Stable coalition structures with fixed decision scheme

This paper studies the stability of a finite local public goods economy in horizontal differentiation, where a jurisdiction's choice of the public good is given by an exogenous decision scheme. In this paper, we characterize the class of decision schemes that ensure the existence of an equilibrium with free mobility (that we call Tiebout equilibrium) for monotone distribution of players. This class contains all the decision schemes whose choice lies between the Rawlsian decision scheme and the median voter with mid-distance of the two median voters when there are ties. We show that for non-monotone distribution, there is no decision scheme that can ensure the stability of coalitions. In the last part of the paper, we prove the non-emptiness of the core of this coalition formation game

Cooperative vs. non-cooperative mechanisms in the EU decision making process

According to the account of the European Union (EU) decision making proposed in this paper, this is a bargaining process during which actors shift their policy positions with a view to reaching agreements on controversial issues.

Learning from Shocks and the Decision to Open

Two claims pervade the literature on the political economy of market reforms: that economic crises cause reforms; and that crises matter because they bring into question the validity of the economic model held to be responsible for them. Economic crises are said to spur a process of learning that is conducive to the abandonment of failing models and to the adoption of successful models. But although these claims have become the conventional wisdom, they have been hardly tested empirically due to the lack of agreement on what constitutes a crisis and to difficulties in measuring learning from them. I propose a model of rational learning from experience and apply it to the decision to open the economy. Using data from 1964 through 1990, I show that learning from the 1982 debt crisis was relevant to the first wave of adoption of an export promotion strategy, but learning was conditional on the high variability of economic outcomes in countries that opened up to trade. Learning was also symbolic in that the sheer number of other countries that liberalized was a more important driver of others’ decisions to follow suit.

A decision-making Fokker-Planck model in computational neuroscience

Minimal models for the explanation of decision-making in computational neuroscience are based on the analysis of the evolution for the average firing rates of two interacting neuron populations. While these models typically lead to multi-stable scenario for the basic derived dynamical systems, noise is an important feature of the model taking into account finite-size effects and robustness of the decisions. These stochastic dynamical systems can be analyzed by studying carefully their associated Fokker-Planck partial differential equation. In particular, we discuss the existence, positivity and uniqueness for the solution of the stationary equation, as well as for the time evolving problem. Moreover, we prove convergence of the solution to the the stationary state representing the probability distribution of finding the neuron families in each of the decision states characterized by their average firing rates. Finally, we propose a numerical scheme allowing for simulations performed on the Fokker-Planck equation which are in agreement with those obtained recently by a moment method applied to the stochastic differential system. Our approach leads to a more detailed analytical and numerical study of this decision-making model in computational neuroscience.

Bringing actors and violent conflict into forced migration literature. A model of the decision to return

Populations displaced as a result of mass violent conflict have become one of the most pressing humanitarian concerns of the last decades. They have also become one salient political issue as a perceived burden (in economic and security terms) and as an important piece in the shift towards a more interventionist paradigm in the international system, based on both humanitarian and security grounds. The saliency of these aspects has detracted attention from the analysis of the interactions between relocation processes and violent conflict. Violent conflict studies have also largely ignored those interactions as a result of the consideration of these processes as mere reaction movements determined by structural conditions. This article takes the view that individual’s agency is retained during such processes, and that it is consequential, calling for the need to introduce a micro perspective. Based on this, a model for the individual’s decision of return is presented. The model has the potential to account for the dynamics of return at both the individual and the aggregate level. And it further helps to grasp fundamental interconnections with violent conflict. Some relevant conclusions are derived for the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina and about the implications of the politicization of return.

Revisiting the size-R&D productivity relation: introducing the mediating role of decision-making style on the scale and quality of innovative output

We develop a mediation model in which firm size is proposed to affect the scale and quality of innovative output through the adoption of different decision styles during the R&D process. The aim of this study is to understand how the internal changes that firms undergo as they evolve from small to larger organizations affect R&D productivity. In so doing, we illuminate the underlying theoretical mechanism affecting two different dimensions of R&D productivity, namely the scale and quality of innovative output which have not received much attention in previous literature. Using longitudinal data of Spanish manufacturing firms we explore the validity of this mediation model. Our results show that as firms evolve in size, they increasingly emphasize analytical decision making, and consequently, large-sized firms aim for higher-quality innovations while small firms aim for a larger scale of innovative output.

The Decision on Turkish EU accession in December 2002: The logic of anarchy, collective action problems and rhetorical action

Studies of the EU accession of the East and Central European Countries have stressed the importance of neo-liberal institutionalism as an explanation for Member State preferences. In this paper it is argued that Member States’ preferences over Turkish EU accession are better explained by power politics and neo-realism. It seems therefore that Turkey’s way to the EU follows another path than the East and Central Countries. Turkish accession raises the question of the EU’s role in a uni-polar world order – whether the EU should develop into an independent actor on the world stage or not. However, when it comes to the interaction among the Member States in order to decide on when to open accession negotiations with Turkey the constitutive values of the EU seriously modify the outcome that pure power politics would have let to.

Decision Support Methods for Global Optomization

Immobile location-allocation (LA) problems is a type of LA problem that consists in determining the service each facility should offer in order to optimize some criterion (like the global demand), given the positions of the facilities and the customers. Due to the complexity of the problem, i.e. it is a combinatorial problem (where is the number of possible services and the number of facilities) with a non-convex search space with several sub-optimums, traditional methods cannot be applied directly to optimize this problem. Thus we proposed the use of clustering analysis to convert the initial problem into several smaller sub-problems. By this way, we presented and analyzed the suitability of some clustering methods to partition the commented LA problem. Then we explored the use of some metaheuristic techniques such as genetic algorithms, simulated annealing or cuckoo search in order to solve the sub-problems after the clustering analysis

List-based decision problems

When encountering a set of alternatives displayed in the form of a list, the decision maker usually determines a particular alternative, after which she stops checking the remaining ones, and chooses an alternative from those observed so far. We present a framework in which both decision problems are explicitly modeled, and axiomatically characterize a stop-and-choose rule which unifies position-biased successive choice and satisficing choice.

Neuronal adaptation effects in decision making

Recently, there has been an increased interest on the neural mechanisms underlying perceptual decision making. However, the effect of neuronal adaptation in this context has not yet been studied. We begin our study by investigating how adaptation can bias perceptual decisions. We considered behavioral data from an experiment on high-level adaptation-related aftereffects in a perceptual decision task with ambiguous stimuli on humans. To understand the driving force behind the perceptual decision process, a biologically inspired cortical network model was used. Two theoretical scenarios arose for explaining the perceptual switch from the category of the adaptor stimulus to the opposite, nonadapted one. One is noise-driven transition due to the probabilistic spike times of neurons and the other is adaptation-driven transition due to afterhyperpolarization currents. With increasing levels of neural adaptation, the system shifts from a noise-driven to an adaptation-driven modus. The behavioral results show that the underlying model is not just a bistable model, as usual in the decision-making modeling literature, but that neuronal adaptation is high and therefore the working point of the model is in the oscillatory regime. Using the same model parameters, we studied the effect of neural adaptation in a perceptual decision-making task where the same ambiguous stimulus was presented with and without a preceding adaptor stimulus. We find that for different levels of sensory evidence favoring one of the two interpretations of the ambiguous stimulus, higher levels of neural adaptation lead to quicker decisions contributing to a speed–accuracy trade off.

Estimating Bayesian decision problems with heterogeneous priors

In many areas of economics there is a growing interest in how expertise andpreferences drive individual and group decision making under uncertainty. Increasingly, we wish to estimate such models to quantify which of these drive decisionmaking. In this paper we propose a new channel through which we can empirically identify expertise and preference parameters by using variation in decisionsover heterogeneous priors. Relative to existing estimation approaches, our \Prior-Based Identification" extends the possible environments which can be estimated,and also substantially improves the accuracy and precision of estimates in thoseenvironments which can be estimated using existing methods.

Econometrics and decision making: Effects of presentation mode

Much of empirical economics involves regression analysis. However, does thepresentation of results affect economists ability to make inferences for decision makingpurposes? In a survey, 257 academic economists were asked to make probabilisticinferences on the basis of the outputs of a regression analysis presented in a standardformat. Questions concerned the distribution of the dependent variable conditional onknown values of the independent variable. However, many respondents underestimateduncertainty by failing to take into account the standard deviation of the estimatedresiduals. The addition of graphs did not substantially improve inferences. On the otherhand, when only graphs were provided (i.e., with no statistics), respondents weresubstantially more accurate. We discuss implications for improving practice in reportingresults of regression analyses.

Contractual allocation of decision rights and incentives: The case of automobile distribution

We analyze empirically the allocation of rights and monetary incentives in automobile franchise contracts. These contracts substantially restrict the decision rights of dealers and grant manufacturers extensive contractual completion and enforcement powers, converting the manufacturers, de facto, in a sort of quasi-judiciary instance. Variation in the allocation of decision rights andincentive intensity is explained by the incidence of moral hazard in the relation. In particular, when the cost of dealer moral hazard is higher and the risk of manufactureropportunism is lower, manufacturers enjoy more discretion in determining the performance required from their dealers and in using mechanisms such as monitoring, termination and monetary incentives to ensure such performance is provided. We also explore the existence of interdependencies between the different elements of the system. and find some complementarities between completion and termination rights, and between monitoring rights and the intensity of incentives.

The impact of gender composition on team performance and decision-making: Evidence from the field

We investigate whether the gender composition of teams affect theireconomic performance. We study a large business game, played in groups ofthree, where each group takes the role of a general manager. There are twoparallel competitions, one involving undergraduates and the other involvingMBAs. Our analysis shows that teams formed by three women aresignificantly outperformed by any other gender combination, both at theundergraduate and MBA levels. Looking across the performancedistribution, we find that for undergraduates, three women teams areoutperformed throughout, but by as much as 10pp at the bottom and by only1pp at the top. For MBAs, at the top, the best performing group is two menand one woman. The differences in performance are explained bydifferences in decision-making. We observe that three women teams are lessaggressive in their pricing strategies, invest less in R&D, and invest more insocial sustainability initiatives, than any other gender combination teams.Finally, we find support for the hypothesis that it is poor work dynamicsamong the three women teams that drives the results.

Social value orientation as a moral intuition: Decision-making in the dictator game

We studied the decision making process in the Dictator Game and showed that decisions are the result of a two-step process. In a first step, decision makers generate an automatic, intuitive proposal. Given sufficient motivation and cognitive resources, they adjust this in a second, more deliberated phase. In line with the social intuitionist model, we show that one s Social Value Orientation determines intuitive choice tendencies in the first step, and that this effect is mediated by the dictator s perceived interpersonal closeness with the receiver. Self-interested concerns subsequently leadto a reduction of donation size in step 2. Finally, we show that increasing interpersonal closeness can promote pro-social decision-making.