Draft genome sequence of Aeromonas molluscorum strain 848TT, isolated from bivalve molluscs

We report here the draft genome sequence of Aeromonas molluscorum 848T, the type strain of this Aeromonas species, which was isolated from wedge shells (Donax trunculus) obtained from a retail market in Barcelona, Spain, in 1997.

Does Rigidity of Prices Hide Collusion?

Cartel detection is one of the most basic and most complicated tasks of competition authorities. In recent years, however, variance filters have provided a fairly simple tool for rejecting the existence of price-fixing, with the added advantage that the methodology requires only a low volume of data. In this paper we analyze two aspects of variance filters: 1- the relationship established between market structure and price rigidity, and 2- the use of different benchmarks for implementing the filters. This paper addresses these two issues by applying a variance filter to a gasoline retail market characterized by a set of unique features. Our results confirm the positive relationship between monopolies and price rigidity, and the variance filter's ability to detect non-competitive behavior when an appropriate benchmark is used. Our findings should serve to promote the implementation of this methodology among competition authorities, albeit in the awareness that a more exhaustive complementary analysis is required.

Platform pricing and consumer foresight: The case of airports

Airports have become platforms that derive revenues from both aeronautical and commercial activities. The demand for these services is characterized by a one-way complementarity in that only air travelers can purchase retail goods at the airport terminals. We analyze a model of optimal airport behavior in which this one-way complementarity is subject to consumer foresight, i.e., consumers may not anticipate in full the ex post retail surplus when purchasing a flight ticket. An airport sets landing fees, and, in addition, also chooses the retail market structure by selecting the number of retail concessions to be awarded. We find that, with perfectly myopic consumers, the airport chooses to attract more passengers via low landing fees, and also sets the minimum possible number of retailers in order to increase the concessions’ revenues, from which it obtains the largest share of profits. However, even a very small amount of anticipation of the consumer surplus from retail activities changes significantly the airport’s choices: the optimal airport policy is dependent on the degree of differentiation in the retail market. When consumers instead have perfect foresight, the airport establishes a very competitive retail market, where consumers enjoy a large surplus. This attracts passengers and it is exploited by the airport by charging higher landing fees, which then constitute the largest share of its profits. Overall, the airport’s profits are maximal when consumers have perfect foresight. Keywords: two-sided markets, platform pricing, one-way demand complementarity, consumer foresight. JEL classification: L1, L2, L93.

One more lie: the Monday effect in Spain’s retail petrol market

Empirical evidence drawn from the economic literature points to a low level of competition in the retail petrol market. Similar evidence can be found for the Spanish market. In fact, both Spain’s antitrust authority -Comisión Nacional de la Competencia- and its energy regulator -Comisión Nacional de la Energía- have recently initiated disciplinary proceedings against the majors on the grounds of suspected price manipulation in the retail petrol market. They are accused of cutting retail prices on Mondays so as to distort the rank position of Spain in European Union statistics in a practice that has received the name of the Monday effect. Here, we analyze this effect by constructing a database that includes daily retail prices for all petrol stations in Spain in the period 2009-2012, and a more detailed database for the city of Barcelona in 2013. Our estimations confirm that: 1- in 2011 and 2012 prices fell on Mondays at retailers branded by majors; 2- prices were unchanged at stations in our two control groups; 3- prices were also seen to fall when a more detailed analysis was conducted, and this price cut was also found in 2013. In short, one more indicator of collusion in this sector and … one more lie.

(No)competition in the Spanish retailing gasoline market: a variance filter approach

Various methodologies in economic literature have been used to analyse the international hydrocarbon retail sector. Nevertheless at a Spanish level these studies are much more recent and most conclude that generally there is no effective competition present in this market, regardless of the approach used. In this paper, in order to analyse the price levels in the Spanish petrol market, our starting hypothesis is that in uncompetitive markets the prices are higher and the standard deviation is lower. We use weekly retail petrol price data from the ten biggest Spanish cities, and apply Markov chains to fill the missing values for petrol 95 and diesel, and we also employ a variance filter. We conclude that this market demonstrates reduced price dispersion, regardless of brand or city.

Price transmission and market power analysis in the Spanish seafood market chain

[cat] Espanya és un dels principals mercats de productes pesquers d’Europa i del món. El consum de productes pesquers ha estat tradicionalment molt important a Espanya, el 2005 es varen consumir 36,7 kg per persona (MAPA, diversos anys). Malgrat això, el mercat i cóm interactuen els diversos nivells de la cadena de comercialització han gaudit de poca atenció. En aquest estudi, utilitzant dades setmanals, s’analitza per als dotze principals productes pesquers, l’elasticitat en la transmissió de preus al llarg de la cadena de comercialització a Espanya (llotja, mercat central i detallista). Finalment s’investiga la presència d’assimetria en la transmissió de preus entre aquests nivells de mercat. Els resultats obtinguts tenen importants implicacions a l’hora d’analitzar la demanda, poder de mercat i marges al llarg del mercat per als productes pesquers.

Price transmission and market power analysis in the Spanish seafood market chain

[cat] Espanya és un dels principals mercats de productes pesquers d’Europa i del món. El consum de productes pesquers ha estat tradicionalment molt important a Espanya, el 2005 es varen consumir 36,7 kg per persona (MAPA, diversos anys). Malgrat això, el mercat i cóm interactuen els diversos nivells de la cadena de comercialització han gaudit de poca atenció. En aquest estudi, utilitzant dades setmanals, s’analitza per als dotze principals productes pesquers, l’elasticitat en la transmissió de preus al llarg de la cadena de comercialització a Espanya (llotja, mercat central i detallista). Finalment s’investiga la presència d’assimetria en la transmissió de preus entre aquests nivells de mercat. Els resultats obtinguts tenen importants implicacions a l’hora d’analitzar la demanda, poder de mercat i marges al llarg del mercat per als productes pesquers.

Financial development, labor and market regulations and growth

This paper investigates the importance that market regulation and financial imperfections have on firm growth. We analyse institutions af- fecting labor market as Employment Protection Laws (EP) and Product Market Regulation (PM). We show that together with the beneficial effects of financial development, a firm will get less financing, and thus investless, in a weak financial market (finance effect), the strictness of product and labor market regulations also affect firm growth (labor effect). In particular, we show that the stricter the rules the more detrimental the influence on growth in sectoral value added for a large number of countries. We also show that the labor effect overcomes the positive finance effect.

Security prices and market transparency: the role of prior information

This paper analyzes the role of traders' priors (proper versus improper) on the implications of market transparency by comparing a pre-trade transparent market with an opaque market in a set-up based on Madhavan (1996). We show that prices may be more informative in the opaque market, regardless of how priors are modelled. In contrast, the comparison of market liquidity and volatility in the two market structures are affected by prior specification. Key words: Market microstructure, Transparency, Prior information

Labour market frictions, social policies, and barriers to technology adoption

Barriers to technological changes have recently been shown to be a key element in explaining differences in output per worker across countries. This study examines the role that labour market features and institutions have in explaining barriers to technology adoption. I build a model that includes labour market frictions, capital market imperfections and heterogeneity in workers' skills. I found that the unemployment rate together with the welfare losses that workers experiment after displacement are key factors in explaining the existence of barriers to technology adoption. Moreover, I found that none of these factors alone is sufficient to build these barriers. The theory also suggests that welfare policies like the unemployment insurance system may enhance these kinds of barriers while policies like a severance payment system financed by an income tax seem to be more effective in eliminating them.

Double implementation in a market for indivisible goods with a price constraint

I consider the problem of assigning agents to objects where each agent must pay the price of the object he gets and prices must sum to a given number. The objective is to select an assignment-price pair that is envy-free with respect to the true preferences. I prove that the proposed mechanism will implement both in Nash and strong Nash the set of envy-free allocations. The distinguishing feature of the mechanism is that it treats the announced preferences as the true ones and selects an envy-free allocation with respect to the announced preferences.

Interest rate determination in the interbank market

The purpose of this paper is to study the determinants of equilibrium in the market for daily funds. We use the EONIA panel database which includes daily information on the lending rates applied by contributing commercial banks. The data clearly shows an increase in both the time series volatility and the cross section dispersion of rates towards the end of the reserve maintenance period. These increases are highly correlated. With respect to quantities, we find that the volume of trade as well as the use of the standing facilities are also larger at the end of the maintenance period. Our theoretical model shows how the operational framework of monetary policy causes a reduction in the elasticity of the supply of funds by banks throughout the reserve maintenance period. This reduction in the elasticity together with market segmentation and heterogeneity are able to generate distributions for the interest rates and quantities traded with the same properties as in the data.

Imperfect competition and market liquidity with a supply informed trader

We develop a model of insider trading where agents have private information either about liquidation value or about supply and behave strategically to maximize their profits. The supply informed trader plays a dual role in market making and in information revelation. This trader not only reveals a part of the information he owns, but he also induces the other traders to reveal more of their private information. The presence of different types of information decreases market liquidity and induces non-monotonicity of the market indicators with respect to the variance of liquidation value. Replacing the noise introduced by liquidity traders with a random supply also allows us to study the effect the shocks on different components of supply have on prices and quantities.

Competition with forward contracts: a laboratory analysis motivated by electricity market design

We use experiments to study the efficiency effects for a market as a whole of adding the possibility of forward contracting to a pre-existing spot market. We deal separately with the cases where spot market competition is in quantities and where it is in supply functions. In both cases we compare the effect of adding a contract market with the introduction of an additional competitor, changing the market structure from a triopoly to a quadropoly. We find that, as theory suggests, for both types of competition the introduction of a forward market significantly lowers prices. The combination of supply function competition with a forward market leads to high efficiency levels.

The daily market for funds in Europe: what has changed with the EMU?

This paper presents evidence that the existence of deposit and lending facilities combined with an averaging provision for the reserve requirement are powerful tools to stabilize the overnight rate. We reach this conclusion by comparing the behavior of this rate in Germany before and after the start of the EMU. The analysis of the German experience is useful because it allows to isolate the effects on the overnight rate of these particular instruments of monetary policy. To show that this outcome is a general conclusion and not a particular result of the German market, we develop a theoretical model of reserve management which is able to reproduce our empirical findings.