Causal Warrant for Realism about Particle Physics

While scientific realism generally assumes that successful scientific explanations yield information about reality, realists also have to admit that not all information acquired in this way is equally well warranted. Some versions of scientific realism do this by saying that explanatory posits with which we have established some kind of causal contact are better warranted than those that merely appear in theoretical hypotheses. I first explicate this distinction by considering some general criteria that permit us to distinguish causal warrant from theoretical warrant. I then apply these criteria to a specific case from particle physics, claiming that scientific realism has to incorporate the distinction between causal and theoretical warrant if it is to be an adequate stance in the philosophy of particle physics.

Maladie d'Alzheimer: de la pathogénie aux perspectives cliniques [Alzheimer disease: from pathogenetic issues to clinical perspectives].

The aim of this article is a critical review of the main pathogenetic issues debated in Alzheimer disease, with a focus on the clinical perspectives that could derive from. The pertinence of the amyloid cascade hypothesis as a unique and causal explanation of cognitive deterioration is challenged in the light of recent therapeutic failures of clinical trials and increasing role of tau protein in clinical expression. The detection of very early and possibly preclinical stages of the disease emerges as a necessary condition for the efficacy of future amyloid or tau-oriented curative strategies. In this respect, the possibility of finding individual vulnerability markers--in the group of patients with "mild cognitive impairment" or even in cognitively intact subjects--represents a major challenge of the clinical research in this field.

Causal explanations and scientific realism in particle physics

Particle physics studies highly complex processes which cannot be directly observed. Scientific realism claims that we are nevertheless warranted in believing that these processes really occur and that the objects involved in them really exist. This dissertation defends a version of scientific realism, called causal realism, in the context of particle physics. I start by introducing the central theses and arguments in the recent philosophical debate on scientific realism (chapter 1), with a special focus on an important presupposition of the debate, namely common sense realism. Chapter 2 then discusses entity realism, which introduces a crucial element into the debate by emphasizing the importance of experiments in defending scientific realism. Most of the chapter is concerned with Ian Hacking's position, but I also argue that Nancy Cartwright's version of entity realism is ultimately preferable as a basis for further development. In chapter 3,1 take a step back and consider the question whether the realism debate is worth pursuing at all. Arthur Fine has given a negative answer to that question, proposing his natural ontologica! attitude as an alternative to both realism and antirealism. I argue that the debate (in particular the realist side of it) is in fact less vicious than Fine presents it. The second part of my work (chapters 4-6) develops, illustrates and defends causal realism. The key idea is that inference to the best explanation is reliable in some cases, but not in others. Chapter 4 characterizes the difference between these two kinds of cases in terms of three criteria which distinguish causal from theoretical warrant. In order to flesh out this distinction, chapter 5 then applies it to a concrete case from the history of particle physics, the discovery of the neutrino. This case study shows that the distinction between causal and theoretical warrant is crucial for understanding what it means to "directly detect" a new particle. But the distinction is also an effective tool against what I take to be the presently most powerful objection to scientific realism: Kyle Stanford's argument from unconceived alternatives. I respond to this argument in chapter 6, and I illustrate my response with a discussion of Jean Perrin's experimental work concerning the atomic hypothesis. In the final part of the dissertation, I turn to the specific challenges posed to realism by quantum theories. One of these challenges comes from the experimental violations of Bell's inequalities, which indicate a failure of locality in the quantum domain. I show in chapter 7 how causal realism can further our understanding of quantum non-locality by taking account of some recent experimental results. Another challenge to realism in quantum mechanics comes from delayed-choice experiments, which seem to imply that certain aspects of what happens in an experiment can be influenced by later choices of the experimenter. Chapter 8 analyzes these experiments and argues that they do not warrant the antirealist conclusions which some commentators draw from them. It pays particular attention to the case of delayed-choice entanglement swapping and the corresponding question whether entanglement is a real physical relation. In chapter 9,1 finally address relativistic quantum theories. It is often claimed that these theories are incompatible with a particle ontology, and this calls into question causal realism's commitment to localizable and countable entities. I defend the commitments of causal realism against these objections, and I conclude with some remarks connecting the interpretation of quantum field theory to more general metaphysical issues confronting causal realism.

On making causal claims: A review and recommendations

Social scientists often estimate models from correlational data, where the independent variable has not been exogenously manipulated; they also make implicit or explicit causal claims based on these models. When can these claims be made? We answer this question by first discussing design and estimation conditions under which model estimates can be interpreted, using the randomized experiment as the gold standard. We show how endogeneity--which includes omitted variables, omitted selection, simultaneity, common methods bias, and measurement error--renders estimates causally uninterpretable. Second, we present methods that allow researchers to test causal claims in situations where randomization is not possible or when causal interpretation is confounded, including fixed-effects panel, sample selection, instrumental variable, regression discontinuity, and difference-in-differences models. Third, we take stock of the methodological rigor with which causal claims are being made in a social sciences discipline by reviewing a representative sample of 110 articles on leadership published in the previous 10 years in top-tier journals. Our key finding is that researchers fail to address at least 66 % and up to 90 % of design and estimation conditions that make causal claims invalid. We conclude by offering 10 suggestions on how to improve non-experimental research.

De novo mutation in the KCNQ1 gene causal to Jervell and Lange-Nielsen syndrome.

Jervell and Lange-Nielsen syndrome (JLNS) is an autosomal recessive disorder, clinically characterized by severe cardiac arrhythmias [due to prolonged QTc interval in electrocardiogram (ECG)] and bilateral sensory neural deafness. Molecular defects causal to JLNS are either homozygous or compound heterozygous mutations, predominantly in the KCNQ1 gene and occasionally in the KCNE1 gene. As the molecular defect is bi-allelic, JLNS patients inherit one pathogenic mutation causal to the disorder from each parent. In this report, we show for the first time that such a disorder could also occur due to a spontaneous de novo mutation in the affected individual, not inherited from the parent, which makes this case unique unlike the previously reported JLNS cases.

The metaphysics of quantum gravity : a causal approach

The dissertation investigates some relevant metaphysical issues arising in the context of spacetime theories. In particular, the inquiry focuses on general relativity and canonical quantum gravity. A formal definition of spacetime theory is proposed and, against this framework, an analysis of the notions of general covariance, symmetry and background independence is performed. It is argued that many conceptual issues in general relativity and canonical quantum gravity derive from putting excessive emphasis on general covariance as an ontological prin-ciple. An original metaphysical position grounded in scientific essential- ism and causal realism (weak essentialism) is developed and defended. It is argued that, in the context of general relativity, weak essentialism supports spacetime substantivalism. It is also shown that weak essentialism escapes arguments from metaphysical underdetermination by positing a particular kind of causation, dubbed geometric. The proposed interpretive framework is then applied to Bohmian mechanics, pointing out that weak essentialism nicely fits into this theory. In the end, a possible Bohmian implementation of loop quantum gravity is considered, and such a Bohmian approach is interpreted in a geometric causal fashion. Under this interpretation, Bohmian loop quantum gravity straightforwardly commits us to an ontology of elementary extensions of space whose evolution is described by a non-local law. The causal mechanism underlying this evolution clarifies many conceptual issues related to the emergence of classical spacetime from the quantum regime. Although there is as yet no fully worked out physical theory of quantum gravity, it is argued that the proposed approach sets up a standard that proposals for a serious ontology in this field should meet.

Causal mechanisms underlying host specificity in bat ectoparasites.

In parasites, host specificity may result either from restricted dispersal capacity or from fixed coevolutionary host-parasite adaptations. Knowledge of those proximal mechanisms leading to particular host specificity is fundamental to understand host-parasite interactions and potential coevolution of parasites and hosts. The relative importance of these two mechanisms was quantified through infection and cross-infection experiments using mites and bats as a model. Monospecific pools of parasitic mites (Spinturnix myoti and S. andegavinus) were subjected either to individual bats belonging to their traditional, native bat host species, or to another substitute host species within the same bat genus (Myotis). The two parasite species reacted differently to these treatments. S. myoti exhibited a clear preference for, and had a higher fitness on, its native host, Myotis myotis. In contrast, S. andegavinus showed no host choice, although its fitness was higher on its native host M. daubentoni. The causal mechanisms mediating host specificity can apparently differ within closely related host-parasite systems.