Flow-R, a model for susceptibility mapping of debris flows and other gravitational hazards at a regional scale

The development of susceptibility maps for debris flows is of primary importance due to population pressure in hazardous zones. However, hazard assessment by processbased modelling at a regional scale is difficult due to the complex nature of the phenomenon, the variability of local controlling factors, and the uncertainty in modelling parameters. A regional assessment must consider a simplified approach that is not highly parameter dependant and that can provide zonation with minimum data requirements. A distributed empirical model has thus been developed for regional susceptibility assessments using essentially a digital elevation model (DEM). The model is called Flow-R for Flow path assessment of gravitational hazards at a Regional scale (available free of charge under www.flow-r.org) and has been successfully applied to different case studies in various countries with variable data quality. It provides a substantial basis for a preliminary susceptibility assessment at a regional scale. The model was also found relevant to assess other natural hazards such as rockfall, snow avalanches and floods. The model allows for automatic source area delineation, given user criteria, and for the assessment of the propagation extent based on various spreading algorithms and simple frictional laws.We developed a new spreading algorithm, an improved version of Holmgren's direction algorithm, that is less sensitive to small variations of the DEM and that is avoiding over-channelization, and so produces more realistic extents. The choices of the datasets and the algorithms are open to the user, which makes it compliant for various applications and dataset availability. Amongst the possible datasets, the DEM is the only one that is really needed for both the source area delineation and the propagation assessment; its quality is of major importance for the results accuracy. We consider a 10m DEM resolution as a good compromise between processing time and quality of results. However, valuable results have still been obtained on the basis of lower quality DEMs with 25m resolution.

The genetical theory of social behaviour.

We survey the population genetic basis of social evolution, using a logically consistent set of arguments to cover a wide range of biological scenarios. We start by reconsidering Hamilton's (Hamilton 1964 J. Theoret. Biol. 7, 1-16 (doi:10.1016/0022-5193(64)90038-4)) results for selection on a social trait under the assumptions of additive gene action, weak selection and constant environment and demography. This yields a prediction for the direction of allele frequency change in terms of phenotypic costs and benefits and genealogical concepts of relatedness, which holds for any frequency of the trait in the population, and provides the foundation for further developments and extensions. We then allow for any type of gene interaction within and between individuals, strong selection and fluctuating environments and demography, which may depend on the evolving trait itself. We reach three conclusions pertaining to selection on social behaviours under broad conditions. (i) Selection can be understood by focusing on a one-generation change in mean allele frequency, a computation which underpins the utility of reproductive value weights; (ii) in large populations under the assumptions of additive gene action and weak selection, this change is of constant sign for any allele frequency and is predicted by a phenotypic selection gradient; (iii) under the assumptions of trait substitution sequences, such phenotypic selection gradients suffice to characterize long-term multi-dimensional stochastic evolution, with almost no knowledge about the genetic details underlying the coevolving traits. Having such simple results about the effect of selection regardless of population structure and type of social interactions can help to delineate the common features of distinct biological processes. Finally, we clarify some persistent divergences within social evolution theory, with respect to exactness, synergies, maximization, dynamic sufficiency and the role of genetic arguments.

Taking "Galton's problem" Seriously : Towards a Theory of Policy Diffusion

This article builds on the recent policy diffusion literature and attempts to overcome one of its major problems, namely the lack of a coherent theoretical framework. The literature defines policy diffusion as a process where policy choices are interdependent, and identifies several diffusion mechanisms that specify the link between the policy choices of the various actors. As these mechanisms are grounded in different theories, theoretical accounts of diffusion currently have little internal coherence. In this article we put forward an expected-utility model of policy change that is able to subsume all the diffusion mechanisms. We argue that the expected utility of a policy depends on both its effectiveness and the payoffs it yields, and we show that the various diffusion mechanisms operate by altering these two parameters. Each mechanism affects one of the two parameters, and does so in distinct ways. To account for aggregate patterns of diffusion, we embed our model in a simple threshold model of diffusion. Given the high complexity of the process that results, strong analytical conclusions on aggregate patterns cannot be drawn without more extensive analysis which is beyond the scope of this article. However, preliminary considerations indicate that a wide range of diffusion processes may exist and that convergence is only one possible outcome.

Social Cognition is not Reducible to Theory of Mind. When Children use Deontic Rules to Predict Others' Behaviors

The objective of this paper is to discuss whether children have a capacity for deonticreasoning that is irreducible to mentalizing. The results of two experiments point tothe existence of such non-mentalistic understanding and prediction of the behaviourof others. In Study 1, young children (3- and 4-year-olds) were told different versionsof classic false-belief tasks, some of which were modified by the introduction of a ruleor a regularity. When the task (a standard change of location task) included a rule, theperformance of 3-year-olds, who fail traditional false-belief tasks, significantly improved.In Study 2, 3-year-olds proved to be able to infer a rule from a social situation and touse it in order to predict the behaviour of a character involved in a modified versionof the false-belief task. These studies suggest that rules play a central role in the socialcognition of young children and that deontic reasoning might not necessarily involvemind reading.

Kinetic study of neuropeptide Y (NPY) proteolysis in blood and identification of NPY3-35: a new peptide generated by plasma kallikrein.

There is little information on how neuropeptide Y (NPY) proteolysis by peptidases occurs in serum, in part because reliable techniques are lacking to distinguish different NPY immunoreactive forms and also because the factors affecting the expression of these enzymes have been poorly studied. In the present study, LC-MS/MS was used to identify and quantify NPY fragments resulting from peptidolytic cleavage of NPY(1-36) upon incubation with human serum. Kinetic studies indicated that NPY(1-36) is rapidly cleaved in serum into 3 main fragments with the following order of efficacy: NPY(3-36) >> NPY(3-35) > NPY(2-36). Trace amounts of additional NPY forms were identified by accurate mass spectrometry. Specific inhibitors of dipeptidyl peptidase IV, kallikrein, and aminopeptidase P prevented the production of NPY(3-36), NPY(3-35), and NPY(2-36), respectively. Plasma kallikrein at physiological concentrations converted NPY(3-36) into NPY(3-35). Receptor binding assays revealed that NPY(3-35) is unable to bind to NPY Y1, Y2, and Y5 receptors; thus NPY(3-35) may represent the major metabolic clearance product of the Y2/Y5 agonist, NPY(3-36).

Essays on the treatment of cash flows under stochastic interest rates

Abstract This paper shows how to calculate recursively the moments of the accumulated and discounted value of cash flows when the instantaneous rates of return follow a conditional ARMA process with normally distributed innovations. We investigate various moment based approaches to approximate the distribution of the accumulated value of cash flows and we assess their performance through stochastic Monte-Carlo simulations. We discuss the potential use in insurance and especially in the context of Asset-Liability Management of pension funds.

P value and the theory of hypothesis testing: an explanation for new researchers.

In the 1920s, Ronald Fisher developed the theory behind the p value and Jerzy Neyman and Egon Pearson developed the theory of hypothesis testing. These distinct theories have provided researchers important quantitative tools to confirm or refute their hypotheses. The p value is the probability to obtain an effect equal to or more extreme than the one observed presuming the null hypothesis of no effect is true; it gives researchers a measure of the strength of evidence against the null hypothesis. As commonly used, investigators will select a threshold p value below which they will reject the null hypothesis. The theory of hypothesis testing allows researchers to reject a null hypothesis in favor of an alternative hypothesis of some effect. As commonly used, investigators choose Type I error (rejecting the null hypothesis when it is true) and Type II error (accepting the null hypothesis when it is false) levels and determine some critical region. If the test statistic falls into that critical region, the null hypothesis is rejected in favor of the alternative hypothesis. Despite similarities between the two, the p value and the theory of hypothesis testing are different theories that often are misunderstood and confused, leading researchers to improper conclusions. Perhaps the most common misconception is to consider the p value as the probability that the null hypothesis is true rather than the probability of obtaining the difference observed, or one that is more extreme, considering the null is true. Another concern is the risk that an important proportion of statistically significant results are falsely significant. Researchers should have a minimum understanding of these two theories so that they are better able to plan, conduct, interpret, and report scientific experiments.

Reception of Walras' theory of exchange and theory of production in Russia

This paper evaluates the reception of Léon Walras' ideas in Russia before 1920. Despite an unfavourable institutional context, Walras was read by Russian economists. On the one hand, Bortkiewicz and Winiarski, who lived outside Russia and had the opportunity to meet and correspond with Walras, were first class readers and very good ambassadors for Walras' ideas, while on the other, the economists living in Russia were more selective in their readings. They restricted themselves to Walras' Elements of Pure Economics, in particular, its theory of exchange, while ignoring its theory of production. We introduce a cultural argument to explain their selective reading. JEL classification numbers: B 13, B 19.

Debating the centre : the theory of principal qualificand (mukhyavisesya) in classical Indian philosophy

The theory of language has occupied a special place in the history of Indian thought. Indian philosophers give particular attention to the analysis of the cognition obtained from language, known under the generic name of śābdabodha. This term is used to denote, among other things, the cognition episode of the hearer, the content of which is described in the form of a paraphrase of a sentence represented as a hierarchical structure. Philosophers submit the meaning of the component items of a sentence and their relationship to a thorough examination, and represent the content of the resulting cognition as a paraphrase centred on a meaning element, that is taken as principal qualificand (mukhyaviśesya) which is qualified by the other meaning elements. This analysis is the object of continuous debate over a period of more than a thousand years between the philosophers of the schools of Mimāmsā, Nyāya (mainly in its Navya form) and Vyākarana. While these philosophers are in complete agreement on the idea that the cognition of sentence meaning has a hierarchical structure and share the concept of a single principal qualificand (qualified by other meaning elements), they strongly disagree on the question which meaning element has this role and by which morphological item it is expressed. This disagreement is the central point of their debate and gives rise to competing versions of this theory. The Mïmāmsakas argue that the principal qualificand is what they call bhāvanā ̒bringing into being̒, ̒efficient force̒ or ̒productive operation̒, expressed by the verbal affix, and distinct from the specific procedures signified by the verbal root; the Naiyāyikas generally take it to be the meaning of the word with the first case ending, while the Vaiyākaranas take it to be the operation expressed by the verbal root. All the participants rely on the Pāninian grammar, insofar as the Mimāmsakas and Naiyāyikas do not compose a new grammar of Sanskrit, but use different interpretive strategies in order to justify their views, that are often in overt contradiction with the interpretation of the Pāninian rules accepted by the Vaiyākaranas. In each of the three positions, weakness in one area is compensated by strength in another, and the cumulative force of the total argumentation shows that no position can be declared as correct or overall superior to the others. This book is an attempt to understand this debate, and to show that, to make full sense of the irreconcilable positions of the three schools, one must go beyond linguistic factors and consider the very beginnings of each school's concern with the issue under scrutiny. The texts, and particularly the late texts of each school present very complex versions of the theory, yet the key to understanding why these positions remain irreconcilable seems to lie elsewhere, this in spite of extensive argumentation involving a great deal of linguistic and logical technicalities. Historically, this theory arises in Mimāmsā (with Sabara and Kumārila), then in Nyāya (with Udayana), in a doctrinal and theological context, as a byproduct of the debate over Vedic authority. The Navya-Vaiyākaranas enter this debate last (with Bhattoji Dïksita and Kaunda Bhatta), with the declared aim of refuting the arguments of the Mïmāmsakas and Naiyāyikas by bringing to light the shortcomings in their understanding of Pāninian grammar. The central argument has focused on the capacity of the initial contexts, with the network of issues to which the principal qualificand theory is connected, to render intelligible the presuppositions and aims behind the complex linguistic justification of the classical and late stages of this debate. Reading the debate in this light not only reveals the rationality and internal coherence of each position beyond the linguistic arguments, but makes it possible to understand why the thinkers of the three schools have continued to hold on to three mutually exclusive positions. They are defending not only their version of the principal qualificand theory, but (though not openly acknowledged) the entire network of arguments, linguistic and/or extra-linguistic, to which this theory is connected, as well as the presuppositions and aims underlying these arguments.