The Omega model: from bankruptcy to occupation times in the red

Ruin occurs the first time when the surplus of a company or an institution is negative. In the Omega model, it is assumed that even with a negative surplus, the company can do business as usual until bankruptcy occurs. The probability of bankruptcy at a point of time only depends on the value of the negative surplus at that time. Under the assumption of Brownian motion for the surplus, the expected discounted value of a penalty at bankruptcy is determined, and hence the probability of bankruptcy. There is an intrinsic relation between the probability of no bankruptcy and an exposure random variable. In special cases, the distribution of the total time the Brownian motion spends below zero is found, and the Laplace transform of the integral of the negative part of the Brownian motion is expressed in terms of the Airy function of the first kind.

A model for the evolution of reinforcement learning in fluctuating games

Many species are able to learn to associate behaviours with rewards as this gives fitness advantages in changing environments. Social interactions between population members may, however, require more cognitive abilities than simple trial-and-error learning, in particular the capacity to make accurate hypotheses about the material payoff consequences of alternative action combinations. It is unclear in this context whether natural selection necessarily favours individuals to use information about payoffs associated with nontried actions (hypothetical payoffs), as opposed to simple reinforcement of realized payoff. Here, we develop an evolutionary model in which individuals are genetically determined to use either trial-and-error learning or learning based on hypothetical reinforcements, and ask what is the evolutionarily stable learning rule under pairwise symmetric two-action stochastic repeated games played over the individual's lifetime. We analyse through stochastic approximation theory and simulations the learning dynamics on the behavioural timescale, and derive conditions where trial-and-error learning outcompetes hypothetical reinforcement learning on the evolutionary timescale. This occurs in particular under repeated cooperative interactions with the same partner. By contrast, we find that hypothetical reinforcement learners tend to be favoured under random interactions, but stable polymorphisms can also obtain where trial-and-error learners are maintained at a low frequency. We conclude that specific game structures can select for trial-and-error learning even in the absence of costs of cognition, which illustrates that cost-free increased cognition can be counterselected under social interactions.

A risk model with an observer in a Markov environment

We consider a spectrally-negative Markov additive process as a model of a risk process in a random environment. Following recent interest in alternative ruin concepts, we assume that ruin occurs when an independent Poissonian observer sees the process as negative, where the observation rate may depend on the state of the environment. Using an approximation argument and spectral theory, we establish an explicit formula for the resulting survival probabilities in this general setting. We also discuss an efficient evaluation of the involved quantities and provide a numerical illustration.