From breaking the rule to making the rules : the adoption, entrenchment and diffusion of gender quotas in France

Once a country allergic to any type of preferential treatment or quota measure for women, France has become a country that applies gender quotas to regulate women's presence and representation in politics, the business sector, public bodies, public administration, and even some civil society organizations. While research has concentrated on the adoption of electoral gender quotas in many countries and their international diffusion, few studies focus on explaining the successful diffusion of gender quotas from politics to other domains in the same country. This paper proposes to fill this gap by studying the particularly puzzling case of a country that at one point strongly opposed the adoption of gender quotas in politics, but, in less than a decade, transformed into one of the few countries applying gender quotas across several policy domains. This paper argues that the legal entrenchment of the parity principle, the institutionalization of parity in several successive women's policy agencies, and key players in these newly created agencies are mainly responsible for this unexpected development. The diffusion of gender quotas in France thus offers an illuminating example of under which conditions women's policy agencies can act autonomously to diffuse and impose a new tool for gender equality

Interactive Epistemology and Reasoning: On the Foundations of Game Theory

Game theory describes and analyzes strategic interaction. It is usually distinguished between static games, which are strategic situations in which the players choose only once as well as simultaneously, and dynamic games, which are strategic situations involving sequential choices. In addition, dynamic games can be further classified according to perfect and imperfect information. Indeed, a dynamic game is said to exhibit perfect information, whenever at any point of the game every player has full informational access to all choices that have been conducted so far. However, in the case of imperfect information some players are not fully informed about some choices. Game-theoretic analysis proceeds in two steps. Firstly, games are modelled by so-called form structures which extract and formalize the significant parts of the underlying strategic interaction. The basic and most commonly used models of games are the normal form, which rather sparsely describes a game merely in terms of the players' strategy sets and utilities, and the extensive form, which models a game in a more detailed way as a tree. In fact, it is standard to formalize static games with the normal form and dynamic games with the extensive form. Secondly, solution concepts are developed to solve models of games in the sense of identifying the choices that should be taken by rational players. Indeed, the ultimate objective of the classical approach to game theory, which is of normative character, is the development of a solution concept that is capable of identifying a unique choice for every player in an arbitrary game. However, given the large variety of games, it is not at all certain whether it is possible to device a solution concept with such universal capability. Alternatively, interactive epistemology provides an epistemic approach to game theory of descriptive character. This rather recent discipline analyzes the relation between knowledge, belief and choice of game-playing agents in an epistemic framework. The description of the players' choices in a given game relative to various epistemic assumptions constitutes the fundamental problem addressed by an epistemic approach to game theory. In a general sense, the objective of interactive epistemology consists in characterizing existing game-theoretic solution concepts in terms of epistemic assumptions as well as in proposing novel solution concepts by studying the game-theoretic implications of refined or new epistemic hypotheses. Intuitively, an epistemic model of a game can be interpreted as representing the reasoning of the players. Indeed, before making a decision in a game, the players reason about the game and their respective opponents, given their knowledge and beliefs. Precisely these epistemic mental states on which players base their decisions are explicitly expressible in an epistemic framework. In this PhD thesis, we consider an epistemic approach to game theory from a foundational point of view. In Chapter 1, basic game-theoretic notions as well as Aumann's epistemic framework for games are expounded and illustrated. Also, Aumann's sufficient conditions for backward induction are presented and his conceptual views discussed. In Chapter 2, Aumann's interactive epistemology is conceptually analyzed. In Chapter 3, which is based on joint work with Conrad Heilmann, a three-stage account for dynamic games is introduced and a type-based epistemic model is extended with a notion of agent connectedness. Then, sufficient conditions for backward induction are derived. In Chapter 4, which is based on joint work with Jérémie Cabessa, a topological approach to interactive epistemology is initiated. In particular, the epistemic-topological operator limit knowledge is defined and some implications for games considered. In Chapter 5, which is based on joint work with Jérémie Cabessa and Andrés Perea, Aumann's impossibility theorem on agreeing to disagree is revisited and weakened in the sense that possible contexts are provided in which agents can indeed agree to disagree.

Policy Change and the Politics of Expertise. Economic Ideas and immigration Control Reforms in switzerland

This article analyses the varying influence across time of the "epistemic community" of free-market economists on immigration policy making in Switzerland. To this end, a framework for the analysis of the impact of economic expertise is provided, and then used in an historical analysis comparing the 1960s with the 1990s. Whereas this influence can be considered to have been weak in the 1960s, it gained significantly in importance in the 1990s, when a period of economic unrest seriously challenged previous immigration policies. It is argued that economic experts played an important role in framing the reforms undertaken during this latter period, notably by providing a "credible causal story" about the links between the existing immigration policy and the social problems which arose in the country in the 1990s. As compared to the 1960s, economic expertise in the 1990s enjoyed more credibility, more political support and took full advantage of a more uncertain social and economic context

Three essays in dynamic corporate finance

The three essays constituting this thesis focus on financing and cash management policy. The first essay aims to shed light on why firms issue debt so conservatively. In particular, it examines the effects of shareholder and creditor protection on capital structure choices. It starts by building a contingent claims model where financing policy results from a trade-off between tax benefits, contracting costs and agency costs. In this setup, controlling shareholders can divert part of the firms' cash ows as private benefits at the expense of minority share- holders. In addition, shareholders as a class can behave strategically at the time of default leading to deviations from the absolute priority rule. The analysis demonstrates that investor protection is a first order determinant of firms' financing choices and that conflicts of interests between firm claimholders may help explain the level and cross-sectional variation of observed leverage ratios. The second essay focuses on the practical relevance of agency conflicts. De- spite the theoretical development of the literature on agency conflicts and firm policy choices, the magnitude of manager-shareholder conflicts is still an open question. This essay proposes a methodology for quantifying these agency conflicts. To do so, it examines the impact of managerial entrenchment on corporate financing decisions. It builds a dynamic contingent claims model in which managers do not act in the best interest of shareholders, but rather pursue private benefits at the expense of shareholders. Managers have discretion over financing and dividend policies. However, shareholders can remove the manager at a cost. The analysis demonstrates that entrenched managers restructure less frequently and issue less debt than optimal for shareholders. I take the model to the data and use observed financing choices to provide firm-specific estimates of the degree of managerial entrenchment. Using structural econometrics, I find costs of control challenges of 2-7% on average (.8-5% at median). The estimates of the agency costs vary with variables that one expects to determine managerial incentives. In addition, these costs are sufficient to resolve the low- and zero-leverage puzzles and explain the time series of observed leverage ratios. Finally, the analysis shows that governance mechanisms significantly affect the value of control and firms' financing decisions. The third essay is concerned with the documented time trend in corporate cash holdings by Bates, Kahle and Stulz (BKS,2003). BKS find that firms' cash holdings double from 10% to 20% over the 1980 to 2005 period. This essay provides an explanation of this phenomenon by examining the effects of product market competition on firms' cash holdings in the presence of financial constraints. It develops a real options model in which cash holdings may be used to cover unexpected operating losses and avoid inefficient closure. The model generates new predictions relating cash holdings to firm and industry characteristics such as the intensity of competition, cash flow volatility, or financing constraints. The empirical examination of the model shows strong support of model's predictions. In addition, it shows that the time trend in cash holdings documented by BKS can be at least partly attributed to a competition effect.

Another Kind of Knowledge: Aristotle's Phronêsis from an Epistemological Point of View

In my thesis, I defend the idea that Aristotle's notion of phronêsis (practical wisdom) is best understood as a kind of practical knowledge. I interpret phronêsis as the knowledge we display when we make the correct decision to act. In a particular situation that demands a specific response, we have practical knowledge of what to do when we make the best decision possible. This interpretation of phronêsis involves that it is possible to evaluate our decisions epistemically, that is, to evaluate whether we really know what to do or not. Aristotle provides a tool for the evaluation of our decisions, which is a definite kind of argument and which the tradition has called the 'practical syllogism'. The practical syllogism stands as the explanation of our decisions or actions. We invoke it when we want to explain or justify why we act as we do. My claim is that the components of the practical syllogism enable one to evaluate not only the moral character of our actions, but also the epistemic strength of our decisions. Correspondingly, a decision is morally right, i.e. virtuous, if the agent considers the right moral principle to apply, and if he is aware of the relevant circumstances of the situation (moral evaluation). Moreover, a decision displays practical knowledge if the agent meets three conditions (epistemic evaluation): he must desire the moral principle for its own sake; he must have experience in spotting the relevant circumstances of the situation; and he must be able to closely connect these circumstances with the moral principle. This interpretation of phronêsis differs from other more traditional interpretations in the emphasis it puts on phronêsis as knowledge. Other interpretations focus more on the moral dimension on phronêsis, without taking its epistemic value seriously. By contrast, I raise seriously the question of what it takes to genuinely know what one should do in a particular situation. -- Dans ma thèse, je défends l'idée que la notion aristotélicienne de phronêsis (sagesse pratique) doit être interprétée comme connaissance pratique. Je comprends la phronêsis comme étant la connaissance que nous avons lorsque nous prenons une bonne décision. Dans une situation particulière qui demande une réponse précise, nous avons une connaissance pratique lorsque nous prenons la meilleure décision possible. Cette interprétation de la phronêsis implique qu'il est possible d'évaluer nos décisions de manière épistémique, c'est-à-dire, d'évaluer si nous savons vraiment ce qu'il faut faire ou non. Ma position est qu'Aristote fournit un outil pour évaluer épistémiquement nos décisions, qui consiste en un certain type d'argument et que la tradition a appelé le 'syllogisme pratique'. Le syllogisme pratique correspond à l'explication de nos décisions ou de nos actions. Nous invoquons un syllogisme pratique lorsque nous voulons expliquer ou justifier pourquoi nous agissons comme nous le faisons. Les éléments du syllogisme pratique permettent d'évaluer non seulement le caractère moral de nos actions, mais aussi la force épistémique de nos décisions. Par conséquent, une décision est moralement correcte, i.e. vertueuse, si l'agent considère le bon principe moral, et s'il est attentif aux circonstances pertinentes de la situation (évaluation morale). En outre, une décision inclut la connaissance pratique si l'agent remplit trois conditions (évaluation épistémique) : il doit désirer le principe moral pour lui-même, il doit avoir de l'expérience pour déceler les circonstances pertinentes, et il doit pouvoir lier intimement ces circonstances avec le principe moral. Cette interprétation de la phronêsis diffère d'autres interprétations plus traditionnelles par l'emphase mise sur la phronêsis en tant que connaissance. D'autres interprétations se concentrent plus sur la dimension morale de la phronêsis, sans se préoccuper sérieusement de sa valeur épistémique. Au contraire, je pose sérieusement la question des conditions nécessaires pour réellement savoir ce qu'il faut faire dans une situation donnée.

Les Neurosciences au Tribunal: de la responsabilité à la dangerosité

In recent years, an explosion of interest in neuroscience has led to the development of "Neuro-law," a new multidisciplinary field of knowledge whose aim is to examine the impact and role of neuroscientific findings in legal proceedings. Neuroscientific evidence is increasingly being used in US and European courts in criminal trials, as part of psychiatric testimony, nourishing the debate about the legal implications of brain research in psychiatric-legal settings. During these proceedings, the role of forensic psychiatrists is crucial. In most criminal justice systems, their mission consists in accomplishing two basic tasks: assessing the degree of responsibility of the offender and evaluating their future dangerousness. In the first part of our research, we aim to examine the impact of Neuroscientific evidence in the assessment of criminal responsibility, a key concept of law. An initial jurisprudential research leads to conclude that there are significant difficulties and limitations in using neuroscience for the assessment of criminal responsibility. In the current socio-legal context, responsibility assessments are progressively being weakened, whereas dangerousness assessments gain increasing importance in the field of forensic psychiatry. In the second part of our research we concentrate on the impact of using neuroscience for the assessment of dangerousness. We argue that in the current policy era of zero tolerance, judges, confronted with the pressure to ensure public security, may tend to interpret neuroscientific knowledge and data as an objective and reliable way of evaluating one's dangerousness and risk of reoffending, rather than their responsibility. This tendency could be encouraged by a utilitarian approach to punishment, advanced by some recent neuroscientific research which puts into question the existence of free will and responsibility and argues for a rejection of the retributive theory of punishment. Although this shift away from punishment aimed at retribution in favor of a consequentialist approach to criminal law is advanced by some authors as a more progressive and humane approach, we believe that it could lead to the instrumentalisation of neuroscience in the interest of public safety, which can run against the proper exercise of justice and civil liberties of the offenders. By advancing a criminal law regime animated by the consequentialist aim of avoiding social harms through rehabilitation, neuroscience promotes a return to a therapeutical approach to crime which can have serious impact on the kind and the length of sentences imposed on the offenders; if neuroscientific data are interpreted as evidence of dangerousness, rather than responsibility, it is highly likely that judges impose heavier sentences, or/and security measures (in civil law systems), which can be indeterminate in length. Errors and epistemic traps of past criminological movements trying to explain the manifestation of a violent and deviant behavior on a biological and deterministic basis stress the need for caution concerning the use of modern neuroscientific methods in criminal proceedings.