Olympic social responsibility : a challenge for the future

Social responsibility, especially in the fields of education, society and peace, is one of the cornerstones of the olympic ideal and strategic vision (contribute to building a better world through sport). The article reviews the literature on organizational social responsibility (OSR) and the relationship between sport/olympism and OSR in order to examine the conditions governing the implementation and success of the International Olympic Committee's strategic vision. Several ways in which the IOC could promote a more ambitious and better-integrated social strategy: revise its performance model, notably evaluate and present in a social responsibility report; promote the adoption of OSR initiatives and strategies within the Olympic System from the bottom-up, rather than from the top-down; share best practices in the different countries for promoting and developing "sport for all"; create a World Agency for Development through Sport, or partnering and funding the international platform on sport and development; creating a World Agency for the International Governance of Sport. Two possible scenarios for the future of Olympic responsibility are finally discussed: strategy of "small steps" and a more ambitious local and global social strategy through sport and olympism.

Le visage au-delà de l'apparence. Levinas et l'autre rive de l'éthique

In this article I look at the significance of Emmanuel Levinas' thought for an ethics of care. I argue that the meaning Levinas gives to the term « face » is a central aspect related to this issue. The face is in this French philosopher's view an ambiguous phenomenon, an enigma, that bears high ethical significance : beyond its physical appearance, the face of the other escapes every affort at representation, it indicates the way in which the representation of the other exceeds any idea of the other in me, and it is precisely this irreducibility of alterity that lights up its ethical meaning. In Levinas' view, to be oneself is to be for the other, and the otherness of the other manifests itself in the face-to-face encounter. Accordingly, responsibility is the response to the injunction, the interpellation, of the other's face, preceding the claim of justice, and humaneness is conceived as entangled in the other's face. Against this background, I suggest that Levinas' philosophical insight constitutes a turning point from a traditional to a new conception of responsibility that may bear great significance to a renewed understanding of an hermeneutics and an ethics of care.