Significados sociales y culturales del envio de remesas de la migracion ecuatoriana en España

Proyecto realizado a partir de una estancia en la Facultad Latinoaméricana de Ciencias Sociales de Quito, Ecuador, entre julio y octubre del 2006. La estancia de investigación está enmarcada en la realización de una tesis doctoral sobre las connotaciones sociales y culturales que las remesas tienen para la migración ecuatoriana en España. Se pretende aportar conocimiento sobre las remesas partiendo de los posibles significados sociales y culturales que éstas guardan para los migrantes y sus familiares. En la mayor parte de los estudios sobre remesas han abundado una visión economicista y centrada únicamente en aspectos cuantitativos dejando a un margen aspectos como el papel que las remesas juegan en el mantenimiento del espacio social transnacional, su relación con el proyecto migratorio, o el uso y finalidad que se hace de estas remesas dentro del grupo doméstico. En este sentido, la estancia ha permitido realizar parte del trabajo de campo de la investigación (observación participante, realización de entrevistas semiestructuradas a familiares de migrantes, migrantes retornados, y migrantes que estaban de vacaciones, realización de grupos focales), así como contrastar y discutir algunas de las primeras conclusiones obtenidas en el trabajo con investigadores de este tema en Ecuador y realizar un vaciado de bibliografía publicada en Ecuador relacionada con el tema.

Collusion and fights in an experiment with price-setting firms and production in advance

We present results from 50-round market experiments in which firms decide repeatedly both on price and quantity of a completely perishable good. Each firm has capacity to serve the whole market. The stage game does not have an equilibrium in pure strategies. We run experiments for markets with two and three identical firms. Firms tend to cooperate to avoid fights, but when they fight bankruptcies are rather frequent. On average, pricing behavior is closer to that for pure quantity than for pure price competition and price and efficiency levels are higher for two than for three firms. Consumer surplus increases with the number of firms, but unsold production leads to higher efficiency losses with more firms. Over time prices tend to the highest possible one for markets both with two and three firms.

Personal relations and their effect on behavior in an organizational setting: an experimental study

We study how personal relations affect performance in organizations. In the experimental game we use a manager has to assign different degrees of decision power to two employees. These two employees then have to make distributive decisions which affect themselves and the manager. Our focus is on the effects on managers' assignment of decision power and on employees' distributive decisions of one of the employees and the manager knowing each other personally. Our evidence shows that managers tend to favor employees that they personally know and that these employees tend, more than other employees, to favor the manager in their distributive decisions. However, this behavior does not affect the performance of the employees that do not know the manager. All these effects are independent of whether the employees that know the manager are more or less productive than those who do not know the manager. The results shed light on discrimination and nepotism and its consequences for the performance of family firms and other organizations.

Monopolistic competition and different wage setting systems

In this paper we match the static disequilibrium unemployment model without frictions in the labor market and monopolistic competition with an infinite horizon model of growth. We compare the wages set at the firm, sector and national (centralized) levels, their unemployment rates and growth of the economic variables, for the Cobb-Douglas production function, in order to see under wich conditions the inverse U hypothesis between unemployment and centralization of wage bargain is confirmed. We also analyze, in the three wage setting systems, the effect of an increase in the monopoly power on employment and growth.

Repeated Agenda Setting and the Unanimous Approval of Bad Policies

This paper addresses the puzzle of why legislation, even highly inefficient legislation, may pass with overwhelming majorities. We model a egislature in which the same agenda setter serves for two periods, showing how he can exploit a legislature (completely) in the first period by romising future benefits to legislators who support him. In equilibrium, large majority of legislators vote for the first-period proposal because a ote in favor maintains the chance for membership in the minimum winning coalition in the future. The model thus generates situations in which egislators approve policies by large majorities, or even unanimously, that enefit few, or even none, of them. The results are robust: some institutional arrangements, such as super-majority rules or sequential voting, imit but do not eliminate the agenda setter's power to exploit the legislature, and other institutions such as secret voting do not limit his power.

La Representación del movimiento social anti-desahucios en la prensa española : una perspectva de agenda-setting

Aunque hasta este momento se abundan estudios acerca de los movimientos sociales, la mayoría se aborda desde los propios movimientos y investigar los movimientos que se desarrollan y alcanzan una magnitud increíble mediante las redes sociales ocupa una posición imprescindible en este tipo de la investigación, mientras que realizar un estudio sobre los movimientos sociales a través de los medios tradicionales y oficiales carece de atención de los investigadores. Por esta razón, tomo el caso del movimiento antidesahucios como un ejemplo clàsico para examinar los movimientos sociales desde la perspectiva mediàtica, es decir, la perspectiva de agenda-setting

Determinants of linear judgment: A meta-analysis of lens model studies

The mathematical representation of Brunswik s lens model has been usedextensively to study human judgment and provides a unique opportunity to conduct ameta-analysis of studies that covers roughly five decades. Specifically, we analyzestatistics of the lens model equation (Tucker, 1964) associated with 259 different taskenvironments obtained from 78 papers. In short, we find on average fairly high levelsof judgmental achievement and note that people can achieve similar levels of cognitiveperformance in both noisy and predictable environments. Although overall performancevaries little between laboratory and field studies, both differ in terms of components ofperformance and types of environments (numbers of cues and redundancy). An analysisof learning studies reveals that the most effective form of feedback is information aboutthe task. We also analyze empirically when bootstrapping is more likely to occur. Weconclude by indicating shortcomings of the kinds of studies conducted to date, limitationsin the lens model methodology, and possibilities for future research.

An agenda-setting model of electoral competition

This paper presents a model of electoral competition focusing on the formation of thepublic agenda. An incumbent government and a challenger party in opposition competein elections by choosing the issues that will key out their campaigns. Giving salience toan issue implies proposing an innovative policy proposal, alternative to the status-quo.Parties trade off the issues with high salience in voters concerns and those with broadagreement on some alternative policy proposal. Each party expects a higher probabilityof victory if the issue it chooses becomes salient in the voters decision. But remarkably,the issues which are considered the most important ones by a majority of votes may notbe given salience during the electoral campaign. An incumbent government may survivein spite of its bad policy performance if there is no sufficiently broad agreement on apolicy alternative. We illustrate the analytical potential of the model with the case of theUnited States presidential election in 2004.

Setting the rules of the game: The choice of electoral systems in advanced democracies

The origins of electoral systems have received scant attention in the literature. Looking at the history of electoral rules in the advanced world in the last century, this paper shows that the existing wide variation in electoral rules across nations can be traced to the strategic decisions that the current ruling parties, anticipating the coordinating consequences of different electoral regimes, make to maximize their representation according to the following conditions. On the one hand, as long as the electoral arena does not change substantially and the current electoral regime serves the ruling parties well, the latter have no incentives to modify the electoral regime. On the other hand, as soon as the electoral arena changes (due to the entry of new voters or a change in their preferences), the ruling parties will entertain changing the electoral system, depending on two main conditions: the emergence of new parties and the coordinating capacities of the old ruling parties. Accordingly, if the new parties are strong, the old parties shift from plurality/majority rules to proportional representation (PR) only if the latter are locked into a 'non-Duvergerian' equilibrium; i.e. if no old party enjoys a dominant position (the case of most small European states)--conversely, they do not if a Duvergerian equilibrium exists (the case of Great Britain). Similarly, whenever the new entrants are weak, a non-PR system is maintained, regardless of the structure of the old party system (the case of the USA). The paper discusses as well the role of trade and ethnic and religious heterogeneity in the adoption of PR rules.

Labor markets and monetary policy: A new-Keynesian model with unemployement

We construct a utility-based model of fluctuations, with nominal rigidities andunemployment, and draw its implications for the unemployment-inflation trade-off and for the conduct of monetary policy.We proceed in two steps. We first leave nominal rigidities aside. We show that,under a standard utility specification, productivity shocks have no effect onunemployment in the constrained efficient allocation. We then focus on theimplications of alternative real wage setting mechanisms for fluctuations in un-employment. We show the role of labor market frictions and real wage rigiditiesin determining the effects of productivity shocks on unemployment.We then introduce nominal rigidities in the form of staggered price setting byfirms. We derive the relation between inflation and unemployment and discusshow it is influenced by the presence of labor market frictions and real wagerigidities. We show the nature of the tradeoff between inflation and unemployment stabilization, and its dependence on labor market characteristics. We draw the implications for optimal monetary policy.

Pitfalls in the modeling of forward-looking price setting and investment decisions

The present paper makes progress in explaining the role of capital for inflation and output dynamics. We followWoodford (2003, Ch. 5) in assuming Calvo pricing combined with a convex capital adjustment cost at the firm level. Our main result is that capital accumulation affects inflation dynamics primarily through its impact on the marginal cost. This mechanism is much simpler than the one implied by the analysis in Woodford's text. The reason is that his analysis suffers from a conceptual mistake, as we show. The latter obscures the economic mechanism through which capital affects inflation and output dynamics in the Calvo model, as discussed in Woodford (2004).

On heuristic and linear models of judgment: Mapping the demand for knowledge

Research on judgment and decision making presents a confusing picture of human abilities. For example, much research has emphasized the dysfunctional aspects of judgmental heuristics, and yet, other findings suggest that these can be highly effective. A further line of research has modeled judgment as resulting from as if linear models. This paper illuminates the distinctions in these approaches by providing a common analytical framework based on the central theoretical premise that understanding human performance requires specifying how characteristics of the decision rules people use interact with the demands of the tasks they face. Our work synthesizes the analytical tools of lens model research with novel methodology developed to specify the effectiveness of heuristics in different environments and allows direct comparisons between the different approaches. We illustrate with both theoretical analyses and simulations. We further link our results to the empirical literature by a meta-analysis of lens model studies and estimate both human andheuristic performance in the same tasks. Our results highlight the trade-off betweenlinear models and heuristics. Whereas the former are cognitively demanding, the latterare simple to use. However, they require knowledge and thus maps of when andwhich heuristic to employ.