Self-selection consistent functions

This paper studies collective choice rules whose outcomes consist of a collection of simultaneous decisions, each one of which is the only concern of some group of individuals in society. The need for such rules arises in different contexts, including the establishment of jurisdictions, the location of multiple public facilities, or the election of representative committees. We define a notion of allocation consistency requiring that each partial aspect of the global decision taken by society as a whole should be ratified by the group of agents who are directly concerned with this particular aspect. We investigate the possibility of designing envy-free allocation consistent rules, we also explore whether such rules may also respect the Condorcet criterion.

Simultaneous Nash bargaining with consistent beliefs

We propose and analyze a new solution concept, the R solution, for three-person, transferable utility, cooperative games. In the spirit of the Nash Bargaining Solution, our concept is founded on the predicted outcomes of simultaneous, two-party negotiations that would be the alternative to the grand coalition. These possibly probabilistic predictions are based on consistent beliefs. We analyze the properties of the R solution and compare it with the Shapley value and other concepts. The R solution exists and is unique. It belongs to the bargaining set and to the core whenever the latter is not empty. In fact, when the grand coalition can simply execute one of the three possible bilateral trades, the R solution is the most egalitarian selection of the bargaining set. Finally, we discuss how the R solution changes important conclusions of several well known Industrial Organization models.

A new efficient approach to the direct restricted active space self-consistent field method

An implicitly parallel method for integral-block driven restricted active space self-consistent field (RASSCF) algorithms is presented. The approach is based on a model space representation of the RAS active orbitals with an efficient expansion of the model subspaces. The applicability of the method is demonstrated with a RASSCF investigation of the first two excited states of indole

Consistent solutions in exchange economies: A characterization of the price mechanism

We characterize the Walrasian allocations correspondence by means offour axioms: consistency, replica invariance, individual rationality andPareto optimality. It is shown that for any given class of exchange economiesany solution that satisfies the axioms is a selection from the Walrasianallocations with slack. Preferences are assumed to be smooth, but may besatiated and non--convex. A class of economies is defined as all economieswhose agents' preferences belong to an arbitrary family (finite or infinite)of types. The result can be modified to characterize equal budget Walrasianallocations with slack by replacing individual rationality with individualrationality from equal division. The results are valid also for classes ofeconomies in which core--Walras equivalence does not hold.

Finite horizon bargaining and the consistent field

This paper explores the relationships between noncooperative bargaining games and the consistent value for non-transferable utility (NTU) cooperative games. A dynamic approach to the consistent value for NTU games is introduced: the consistent vector field. The main contribution of the paper is to show that the consistent field is intimately related to the concept of subgame perfection for finite horizon noncooperative bargaining games, as the horizon goes to infinity and the cost of delay goes to zero. The solutions of the dynamic system associated to the consistent field characterize the subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs of the noncooperative bargaining games. We show that for transferable utility, hyperplane and pure bargaining games, the dynamics of the consistent fields converge globally to the unique consistent value. However, in the general NTU case, the dynamics of the consistent field can be complex. An example is constructed where the consistent field has cyclic solutions; moreover, the finite horizon subgame perfect equilibria do not approach the consistent value.

A simple randomized algorithm for consistent sequential prediction of ergodic time series

We present a simple randomized procedure for the prediction of a binary sequence. The algorithm uses ideas from recent developments of the theory of the prediction of individual sequences. We show that if thesequence is a realization of a stationary and ergodic random process then the average number of mistakes converges, almost surely, to that of the optimum, given by the Bayes predictor.

Identification of geometrically consistent interest points for 3D scene reconstruction

We propose an algorithm that extracts image features that are consistent with the 3D structure of the scene. The features can be robustly tracked over multiple views and serve as vertices of planar patches that suitably represent scene surfaces, while reducing the redundancy in the description of 3D shapes. In other words, the extracted features will off er good tracking properties while providing the basis for 3D reconstruction with minimum model complexity

Time consistent Pareto solutions in common access resource gameswith asymmetric players

In the analysis of equilibrium policies in a di erential game, if agents have different time preference rates, the cooperative (Pareto optimum) solution obtained by applying the Pontryagin's Maximum Principle becomes time inconsistent. In this work we derive a set of dynamic programming equations (in discrete and continuous time) whose solutions are time consistent equilibrium rules for N-player cooperative di erential games in which agents di er in their instantaneous utility functions and also in their discount rates of time preference. The results are applied to the study of a cake-eating problem describing the management of a common property exhaustible natural resource. The extension of the results to a simple common property renewable natural resource model in in nite horizon is also discussed.

Heterogeneous discounting in consumption-investment problems. Time consistent solutions

[cat] En aquest treball s'analitza un model estocàstic en temps continu en el que l'agent decisor descompta les utilitats instantànies i la funció final amb taxes de preferència temporal constants però diferents. En aquest context es poden modelitzar problemes en els quals, quan el temps s'acosta al moment final, la valoració de la funció final incrementa en comparació amb les utilitats instantànies. Aquest tipus d'asimetria no es pot descriure ni amb un descompte estàndard ni amb un variable. Per tal d'obtenir solucions consistents temporalment es deriva l'equació de programació dinàmica estocàstica, les solucions de la qual són equilibris Markovians. Per a aquest tipus de preferències temporals, s'estudia el model clàssic de consum i inversió (Merton, 1971) per a les funcions d'utilitat del tipus CRRA i CARA, comparant els equilibris Markovians amb les solucions inconsistents temporalment. Finalment es discuteix la introducció del temps final aleatori.

Systematic trends in self-consistent calculations of linear quantum wires

Systematic trends in the properties of a linear split-gate heterojunction are studied by solving iteratively the Poisson and Schrödinger equations for different gate potentials and temperatures. A two-dimensional approximation is presented that is much simpler in the numerical implementation and that accurately reproduces all significant trends. In deriving this approximation, we provide a rigorous and quantitative basis for the formulation of models that assumes a two-dimensional character for the electron gas at the junction.

Ground-state self-consistent calculation of quantum dots under magnetic fields: Addition spectrum

A density-functional self-consistent calculation of the ground-state electronic density of quantum dots under an arbitrary magnetic field is performed. We consider a parabolic lateral confining potential. The addition energy, E(N+1)-E(N), where N is the number of electrons, is compared with experimental data and the different contributions to the energy are analyzed. The Hamiltonian is modeled by a density functional, which includes the exchange and correlation interactions and the local formation of Landau levels for different equilibrium spin populations. We obtain an analytical expression for the critical density under which spontaneous polarization, induced by the exchange interaction, takes place.

Effects of small surface tension in Hele-Shaw multifinger dynamics: an analytical and numerical study

We study the singular effects of vanishingly small surface tension on the dynamics of finger competition in the Saffman-Taylor problem, using the asymptotic techniques described by Tanveer [Philos. Trans. R. Soc. London, Ser. A 343, 155 (1993)] and Siegel and Tanveer [Phys. Rev. Lett. 76, 419 (1996)], as well as direct numerical computation, following the numerical scheme of Hou, Lowengrub, and Shelley [J. Comput. Phys. 114, 312 (1994)]. We demonstrate the dramatic effects of small surface tension on the late time evolution of two-finger configurations with respect to exact (nonsingular) zero-surface-tension solutions. The effect is present even when the relevant zero-surface-tension solution has asymptotic behavior consistent with selection theory. Such singular effects, therefore, cannot be traced back to steady state selection theory, and imply a drastic global change in the structure of phase-space flow. They can be interpreted in the framework of a recently introduced dynamical solvability scenario according to which surface tension unfolds the structurally unstable flow, restoring the hyperbolicity of multifinger fixed points.

Self-consistent medium polarization in spin-polarized 3He

A microscopic calculation of the residual particle-hole (p-h) interaction in spin-polarized 3He is performed. As a starting point the Brueckner G matrix is used which is supplemented by including the phonon exchange terms self-consistently. An important ingredient in this microscopic version of the induced interaction is the treatment of the full momentum dependence of the interaction. This allows a consistent description of the Landau limit (Pauli-principle sum rule for the Landau parameters is fulfilled) but also enables a detailed study of the p-h interaction at finite momentum transfers. A comparison with correlated basis functions results shows good agreement for momentum transfers larger than the Fermi momentum.

Time consistent Pareto solutions in common access resource gameswith asymmetric players

In the analysis of equilibrium policies in a di erential game, if agents have different time preference rates, the cooperative (Pareto optimum) solution obtained by applying the Pontryagin's Maximum Principle becomes time inconsistent. In this work we derive a set of dynamic programming equations (in discrete and continuous time) whose solutions are time consistent equilibrium rules for N-player cooperative di erential games in which agents di er in their instantaneous utility functions and also in their discount rates of time preference. The results are applied to the study of a cake-eating problem describing the management of a common property exhaustible natural resource. The extension of the results to a simple common property renewable natural resource model in in nite horizon is also discussed.

Heterogeneous discounting in consumption-investment problems. Time consistent solutions

[cat] En aquest treball s'analitza un model estocàstic en temps continu en el que l'agent decisor descompta les utilitats instantànies i la funció final amb taxes de preferència temporal constants però diferents. En aquest context es poden modelitzar problemes en els quals, quan el temps s'acosta al moment final, la valoració de la funció final incrementa en comparació amb les utilitats instantànies. Aquest tipus d'asimetria no es pot descriure ni amb un descompte estàndard ni amb un variable. Per tal d'obtenir solucions consistents temporalment es deriva l'equació de programació dinàmica estocàstica, les solucions de la qual són equilibris Markovians. Per a aquest tipus de preferències temporals, s'estudia el model clàssic de consum i inversió (Merton, 1971) per a les funcions d'utilitat del tipus CRRA i CARA, comparant els equilibris Markovians amb les solucions inconsistents temporalment. Finalment es discuteix la introducció del temps final aleatori.