50 resultados para welfare theorems
em Consorci de Serveis Universitaris de Catalunya (CSUC), Spain
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In this paper we obtain the necessary and sufficient conditions for embedding results of different function classes. The main result is a criterion for embedding theorems for the so-called generalized Weyl-Nikol'skii class and the generalized Lipschitz class. To define the Weyl-Nikol'skii class, we use the concept of a (λ,β)-derivative, which is a generalization of the derivative in the sense of Weyl. As corollaries, we give estimates of norms and moduli of smoothness of transformed Fourier series.
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The purpose of this article is to introduce a Cartesian product structure into the social choice theoretical framework and to examine if new possibility results to Gibbard's and Sen's paradoxes can be developed thanks to it. We believe that a Cartesian product structure is a pertinent way to describe individual rights in the social choice theory since it discriminates the personal features comprised in each social state. First we define some conceptual and formal tools related to the Cartesian product structure. We then apply these notions to Gibbard's paradox and to Sen's impossibility of a Paretian liberal. Finally we compare the advantages of our approach to other solutions proposed in the literature for both impossibility theorems.
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This paper analyzes the strategic decision to integrate by firms that produce complementary products. Integration entails bundling pricing. We find out that integration is privately profitable for a high enough degree of product differentiation, that profits of the non-integrated firms decrease, and that consumer surplus need not necessarily increase when firms integrate despite the fact that prices diminish. Thus, integration of a system is welfare-improving for a high enough degree of product differentiation combined with a minimum demand advantage relative to the competing system. Overall, and from a number of extensions undertaken, we conclude that bundling need not be anti-competitive and that integration should be permitted only under some circumstances.
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Some analysts use sequential dominance criteria, and others use equivalence scales in combination with non-sequential dominance tests, to make welfare comparisons of oint distributions of income and needs. In this paper we present a new sequential procedure hich copes with situations in which sequential dominance fails. We also demonstrate that there commendations deriving from the sequential approach are valid for distributions of equivalent income whatever equivalence scale the analyst might adopt. Thus the paper marries together the sequential and equivalizing approaches, seen as alternatives in much previous literature. All results are specified in forms which allow for demographic differences in the populations being compared.
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Using recent results on the behavior of multiple Wiener-Itô integrals based on Stein's method, we prove Hsu-Robbins and Spitzer's theorems for sequences of correlated random variables related to the increments of the fractional Brownian motion.
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We study two cooperative solutions of a market with indivisible goods modeled as a generalized assignment game: Set-wise stability and Core. We first establish that the Set-wise stable set is contained in the Core and it contains the non-empty set of competitive equilibrium payoffs. We then state and prove three limit results for replicated markets. First, the sequence of Cores of replicated markets converges to the set of competitive equilibrium payoffs when the number of replicas tends to infinity. Second, the Set-wise stable set of a two-fold replicated market already coincides with the set of competitive equilibrium payoffs. Third, for any number of replicas there is a market with a Core payoff that is not a competitive equilibrium payoff.
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We analyze how a contest organizer chooses optimally the winner when the contestants' efforts are already exerted and commitment to the use of a given contest success function is not possible. We de…ne the notion of rationalizability in mixed-strategies to capture such a situation. Our approach allows to derive different contest success functions depending on the aims and attitudes of the decider. We derive contest success functions which are closely related to commonly used functions providing new support for them. By taking into account social welfare considerations our approach bridges the contest literature and the recent literature on political economy. Keywords: Endogenous Contests, Contest Success Function, Mixed-Strategies. JEL Classi…cation: C72 (Noncooperative Games), D72 (Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections), D74 (Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances)
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For a quasilinear operator on the semiaxis a reduction theorem is proved on the cones of monotone functions in Lp - Lq setting for 0 < q < ∞, 1<= p < ∞. The case 0 < p < 1 is also studied for operators with additional properties. In particular, we obtain critera for three-weight inequalities for the Hardy-type operators with Oinarov' kernel on monotone functions in the case 0 < q < p <= 1.