Seeds of distrust: conflict in Uganda

We study the effect of civil conflict on social capital, focusing on Uganda's experience during the last decade. Using individual and county-level data, we document large causal effects on trust and ethnic identity of an exogenous outburst of ethnic conflicts in 2002-2005. We exploit two waves of survey data from Afrobarometer (Round 4 Afrobarometer Survey in Uganda, 2000, 2008), including information on socioeconomic characteristics at the individual level, and geo-referenced measures of fighting events from ACLED. Our identification strategy exploits variations in the both the spatial and ethnic intensity of fighting. We find that more intense fighting decreases generalized trust and increases ethnic identity. The effects are quantitatively large and robust to a number of control variables, alternative measures of violence, and different statistical techniques involving ethnic and spatial fixed effects and instrumental variables. Controlling for the intensity of violence during the conflict, we also document that post-conflict economic recovery is slower in ethnically fractionalized counties. Our findings are consistent with the existence of a self-reinforcing process between conflicts and ethnic cleavages.

The Relevance of the Principal-Agent Model for the Analysis of Public Policies : Do the Objectives Conflict ?

This paper aims to provide empirical support for the use of the principal-agent framework in the analysis of public sector and public policies. After reviewing the different conditions to be met for a relevant analysis of the relationship between population and government using the principal-agent theory, our paper focuses on the assumption of conflicting goals between the principal and the agent. A principal-agent analysis assumes in effect that inefficiencies may arise because principal and agent pursue different goals. Using data collected during an amalgamation project of two Swiss municipalities, we show the existence of a gap between the goals of the population and those of the government. Consequently, inefficiencies as predicted by the principal-agent model may arise during the implementation of a public policy, i.e. an amalgamation project. In a context of direct democracy where policies are regularly subjected to referendum, the conflict of objectives may even lead to a total failure of the policy at the polls.

War Signals: A Theory of Trade, Trust and Conflict

We construct a dynamic theory of civil conflict hinging on inter-ethnic trust and trade. The model economy is inhabitated by two ethnic groups. Inter-ethnic trade requires imperfectly observed bilateral investments and one group has to form beliefs on the average propensity to trade of the other group. Since conflict disrupts trade, the onset of a conflict signals that the aggressor has a low propensity to trade. Agents observe the history of conflicts and update their beliefs over time, transmitting them to the next generation. The theory bears a set of testable predictions. First, war is a stochastic process whose frequency depends on the state of endogenous beliefs. Second, the probability of future conflicts increases after each conflict episode. Third, "accidental" conflicts that do not reflect economic fundamentals can lead to a permanent breakdown of trust, plunging a society into a vicious cycle of recurrent conflicts (a war trap). The incidence of conflict can be reduced by policies abating cultural barriers, fostering inter-ethnic trade and human capital, and shifting beliefs. Coercive peace policies such as peacekeeping forces or externally imposed regime changes have instead no persistent effects.

Conflict resolution and evolution of social structures in insect societies

In colonies of social Hymenoptera (which include all ants, as well as some wasp and bee species), only queens reproduce whereas workers generally perform other tasks. The evolution of worker's reproductive altruism can be explained by kin selection, which states that workers can indirectly transmit copies of their genes by helping the reproduction of relatives. The relatedness between queens and workers may however be low, particularly when there are multiple queens per colony, which limits the transmission of copies of workers genes and increases potential conflicts between colony members. In this thesis, we investigated the link between social structure variations and conflicts, and explored the mechanisms involved in variation of colony queen number in ants. According to kin selection, workers should rear the brood they are most related to. In social Hymenoptera, males are haploid whereas females (workers and queens) are diploid. As a result, workers can be up to three times more related to females than males in some colonies, where they should consequently favour the production of females. In contrast, queens are equally related to daughters and sons in all types of colonies and therefore should favour a balanced sex ratio. In a meta-analysis across all studies of social Hymenoptera, we showed that colony sex ratio is generally largely influenced by workers. Hence, the evolution of social structures where queens and workers are equally related to males and females may contribute to decrease the conflict between the two castes over colony sex ratio. Another conflict between queens and workers can occur over male production. Many species contain workers that still have the ability to lay haploid eggs. In some social structures, workers are on average more related to sons of queens than to sons of other workers. As a result, workers should eliminate worker-laid eggs to favour queen-laid eggs. We showed that in the ant Formica selysi, workers eliminate more worker-laid than queen-laid eggs, independently of colony social structure. These results therefore suggest that worker policing can evolve independently from relatedness, potentially because of costs of worker reproduction at the colony-level. Colony queen number is a key parameter that influences relatedness between group members. Queen body size is generally linked to the success of independent colony foundation by single queens and may influence the number of queens in the new colony. In the ant F. selysi, single-queen colonies produce larger queens than multiple-queen colonies. We showed that this association results from genes or maternal effects transmitted to the eggs. However, we also found that queens produced in colonies of the two social forms did not differ in their general ability to found new colonies independently. Queen body size may also influence queen dispersal ability and constrain small queens to be re-adopted in their original nest after mating at proximity. We tested the acceptance of new queens in another ant species, Formica paralugubris, which has numerous queens per colony. Our results show that workers do not discriminate between nestmate and foreign queens, and more generally accept new queens at a limited rate. To conclude, this thesis shows that mechanisms influencing variation in colony queen number and the influence of these changes on conflict resolution are complex. Data gathered in this thesis therefore constitute a solid background for further research on the evolution and the maintenance of complex organisations in insect societies.