Bounding right-arm rotation distances

Rotation distance quantifies the difference in shape between two rooted binary trees of the same size by counting the minimum number of elementary changes needed to transform one tree to the other. We describe several types of rotation distance, and provide upper bounds on distances between trees with a fixed number of nodes with respect to each type. These bounds are obtained by relating each restricted rotation distance to the word length of elements of Thompson's group F with respect to different generating sets, including both finite and infinite generating sets.

Approval voting ion dichotomous preferences

The aim of this paper is to find normative foundations of Approval Voting. In order to show that Approval Voting is the only social choice function that satisfies anonymity, neutrality, strategy-proofness and strict monotonicity we rely on an intermediate result which relates strategy-proofness of a social choice function to the properties of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives and monotonicity of the corresponding social welfare function. Afterwards we characterize Approval Voting by means of strict symmetry, neutrality and strict monotonicity and relate this result to May's Theorem. Finally, we show that it is possible to substitute the property of strict monotonicity by the one efficiency of in the second characterization.

On the weights of nations: assigning voting weights in a heterogenous union

Consider a voting procedure where countries, states, or districts comprising a union each elect representatives who then participate in later votes at the union level on their behalf. The countries, provinces, and states may vary in their populations and composition. If we wish to maximize the total expected utility of all agents in the union, how to weight the votes of the representatives of the different countries, states or districts at the union level? We provide a simple characterization of the efficient voting rule in terms of the weights assigned to different districts and the voting threshold (how large a qualified majority is needed to induce change versus the status quo). Next, in the context of a model of the correlation structure of agents preferences, we analyze how voting weights relate to the population size of a country. We then analyze the voting weights in Council of the European Union under the Nice Treaty and the recently proposed constitution, and contrast them under different versions of our model.

Voting by committees with exit

We study the problem of a society choosing a subset of new members from a finite set of candidates (as in Barberà, Sonnenschein, and Zhou, 1991). However, we explicitly consider the possibility that initial members of the society (founders) may want to leave it if they do not like the resulting new society. We show that, if founders have separable (or additive) preferences, the unique strategy-proof and stable social choice function satisfying voters' sovereignty (on the set of candidates) is the one where candidates are chosen unanimously and no founder leaves the society.

Voting by committees under constraints

We consider social choice problems where a society must choose a subset from a set of objects. Specifically, we characterize the families of strategy-proof voting procedures when not all possible subsets of objects are feasible, and voters' preferences are separable or additively representable.

Candidate stability and voting correspondences

We study the incentives of candidates to enter or to exit elections in order to strategically affect the outcome of a voting correspondence. We extend the results of Dutta, Jackson and Le Breton (2000), who only considered single-valued voting procedures by admitting that the outcomes of voting may consist of sets of candidates. We show that, if candidates form their preferences over sets according to Expected Utility Theory and Bayesian updating, every unanimous and non dictatorial voting correspondence violates candidate stability. When candidates are restricted to use even chance prior distributions, only dictatorial or bidictatorial rules are unanimous and candidate stable. We also analyze the implications of using other extension criteria to define candidate stability that open the door to positive results.

Weighted approval voting

To allow society to treat unequal alternatives distinctly we propose a natural extension of Approval Voting by relaxing the assumption of neutrality. According to this extension, every alternative receives ex-ante a non-negative and finite weight. These weights may differ across alternatives. Given the voting decisions of every individual (individuals are allowed to vote for, or approve of, as many alternatives as they wish to), society elects all alternatives for which the product of total number of votes times exogenous weight is maximal. Our main result is an axiomatic characterization of this voting procedure.

The 2004 election in Spain: terrorism, accountability, and voting

In this paper the electoral consequences of the Islamist terrorist attacks on March 11, 2004 are analysed. According to a quantitative analysis based on a post-electoral survey, we show the causal mechanisms that transform voters’ reactions to the bombings into a particular electoral behaviour and estimate their relevance in the electoral results on March 14, 2004

A right to a national space of communication? : on Stateless nations, their right to a space of communication of their own

Hem establert les bases metodològiques i teòriques per investigar la pregunta “Tenen les nacions sense estat el dret de controlar el seu propi espai de comunicació?”. La investigació ajusta el concepte d’espai de comunicació a la teoria política, cercant els seus límits en els drets individuals i, des de la perspectiva del liberalisme 2, aportant la justificació del seu control en quant que plataforma que incideix en la conservació i supervivència d’una cultura nacional. El primer article i fase de la tesi és l’adaptació i definició del concepte espai de comunicació. Fins ara, la recerca ha proposat diferents models d’espai de comunicació entenent si es tracta d’una visió emfatitzant la distribució i la producció de material marcat amb els símbols de la identitat nacional de la societat emissora, o bé si emfatitza la idea d’un espai de circulació de fluxos comunicatiu ajustat a un territori tradicionalment vinculat a una identitat nacional o nació sense estat. Igualment, es distingeix la dimensió d’emissió –sortir del territori al món- i la de recepció –fluxos informatius rebuts des del món al territori, concretament, al ciutadà; el paper d’intervenció de les institucions democràtiques és diferent en una dimensió o una altra i, per tant, també són diferents els drets afectats i les teories o principis que neguen o justifiquen el control de l’espai de comunicació. També s’ha indagat en les teories sobre els efectes cognitius dels mitjans de comunicació per relacionar-los amb la construcció nacional com a cohesió simbòlica i cultural. Si bé els mitjans no poden fer canviar de pensament immediatament, sí que poden conformar a llarg termini una percepció nacional general. Una comunitat és imaginada, donada la distància física dels seus components, i la comunicació social és, juntament amb l’educació, el principal factor de construcció nacional, avui en dia.

A Political Agency Model of Coattail Voting

In this paper, I provide a formal justi…cation for a well-established coattail effect, when a popular candidate at one branch of government attracts votes to candidates from the same political party for other branches of government. A political agency frame- work with moral hazard is applied to analyze coattails in simultaneous presidential and congressional elections. I show that coattail voting is a natural outcome of the optimal reelection scheme adopted by a representative voter to motivate politicians' efforts in a retrospective voting environment. I assume that an office-motivated politician (executive or congressman) prefers her counterpart to be affiliated with the same political party. This correlation of incentives leads the voter to adopt a joint performance evaluation rule, which is conditioned on the politicians belonging to the same party or different parties. The two-sided coattail effects then arise. On the one hand, the executive's suc- cess/failure props up/drags down her partisan ally in congressional election, which implies presidential coattails. On the other hand, the executive's reelection itself is affected by the congressman's performance, which results in reverse coattails. JEL classi…fication: D72, D86. Keywords: Coattail voting; Presidential coattails; Reverse coattails; Simultaneous elections; Political Agency; Retrospective voting.