte sociétal plus large sur le comportement dans les organisations. Dans cet article, nous soutenons l'idée que les scandales éthiques dans les organisations ou parmi leurs membres ne peuvent être compris correctement sans une vision plus précise de leur contexte plus large (la 'cave à pommes'). Si dans le passé un contexte sociétal fort permettait d'adoucir les applications pratiques de l'Homo economicus (qui considère l'acteur économique comme un agent parfaitement rationnel et égocentrique cherchant à maximiser son utilité sans réflexion morale), l'individualisation et la globalisation ont conduit à un monde économique désencastré et déconnecté des normes sociales plus larges. Ce monde économique autonome promouvoit une interprétation littérale de l'Homo economicus parmi les entreprises et leurs employés. Il en résulte que le premier pas vers des pommes moins pourries passe par un assainissement de la cave, c'est-à-dire l'adoption d'un cadre socio-normatif qui permet un recadrage du contexte dans lequel les organisations économiques et leurs acteurs agissent.
Resumo:
This dissertation is a combination of three relatively independent chapters on the subject of corporate governance. Corporate governance is presently at the epicenter of the global financial crisis. The lack of regulation and the misalignment of objectives have greatly contributed to the major crisis we are now in. Most governance research has been conducted in the United States in a context of widely held corporations and great executive power. It does not reflect the variety of situations around the world and we question the validity of this model in other contexts. The aim of this dissertation is to look at other governance models, in particular the Swiss corporate governance not only from a practical point of view, but also from a multi-theoretical approach. Traditional corporate governance literature has focused on the Anglo-American model that mainly follows the agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) in a shareholder-manager context, and overlooked other approaches. We focus on three different aspects of corporate governance using three different theories. First, we look at the ownership type of various corporations, using the agency theory in a context where issues between shareholders predominate over the typical shareholder-manager relationship. Second, we explore the adoption process of several governance mechanisms that, due to changes in legislation, has taken place in Switzerland since 2002. We use the institutional theory (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983), in a context where the environmental pressures are particularly high. Finally, we spotlight the board of directors as a key element of the governance of publicly listed corporations. Particularly, we focus on the independence of the board of directors, using a combination of the agency and resource dependence theories (Pfeffer, 1972; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978).
Resumo:
The problematic of performativity has recently produced several criticisms and debates about the status of the economic discourse. Indeed the affirmation that economist shapes the world by describing it could leads to the subjectivist idea that each theory can in fine be 'true' and each theory can perform the social world in his specific way. This work clarifies this problematic in connecting it with the institutional theory of John Searle. We define performativity as a particular type of assignment of function. Finally, this enables us to show that performativity is limited by two kinds of factors : brut facts and social facts.
Resumo:
In a world filled with poverty, environmental degradation, and moral injustice, social enterprises offer a ray of hope. These organizations seek to achieve social missions through business ventures. Yet social missions and business ventures are associated with divergent goals, values, norms, and identities. Attending to them simultaneously creates tensions, competing demands, and ethical dilemmas. Effectively understanding social enterprises therefore depends on insight into the nature and management of these tensions. While existing research recognizes tensions between social missions and business ventures, we lack any systematic analysis. Our paper addresses this issue. We first categorize the types of tensions that arise between social missions and business ventures, emphasizing their prevalence and variety. We then explore how four different organizational theories offer insight into these tensions, and we develop an agenda for future research. We end by arguing that a focus on social-business tensions not only expands insight into social enterprises, but also provides an opportunity for research on social enterprises to inform traditional organizational theories. Taken together, our analysis of tensions in social enterprises integrates and seeks to energize research on this expanding phenomenon.
Resumo:
Summary This dissertation explores how stakeholder dialogue influences corporate processes, and speculates about the potential of this phenomenon - particularly with actors, like non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and other representatives of civil society, which have received growing attention against a backdrop of increasing globalisation and which have often been cast in an adversarial light by firms - as a source of teaming and a spark for innovation in the firm. The study is set within the context of the introduction of genetically-modified organisms (GMOs) in Europe. Its significance lies in the fact that scientific developments and new technologies are being generated at an unprecedented rate in an era where civil society is becoming more informed, more reflexive, and more active in facilitating or blocking such new developments, which could have the potential to trigger widespread changes in economies, attitudes, and lifestyles, and address global problems like poverty, hunger, climate change, and environmental degradation. In the 1990s, companies using biotechnology to develop and offer novel products began to experience increasing pressure from civil society to disclose information about the risks associated with the use of biotechnology and GMOs, in particular. Although no harmful effects for humans or the environment have been factually demonstrated even to date (2008), this technology remains highly-contested and its introduction in Europe catalysed major companies to invest significant financial and human resources in stakeholder dialogue. A relatively new phenomenon at the time, with little theoretical backing, dialogue was seen to reflect a move towards greater engagement with stakeholders, commonly defined as those "individuals or groups with which. business interacts who have a 'stake', or vested interest in the firm" (Carroll, 1993:22) with whom firms are seen to be inextricably embedded (Andriof & Waddock, 2002). Regarding the organisation of this dissertation, Chapter 1 (Introduction) describes the context of the study, elaborates its significance for academics and business practitioners as an empirical work embedded in a sector at the heart of the debate on corporate social responsibility (CSR). Chapter 2 (Literature Review) traces the roots and evolution of CSR, drawing on Stakeholder Theory, Institutional Theory, Resource Dependence Theory, and Organisational Learning to establish what has already been developed in the literature regarding the stakeholder concept, motivations for engagement with stakeholders, the corporate response to external constituencies, and outcomes for the firm in terms of organisational learning and change. I used this review of the literature to guide my inquiry and to develop the key constructs through which I viewed the empirical data that was gathered. In this respect, concepts related to how the firm views itself (as a victim, follower, leader), how stakeholders are viewed (as a source of pressure and/or threat; as an asset: current and future), corporate responses (in the form of buffering, bridging, boundary redefinition), and types of organisational teaming (single-loop, double-loop, triple-loop) and change (first order, second order, third order) were particularly important in building the key constructs of the conceptual model that emerged from the analysis of the data. Chapter 3 (Methodology) describes the methodology that was used to conduct the study, affirms the appropriateness of the case study method in addressing the research question, and describes the procedures for collecting and analysing the data. Data collection took place in two phases -extending from August 1999 to October 2000, and from May to December 2001, which functioned as `snapshots' in time of the three companies under study. The data was systematically analysed and coded using ATLAS/ti, a qualitative data analysis tool, which enabled me to sort, organise, and reduce the data into a manageable form. Chapter 4 (Data Analysis) contains the three cases that were developed (anonymised as Pioneer, Helvetica, and Viking). Each case is presented in its entirety (constituting a `within case' analysis), followed by a 'cross-case' analysis, backed up by extensive verbatim evidence. Chapter 5 presents the research findings, outlines the study's limitations, describes managerial implications, and offers suggestions for where more research could elaborate the conceptual model developed through this study, as well as suggestions for additional research in areas where managerial implications were outlined. References and Appendices are included at the end. This dissertation results in the construction and description of a conceptual model, grounded in the empirical data and tied to existing literature, which portrays a set of elements and relationships deemed important for understanding the impact of stakeholder engagement for firms in terms of organisational learning and change. This model suggests that corporate perceptions about the nature of stakeholder influence the perceived value of stakeholder contributions. When stakeholders are primarily viewed as a source of pressure or threat, firms tend to adopt a reactive/defensive posture in an effort to manage stakeholders and protect the firm from sources of outside pressure -behaviour consistent with Resource Dependence Theory, which suggests that firms try to get control over extemal threats by focussing on the relevant stakeholders on whom they depend for critical resources, and try to reverse the control potentially exerted by extemal constituencies by trying to influence and manipulate these valuable stakeholders. In situations where stakeholders are viewed as a current strategic asset, firms tend to adopt a proactive/offensive posture in an effort to tap stakeholder contributions and connect the organisation to its environment - behaviour consistent with Institutional Theory, which suggests that firms try to ensure the continuing license to operate by internalising external expectations. In instances where stakeholders are viewed as a source of future value, firms tend to adopt an interactive/innovative posture in an effort to reduce or widen the embedded system and bring stakeholders into systems of innovation and feedback -behaviour consistent with the literature on Organisational Learning, which suggests that firms can learn how to optimize their performance as they develop systems and structures that are more adaptable and responsive to change The conceptual model moreover suggests that the perceived value of stakeholder contribution drives corporate aims for engagement, which can be usefully categorised as dialogue intentions spanning a continuum running from low-level to high-level to very-high level. This study suggests that activities aimed at disarming critical stakeholders (`manipulation') providing guidance and correcting misinformation (`education'), being transparent about corporate activities and policies (`information'), alleviating stakeholder concerns (`placation'), and accessing stakeholder opinion ('consultation') represent low-level dialogue intentions and are experienced by stakeholders as asymmetrical, persuasive, compliance-gaining activities that are not in line with `true' dialogue. This study also finds evidence that activities aimed at redistributing power ('partnership'), involving stakeholders in internal corporate processes (`participation'), and demonstrating corporate responsibility (`stewardship') reflect high-level dialogue intentions. This study additionally finds evidence that building and sustaining high-quality, trusted relationships which can meaningfully influence organisational policies incline a firm towards the type of interactive, proactive processes that underpin the development of sustainable corporate strategies. Dialogue intentions are related to type of corporate response: low-level intentions can lead to buffering strategies; high-level intentions can underpin bridging strategies; very high-level intentions can incline a firm towards boundary redefinition. The nature of corporate response (which encapsulates a firm's posture towards stakeholders, demonstrated by the level of dialogue intention and the firm's strategy for dealing with stakeholders) favours the type of learning and change experienced by the organisation. This study indicates that buffering strategies, where the firm attempts to protect itself against external influences and cant' out its existing strategy, typically lead to single-loop learning, whereby the firm teams how to perform better within its existing paradigm and at most, improves the performance of the established system - an outcome associated with first-order change. Bridging responses, where the firm adapts organisational activities to meet external expectations, typically leads a firm to acquire new behavioural capacities characteristic of double-loop learning, whereby insights and understanding are uncovered that are fundamentally different from existing knowledge and where stakeholders are brought into problem-solving conversations that enable them to influence corporate decision-making to address shortcomings in the system - an outcome associated with second-order change. Boundary redefinition suggests that the firm engages in triple-loop learning, where the firm changes relations with stakeholders in profound ways, considers problems from a whole-system perspective, examining the deep structures that sustain the system, producing innovation to address chronic problems and develop new opportunities - an outcome associated with third-order change. This study supports earlier theoretical and empirical studies {e.g. Weick's (1979, 1985) work on self-enactment; Maitlis & Lawrence's (2007) and Maitlis' (2005) work and Weick et al's (2005) work on sensegiving and sensemaking in organisations; Brickson's (2005, 2007) and Scott & Lane's (2000) work on organisational identity orientation}, which indicate that corporate self-perception is a key underlying factor driving the dynamics of organisational teaming and change. Such theorizing has important implications for managerial practice; namely, that a company which perceives itself as a 'victim' may be highly inclined to view stakeholders as a source of negative influence, and would therefore be potentially unable to benefit from the positive influence of engagement. Such a selfperception can blind the firm from seeing stakeholders in a more positive, contributing light, which suggests that such firms may not be inclined to embrace external sources of innovation and teaming, as they are focussed on protecting the firm against disturbing environmental influences (through buffering), and remain more likely to perform better within an existing paradigm (single-loop teaming). By contrast, a company that perceives itself as a 'leader' may be highly inclined to view stakeholders as a source of positive influence. On the downside, such a firm might have difficulty distinguishing when stakeholder contributions are less pertinent as it is deliberately more open to elements in operating environment (including stakeholders) as potential sources of learning and change, as the firm is oriented towards creating space for fundamental change (through boundary redefinition), opening issues to entirely new ways of thinking and addressing issues from whole-system perspective. A significant implication of this study is that potentially only those companies who see themselves as a leader are ultimately able to tap the innovation potential of stakeholder dialogue.
Resumo:
Aim Structure of the Thesis In the first article, I focus on the context in which the Homo Economicus was constructed - i.e., the conception of economic actors as fully rational, informed, egocentric, and profit-maximizing. I argue that the Homo Economicus theory was developed in a specific societal context with specific (partly tacit) values and norms. These norms have implicitly influenced the behavior of economic actors and have framed the interpretation of the Homo Economicus. Different factors however have weakened this implicit influence of the broader societal values and norms on economic actors. The result is an unbridled interpretation and application of the values and norms of the Homo Economicus in the business environment, and perhaps also in the broader society. In the second article, I show that the morality of many economic actors relies on isomorphism, i.e., the attempt to fit into the group by adopting the moral norms surrounding them. In consequence, if the norms prevailing in a specific group or context (such as a specific region or a specific industry) change, it can be expected that actors with an 'isomorphism morality' will also adapt their ethical thinking and their behavior -for the 'better' or for the 'worse'. The article further describes the process through which corporations could emancipate from the ethical norms prevailing in the broader society, and therefore develop an institution with specific norms and values. These norms mainly rely on mainstream business theories praising the economic actor's self-interest and neglecting moral reasoning. Moreover, because of isomorphism morality, many economic actors have changed their perception of ethics, and have abandoned the values prevailing in the broader society in order to adopt those of the economic theory. Finally, isomorphism morality also implies that these economic actors will change their morality again if the institutional context changes. The third article highlights the role and responsibility of business scholars in promoting a systematic reflection and self-critique of the business system and develops alternative models to fill the moral void of the business institution and its inherent legitimacy crisis. Indeed, the current business institution relies on assumptions such as scientific neutrality and specialization, which seem at least partly challenged by two factors. First, self-fulfilling prophecy provides scholars with an important (even if sometimes undesired) normative influence over practical life. Second, the increasing complexity of today's (socio-political) world and interactions between the different elements constituting our society question the strong specialization of science. For instance, economic theories are not unrelated to psychology or sociology, and economic actors influence socio-political structures and processes, e.g., through lobbying (Dobbs, 2006; Rondinelli, 2002), or through marketing which changes not only the way we consume, but more generally tries to instill a specific lifestyle (Cova, 2004; M. K. Hogg & Michell, 1996; McCracken, 1988; Muniz & O'Guinn, 2001). In consequence, business scholars are key actors in shaping both tomorrow's economic world and its broader context. A greater awareness of this influence might be a first step toward an increased feeling of civic responsibility and accountability for the models and theories developed or taught in business schools.
Resumo:
This paper evaluates the reception of Léon Walras' ideas in Russia before 1920. Despite an unfavourable institutional context, Walras was read by Russian economists. On the one hand, Bortkiewicz and Winiarski, who lived outside Russia and had the opportunity to meet and correspond with Walras, were first class readers and very good ambassadors for Walras' ideas, while on the other, the economists living in Russia were more selective in their readings. They restricted themselves to Walras' Elements of Pure Economics, in particular, its theory of exchange, while ignoring its theory of production. We introduce a cultural argument to explain their selective reading. JEL classification numbers: B 13, B 19.
Resumo:
Game theory describes and analyzes strategic interaction. It is usually distinguished between static games, which are strategic situations in which the players choose only once as well as simultaneously, and dynamic games, which are strategic situations involving sequential choices. In addition, dynamic games can be further classified according to perfect and imperfect information. Indeed, a dynamic game is said to exhibit perfect information, whenever at any point of the game every player has full informational access to all choices that have been conducted so far. However, in the case of imperfect information some players are not fully informed about some choices. Game-theoretic analysis proceeds in two steps. Firstly, games are modelled by so-called form structures which extract and formalize the significant parts of the underlying strategic interaction. The basic and most commonly used models of games are the normal form, which rather sparsely describes a game merely in terms of the players' strategy sets and utilities, and the extensive form, which models a game in a more detailed way as a tree. In fact, it is standard to formalize static games with the normal form and dynamic games with the extensive form. Secondly, solution concepts are developed to solve models of games in the sense of identifying the choices that should be taken by rational players. Indeed, the ultimate objective of the classical approach to game theory, which is of normative character, is the development of a solution concept that is capable of identifying a unique choice for every player in an arbitrary game. However, given the large variety of games, it is not at all certain whether it is possible to device a solution concept with such universal capability. Alternatively, interactive epistemology provides an epistemic approach to game theory of descriptive character. This rather recent discipline analyzes the relation between knowledge, belief and choice of game-playing agents in an epistemic framework. The description of the players' choices in a given game relative to various epistemic assumptions constitutes the fundamental problem addressed by an epistemic approach to game theory. In a general sense, the objective of interactive epistemology consists in characterizing existing game-theoretic solution concepts in terms of epistemic assumptions as well as in proposing novel solution concepts by studying the game-theoretic implications of refined or new epistemic hypotheses. Intuitively, an epistemic model of a game can be interpreted as representing the reasoning of the players. Indeed, before making a decision in a game, the players reason about the game and their respective opponents, given their knowledge and beliefs. Precisely these epistemic mental states on which players base their decisions are explicitly expressible in an epistemic framework. In this PhD thesis, we consider an epistemic approach to game theory from a foundational point of view. In Chapter 1, basic game-theoretic notions as well as Aumann's epistemic framework for games are expounded and illustrated. Also, Aumann's sufficient conditions for backward induction are presented and his conceptual views discussed. In Chapter 2, Aumann's interactive epistemology is conceptually analyzed. In Chapter 3, which is based on joint work with Conrad Heilmann, a three-stage account for dynamic games is introduced and a type-based epistemic model is extended with a notion of agent connectedness. Then, sufficient conditions for backward induction are derived. In Chapter 4, which is based on joint work with Jérémie Cabessa, a topological approach to interactive epistemology is initiated. In particular, the epistemic-topological operator limit knowledge is defined and some implications for games considered. In Chapter 5, which is based on joint work with Jérémie Cabessa and Andrés Perea, Aumann's impossibility theorem on agreeing to disagree is revisited and weakened in the sense that possible contexts are provided in which agents can indeed agree to disagree.
Resumo:
Introduction In my thesis I argue that economic policy is all about economics and politics. Consequently, analysing and understanding economic policy ideally has at least two parts. The economics part, which is centered around the expected impact of a specific policy on the real economy both in terms of efficiency and equity. The insights of this part point into which direction the fine-tuning of economic policies should go. However, fine-tuning of economic policies will be most likely subject to political constraints. That is why, in the politics part, a much better understanding can be gained by taking into account how the incentives of politicians and special interest groups as well as the role played by different institutional features affect the formation of economic policies. The first part and chapter of my thesis concentrates on the efficiency-related impact of economic policies: how does corporate income taxation in general, and corporate income tax progressivity in specific, affect the creation of new firms? Reduced progressivity and flat-rate taxes are in vogue. By 2009, 22 countries are operating flat-rate income tax systems, as do 7 US states and 14 Swiss cantons (for corporate income only). Tax reform proposals in the spirit of the "flat tax" model typically aim to reduce three parameters: the average tax burden, the progressivity of the tax schedule, and the complexity of the tax code. In joint work, Marius Brülhart and I explore the implications of changes in these three parameters on entrepreneurial activity, measured by counts of firm births in a panel of Swiss municipalities. Our results show that lower average tax rates and reduced complexity of the tax code promote firm births. Controlling for these effects, reduced progressivity inhibits firm births. Our reading of these results is that tax progressivity has an insurance effect that facilitates entrepreneurial risk taking. The positive effects of lower tax levels and reduced complexity are estimated to be significantly stronger than the negative effect of reduced progressivity. To the extent that firm births reflect desirable entrepreneurial dynamism, it is not the flattening of tax schedules that is key to successful tax reforms, but the lowering of average tax burdens and the simplification of tax codes. Flatness per se is of secondary importance and even appears to be detrimental to firm births. The second part of my thesis, which corresponds to the second and third chapter, concentrates on how economic policies are formed. By the nature of the analysis, these two chapters draw on a broader literature than the first chapter. Both economists and political scientists have done extensive research on how economic policies are formed. Thereby, researchers in both disciplines have recognised the importance of special interest groups trying to influence policy-making through various channels. In general, economists base their analysis on a formal and microeconomically founded approach, while abstracting from institutional details. In contrast, political scientists' frameworks are generally richer in terms of institutional features but lack the theoretical rigour of economists' approaches. I start from the economist's point of view. However, I try to borrow as much as possible from the findings of political science to gain a better understanding of how economic policies are formed in reality. In the second chapter, I take a theoretical approach and focus on the institutional policy framework to explore how interactions between different political institutions affect the outcome of trade policy in presence of special interest groups' lobbying. Standard political economy theory treats the government as a single institutional actor which sets tariffs by trading off social welfare against contributions from special interest groups seeking industry-specific protection from imports. However, these models lack important (institutional) features of reality. That is why, in my model, I split up the government into a legislative and executive branch which can both be lobbied by special interest groups. Furthermore, the legislative has the option to delegate its trade policy authority to the executive. I allow the executive to compensate the legislative in exchange for delegation. Despite ample anecdotal evidence, bargaining over delegation of trade policy authority has not yet been formally modelled in the literature. I show that delegation has an impact on policy formation in that it leads to lower equilibrium tariffs compared to a standard model without delegation. I also show that delegation will only take place if the lobby is not strong enough to prevent it. Furthermore, the option to delegate increases the bargaining power of the legislative at the expense of the lobbies. Therefore, the findings of this model can shed a light on why the U.S. Congress often practices delegation to the executive. In the final chapter of my thesis, my coauthor, Antonio Fidalgo, and I take a narrower approach and focus on the individual politician level of policy-making to explore how connections to private firms and networks within parliament affect individual politicians' decision-making. Theories in the spirit of the model of the second chapter show how campaign contributions from lobbies to politicians can influence economic policies. There exists an abundant empirical literature that analyses ties between firms and politicians based on campaign contributions. However, the evidence on the impact of campaign contributions is mixed, at best. In our paper, we analyse an alternative channel of influence in the shape of personal connections between politicians and firms through board membership. We identify a direct effect of board membership on individual politicians' voting behaviour and an indirect leverage effect when politicians with board connections influence non-connected peers. We assess the importance of these two effects using a vote in the Swiss parliament on a government bailout of the national airline, Swissair, in 2001, which serves as a natural experiment. We find that both the direct effect of connections to firms and the indirect leverage effect had a strong and positive impact on the probability that a politician supported the government bailout.