Institutional fragmentation and coordination initiatives in western European welfare states

As a result of recent welfare state transformations, and most notably the reorientation of welfare states towards activation, the internal fragmentation of social security systems has emerged as a key policy problem in many western European countries. The types of response that have been adopted, however, vary substantially across countries, ranging from the encouragement of inter-agency collaboration to the outright merger of agencies. The purpose of this exploratory article is twofold. First, by proposing the concept of coordination initiatives, it tries to develop a better conceptualization of the cross-national diversity in responses to the fragmentation problem. Second, starting from existing theories of welfare state development and policy change, it presents first hypotheses accounting for the variation observed in coordination initiatives.

Market-Based Instruments for ecosystem services: institutional innovation or renovation?

Recent years have seen widespread experimentation with market-based instruments (MBIs) for the provision of environmental goods and ecosystem services. However, little attention has been paid to their design or to the effects of the underlying pro-market narrative on environmental policy instruments. The purpose of this article is to analyze the emergence and dissemination of the term "market-based instruments" applied to the provision of environmental services and to assess to what extent the instruments associated are genuinely innovative. The recommendation to develop markets can lead in practice to a variety of institutional forms, as we show it based on the example of payments for environmental services (PES) and biodiversity offsets, two very different mechanisms that are both presented in the literature as MBIs. Our purpose is to highlight the gap between discourse and practice in connection with MBIs.

Services standardization in the United-States and in Europe: an institutional analysis of private authority

This contribution explores the role of international standards in the rules governing the internationalisation of the service economy. It analyses on a cross-institutional basis patterns of authority in the institutional setting of service standards in the European and Amercian context. The entry into force of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in 1995 gave international standards a major role in harmonising the technical specifications of goods and services traded on the global market Despite the careful wording of the WTO, a whole range of international bodies still have the capacity to define generic as well as detailed technical specifications affecting how swelling offshore services are expected to be traded on worldwide basis. The analysis relies on global political economy approaches to identify constitutive patterns of authority mediating between the political and the economic spheres on a transnational space. It extends to the area of service standards the assumption that the process of globalisation is not opposing states and markets, but a joint expression of both of them including new patterns and agents of structural change through formal and informal power and regulatory practices. The paper argues that service standards reflect the significant development of a form of transnational hybrid authority, that blurs the distinction between private and public actors, whose scope spread all along from physical measures to societal values, and which reinforces the deterritorialisation of regulatory practices in contemporary capitalism. It provides evidence of this argument by analysing the current European strategy regarding service standardization in response to several programming mandate of the European Commission and the American views on the future development of service standards.

Struggles for meaning and struggles for control: the diffusion of bandwagon technology in two institutional environments

In this thesis, I examine the diffusion process for a complex medical technology, the PET scanner, in two different health care systems, one of which is more market-oriented (Switzerland) and the other more centrally managed by a public agency (Quebec). The research draws on institutional and socio-political theories of the diffusion of innovations to examine how institutional contexts affect processes of diffusion. I find that diffusion proceeds more rapidly in Switzerland than in Quebec, but that processes in both jurisdictions are characterized by intense struggles among providers and between providers and public agencies. I show that the institutional environment influences these processes by determining the patterns of material resources and authority available to actors in their struggles to strategically control the technology, and by constituting the discursive resources or institutional logics on which actors may legitimately draw in their struggles to give meaning to the technology in line with their interests and values. This thesis illustrates how institutional structures and meanings manifest themselves in the context of specific decisions within an organizational field, and reveals the ways in which governance structures may be contested and realigned when they conflict with interests that are legitimized by dominant institutional logics. It is argued that this form of contestation and readjustment at the margins constitutes one mechanism by which institutional frameworks are tested, stretched and reproduced or redefined.

The Institutional Foundations of Regulatory Capitalism: The Diffusion of Independent Regulatory Agencies in Western Europe

This article studies the diffusion of the main institutional feature of regulatory capitalism, namely, independent regulatory agencies. While only a few such authorities existed in Europe in the early 1980s, by the end of the twentieth century they had spread impressively across countries and sectors. The analysis finds that three classes of factors (bottom-up, top-down, and horizontal) explain this trend. First, the establishment of independent regulatory agencies was an attempt to improve credible commitment capacity when liberalizing and privatizing utilities and to alleviate the political uncertainty problem, namely, the risk to a government that its policies will be changed when it loses power. Second, Europeanization favored the creation of independent regulators. Third, individual decisions were interdependent, as governments were influenced by the decisions of others in an emulation process where the symbolic properties of independent regulators mattered more than the functions they performed.