Does Interviewer-Respondent Socio-Demographic Matching Increase Cooperation in Centralized CATI Household Panels?

Overall it seems that age and gender interviewer characteristics are relevant in achieving higher cooperation rates by telephone panel members. This appears to be the case especially for older male interviewers, who perform the best on gaining cooperation across different types of respondents. This holds if important interviewer covariates like experience are controlled for. There is no evidence that special sex age or sex matches yield a higher cooperation. It may be that not only the perceived authority of the institution that sponsors the survey plays a role when it comes to cooperation (Groves et al., 1992) but also of the interviewer who asks for this cooperation. Presumably older men have more authority to convince sample members to participate. A simple recommendation is to use as many older male interviewers as possible for the recruitment phase. It is likely that this strategy would also be successful in other western cultures than Switzerland.

Adverse selection, moral hazard, and outlier payment policy

In this article, we analyze the rationale for introducing outlier payments into a prospective payment system for hospitals under adverse selection and moral hazard. The payer has only two instruments: a fixed price for patients whose treatment cost is below a threshold and a cost-sharing rule for outlier patients. We show that a fixed-price policy is optimal when the hospital is sufficiently benevolent. When the hospital is weakly benevolent, a mixed policy solving a trade-off between rent extraction, efficiency, and dumping deterrence must be preferred. We show how the optimal combination of fixed price and partially cost-based payment depends on the degree of benevolence of the hospital, the social cost of public funds, and the distribution of patients severity. [Authors]

An alternative socio-ecological strategy? International Trade Unions' engagement with climate change

In the context of a global ecological crisis, it is an important move when trade unions turn to environmentalism. Yet, the form that this environmentalism takes is often overlooked. This is especially the case with international trade unions. Based on an empirical study of international trade unions' engagement with the climate change issue, this article argues that international trade unions follow three different (and partially conflicting) strategies. I label these strategies as 'deliberative', 'collaborative growth' and 'socialist', and I examine each in turn. I argue that such analysis is important if we want to identify the potential for transforming the social relations of production that are at the root of the current climate crisis, and for identifying an alternative socio-ecological strategy.