66 resultados para Types of cooperation partners
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The aim of this study was to evaluate splenic eosinophil and mast cell accumulation using pagoda red stain in a series of anaphylaxis-related deaths that underwent medico-legal investigations. Our goal was to assess whether fatal reactions to insect stings, intramuscularly administered antibiotics and intravenously injected contrast media are responsible for specific patterns of eosinophil and mast cell accumulation. Two study groups were prospectively formed, an anaphylaxis-related death group and a control group. Autopsy, histology (haematoxylin-eosin stain, pagoda red stain and immunohistochemistry using anti-tryptase antibodies), toxicology and postmortem biochemistry (beta-tryptase, total IgE and specific IgE) were performed in all cases. All tested parameters (spleen weight, beta-tryptase and total IgE levels as well as eosinophil, mast cell and degranulated mast cell numbers in the spleen) were significantly higher in the anaphylaxis-related death group. No statistically significant differences were observed among the various groups (intramuscular antibiotic injection, intravenous contrast medium administration and stinging insects) in any combination, suggesting that mast cell and eosinophil accumulation in the spleen during anaphylaxis does not have any specific pattern related to the triggering allergen. Despite a lower sensitivity than immunohistochemical staining in discriminating eosinophil and mast cells, pagoda red stain allowed these cells to be identified and could therefore be proposed as a low-cost, first-line diagnostic procedure in those situations where immunohistochemistry is not systematically performed or cannot be carried out.
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British mammalogists have used two different systems for surveying the common dormouse Muscardinus avellanarius: a modified bird nest box with the entrance facing the tree trunk, and a smaller, cheaper model called a "nest tube". However, only few data comparing different nest box systems are currently available. To determine which system is more efficient, we compared the use of the large (GB-type) and small nest boxes (DE-type, a commercial wooden mouse trap without a door) in three Swiss forest. The presence of Muscardinus, potential competitors, and any evidence of occupation were examined in 60 pairs of nest boxes based on 2,280 nest box checks conducted over 5 years. Mean annual occupation and cumulative numbers of Muscardinus present were both significantly higher for the DE than for the GB boxes (64.6% versus 32.1%, and 149 versus 67 dormice, respectively). In contrast, the annual occupation by competitors including Glis glis, Apodemus spp. and hole-nesting birds was significantly higher in the GB than in the DE boxes in all forest (19-68% versus 0-16%, depending on the species and forest). These results suggest that smaller nest boxes are preferred by the common dormouse and are rarely occupied by competitors. These boxes hence appear to be preferable for studying Muscardinus populations.
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BACKGROUND: Four different types of internal hernias (IH) are known to occur after laparoscopic Roux-en-Y gastric bypass (LRYGBP) performed for morbid obesity. We evaluate multidetector row helical computed tomography (MDCT) features for their differentiation. METHODS: From a prospectively collected database including 349 patients with LRYGBP, 34 acutely symptomatic patients (28 women, mean age 32.6), operated on for IH immediately after undergoing MDCT, were selected. Surgery confirmed 4 (11.6%) patients with transmesocolic, 10 (29.4%) with Petersen's, 15 (44.2%) with mesojejunal, and 5 (14.8%) with jejunojejunal IH. In consensus, 2 radiologists analyzed 13 MDCT features to distinguish the four types of IH. Statistical significance was calculated (p < 0.05, Fisher's exact test, chi-square test). RESULTS: MDCT features of small bowel obstruction (SBO) (n = 25, 73.5%), volvulus (n = 22, 64.7%), or a cluster of small bowel loops (SBL) (n = 27, 79.4%) were inconsistently present and overlapped between the four IH. The following features allowed for IH differentiation: left upper quadrant clustered small bowel loops (p < 0.0001) and a mesocolic hernial orifice (p = 0.0003) suggested transmesocolic IH. SBL abutting onto the left abdominal wall (p = 0.0021) and left abdominal shift of the superior mesenteric vessels (SMV) (p = 0.0045) suggested Petersen's hernia. The SMV predominantly shifted towards the right anterior abdominal wall in mesojejunal hernia (p = 0.0033). Location of the hernial orifice near the distal anastomosis (p = 0.0431) and jejunojejunal suture widening (p = 0.0005) indicated jejunojejunal hernia. CONCLUSIONS: None of the four IH seems associated with a higher risk of SBO. Certain MDCT features, such as the position of clustered SBL and hernial orifice, help distinguish between the four IH and may permit straightforward surgery.
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Cooperation among unrelated individuals can arise if decisions to help others can be based on reputation. While working for dyadic interactions, reputation-use in social dilemmas involving many individuals (e.g. public goods games) becomes increasingly difficult as groups become larger and errors more frequent. Reputation is therefore believed to have played a minor role for the evolution of cooperation in collective action dilemmas such as those faced by early humans. Here, we show in computer simulations that a reputation system based on punitive actions can overcome these problems and, compared to reputation system based on generous actions, (i) is more likely to lead to the evolution of cooperation in sizable groups, (ii) more effectively sustains cooperation within larger groups, and (iii) is more robust to errors in reputation assessment. Punishment and punishment reputation could therefore have played crucial roles in the evolution of cooperation within larger groups of humans.
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Abstract The object of game theory lies in the analysis of situations where different social actors have conflicting requirements and where their individual decisions will all influence the global outcome. In this framework, several games have been invented to capture the essence of various dilemmas encountered in many common important socio-economic situations. Even though these games often succeed in helping us understand human or animal behavior in interactive settings, some experiments have shown that people tend to cooperate with each other in situations for which classical game theory strongly recommends them to do the exact opposite. Several mechanisms have been invoked to try to explain the emergence of this unexpected cooperative attitude. Among them, repeated interaction, reputation, and belonging to a recognizable group have often been mentioned. However, the work of Nowak and May (1992) showed that the simple fact of arranging the players according to a spatial structure and only allowing them to interact with their immediate neighbors is sufficient to sustain a certain amount of cooperation even when the game is played anonymously and without repetition. Nowak and May's study and much of the following work was based on regular structures such as two-dimensional grids. Axelrod et al. (2002) showed that by randomizing the choice of neighbors, i.e. by actually giving up a strictly local geographical structure, cooperation can still emerge, provided that the interaction patterns remain stable in time. This is a first step towards a social network structure. However, following pioneering work by sociologists in the sixties such as that of Milgram (1967), in the last few years it has become apparent that many social and biological interaction networks, and even some technological networks, have particular, and partly unexpected, properties that set them apart from regular or random graphs. Among other things, they usually display broad degree distributions, and show small-world topological structure. Roughly speaking, a small-world graph is a network where any individual is relatively close, in terms of social ties, to any other individual, a property also found in random graphs but not in regular lattices. However, in contrast with random graphs, small-world networks also have a certain amount of local structure, as measured, for instance, by a quantity called the clustering coefficient. In the same vein, many real conflicting situations in economy and sociology are not well described neither by a fixed geographical position of the individuals in a regular lattice, nor by a random graph. Furthermore, it is a known fact that network structure can highly influence dynamical phenomena such as the way diseases spread across a population and ideas or information get transmitted. Therefore, in the last decade, research attention has naturally shifted from random and regular graphs towards better models of social interaction structures. The primary goal of this work is to discover whether or not the underlying graph structure of real social networks could give explanations as to why one finds higher levels of cooperation in populations of human beings or animals than what is prescribed by classical game theory. To meet this objective, I start by thoroughly studying a real scientific coauthorship network and showing how it differs from biological or technological networks using divers statistical measurements. Furthermore, I extract and describe its community structure taking into account the intensity of a collaboration. Finally, I investigate the temporal evolution of the network, from its inception to its state at the time of the study in 2006, suggesting also an effective view of it as opposed to a historical one. Thereafter, I combine evolutionary game theory with several network models along with the studied coauthorship network in order to highlight which specific network properties foster cooperation and shed some light on the various mechanisms responsible for the maintenance of this same cooperation. I point out the fact that, to resist defection, cooperators take advantage, whenever possible, of the degree-heterogeneity of social networks and their underlying community structure. Finally, I show that cooperation level and stability depend not only on the game played, but also on the evolutionary dynamic rules used and the individual payoff calculations. Synopsis Le but de la théorie des jeux réside dans l'analyse de situations dans lesquelles différents acteurs sociaux, avec des objectifs souvent conflictuels, doivent individuellement prendre des décisions qui influenceront toutes le résultat global. Dans ce cadre, plusieurs jeux ont été inventés afin de saisir l'essence de divers dilemmes rencontrés dans d'importantes situations socio-économiques. Bien que ces jeux nous permettent souvent de comprendre le comportement d'êtres humains ou d'animaux en interactions, des expériences ont montré que les individus ont parfois tendance à coopérer dans des situations pour lesquelles la théorie classique des jeux prescrit de faire le contraire. Plusieurs mécanismes ont été invoqués pour tenter d'expliquer l'émergence de ce comportement coopératif inattendu. Parmi ceux-ci, la répétition des interactions, la réputation ou encore l'appartenance à des groupes reconnaissables ont souvent été mentionnés. Toutefois, les travaux de Nowak et May (1992) ont montré que le simple fait de disposer les joueurs selon une structure spatiale en leur permettant d'interagir uniquement avec leurs voisins directs est suffisant pour maintenir un certain niveau de coopération même si le jeu est joué de manière anonyme et sans répétitions. L'étude de Nowak et May, ainsi qu'un nombre substantiel de travaux qui ont suivi, étaient basés sur des structures régulières telles que des grilles à deux dimensions. Axelrod et al. (2002) ont montré qu'en randomisant le choix des voisins, i.e. en abandonnant une localisation géographique stricte, la coopération peut malgré tout émerger, pour autant que les schémas d'interactions restent stables au cours du temps. Ceci est un premier pas en direction d'une structure de réseau social. Toutefois, suite aux travaux précurseurs de sociologues des années soixante, tels que ceux de Milgram (1967), il est devenu clair ces dernières années qu'une grande partie des réseaux d'interactions sociaux et biologiques, et même quelques réseaux technologiques, possèdent des propriétés particulières, et partiellement inattendues, qui les distinguent de graphes réguliers ou aléatoires. Entre autres, ils affichent en général une distribution du degré relativement large ainsi qu'une structure de "petit-monde". Grossièrement parlant, un graphe "petit-monde" est un réseau où tout individu se trouve relativement près de tout autre individu en termes de distance sociale, une propriété également présente dans les graphes aléatoires mais absente des grilles régulières. Par contre, les réseaux "petit-monde" ont, contrairement aux graphes aléatoires, une certaine structure de localité, mesurée par exemple par une quantité appelée le "coefficient de clustering". Dans le même esprit, plusieurs situations réelles de conflit en économie et sociologie ne sont pas bien décrites ni par des positions géographiquement fixes des individus en grilles régulières, ni par des graphes aléatoires. De plus, il est bien connu que la structure même d'un réseau peut passablement influencer des phénomènes dynamiques tels que la manière qu'a une maladie de se répandre à travers une population, ou encore la façon dont des idées ou une information s'y propagent. Ainsi, durant cette dernière décennie, l'attention de la recherche s'est tout naturellement déplacée des graphes aléatoires et réguliers vers de meilleurs modèles de structure d'interactions sociales. L'objectif principal de ce travail est de découvrir si la structure sous-jacente de graphe de vrais réseaux sociaux peut fournir des explications quant aux raisons pour lesquelles on trouve, chez certains groupes d'êtres humains ou d'animaux, des niveaux de coopération supérieurs à ce qui est prescrit par la théorie classique des jeux. Dans l'optique d'atteindre ce but, je commence par étudier un véritable réseau de collaborations scientifiques et, en utilisant diverses mesures statistiques, je mets en évidence la manière dont il diffère de réseaux biologiques ou technologiques. De plus, j'extrais et je décris sa structure de communautés en tenant compte de l'intensité d'une collaboration. Finalement, j'examine l'évolution temporelle du réseau depuis son origine jusqu'à son état en 2006, date à laquelle l'étude a été effectuée, en suggérant également une vue effective du réseau par opposition à une vue historique. Par la suite, je combine la théorie évolutionnaire des jeux avec des réseaux comprenant plusieurs modèles et le réseau de collaboration susmentionné, afin de déterminer les propriétés structurelles utiles à la promotion de la coopération et les mécanismes responsables du maintien de celle-ci. Je mets en évidence le fait que, pour ne pas succomber à la défection, les coopérateurs exploitent dans la mesure du possible l'hétérogénéité des réseaux sociaux en termes de degré ainsi que la structure de communautés sous-jacente de ces mêmes réseaux. Finalement, je montre que le niveau de coopération et sa stabilité dépendent non seulement du jeu joué, mais aussi des règles de la dynamique évolutionnaire utilisées et du calcul du bénéfice d'un individu.
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In experimental animals, oncofoetal antigens1 have been found to be associated with both chemical-2 and virus-induced tumours3. In man the two best known oncofoetal antigens are the α-foetoprotein (AFP) described by both Abelev4 and Tatarinov5 and the carcinoembryonic antigen (CEA) of the human digestive system identified by Gold and Freedman6. We describe here a different human oncofoetal antigen, common to several types of carcinomas and various foetal organs. This antigen has been identified by rabbit antisera raised against semipurified fractions of colon carcinoma soluble extracts. Because of its β-immunoelectrophoretic mobility, this antigen will be referred to as β-oncofoetal antigen (BOFA).
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Game theory is a branch of applied mathematics used to analyze situation where two or more agents are interacting. Originally it was developed as a model for conflicts and collaborations between rational and intelligent individuals. Now it finds applications in social sciences, eco- nomics, biology (particularly evolutionary biology and ecology), engineering, political science, international relations, computer science, and philosophy. Networks are an abstract representation of interactions, dependencies or relationships. Net- works are extensively used in all the fields mentioned above and in many more. Many useful informations about a system can be discovered by analyzing the current state of a network representation of such system. In this work we will apply some of the methods of game theory to populations of agents that are interconnected. A population is in fact represented by a network of players where one can only interact with another if there is a connection between them. In the first part of this work we will show that the structure of the underlying network has a strong influence on the strategies that the players will decide to adopt to maximize their utility. We will then introduce a supplementary degree of freedom by allowing the structure of the population to be modified along the simulations. This modification allows the players to modify the structure of their environment to optimize the utility that they can obtain.
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Whether or not species participating in specialized and obligate interactions display similar and simultaneous demographic variations at the intraspecific level remains an open question in phylogeography. In the present study, we used the mutualistic nursery pollination occurring between the European globeflower Trollius europaeus and its specialized pollinators in the genus Chiastocheta as a case study. Explicitly, we investigated if the phylogeographies of the pollinating flies are significantly different from the expectation under a scenario of plant-insect congruence. Based on a large-scale sampling, we first used mitochondrial data to infer the phylogeographical histories of each fly species. Then, we defined phylogeographical scenarios of congruence with the plant history, and used maximum likelihood and Bayesian approaches to test for plant-insect phylogeographical congruence for the three Chiastocheta species. We show that the phylogeographical histories of the three fly species differ. Only Chiastocheta lophota and Chiastocheta dentifera display strong spatial genetic structures, which do not appear to be statistically different from those expected under scenarios of phylogeographical congruence with the plant. The results of the present study indicate that the fly species responded in independent and different ways to shared evolutionary forces, displaying varying levels of congruence with the plant genetic structure
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RESUME De plus en plus de familles se rendent vers des destinations tropicales, s'exposant à des agents infectieux et des maladies tropicales qu'ils ne rencontrent pas chez eux. Nous avons étudié 157 enfants (0-16 ans) et leurs parents partant pour les tropiques, qui ont tous consulté une clinique pré-voyage et qui étaient généralement compliants aux conseils prodigués. Les taux d'incidence de maladies communes chez les enfants et les adultes étaient respectivement de 16.9 (14.3-19.7) et 15.1 (12.7-17.8) épisodes/ 100 personnes-semaines. La diarrhée, les douleurs abdominales et la fièvre représentaient les plaintes les plus fréquentes. Il n'y avait pas de différence significative d'incidence des épisodes morbides entre les enfants et les adultes sauf pour la fièvre (plus fréquente chez les enfants). La plupart des épisodes avaient lieu dans les dix premiers jours du voyage. L'incidence de morbidité similaire chez les enfants et les adultes ainsi que l'aspect bénin des épisodes remet en question l'opinion selon laquelle il n'est pas sage de voyager avec des jeunes enfants.