Hezbollah's identities and their relevance for cultural and religious IR

This working paper analyses the role of religious and resistance identities in Hezbollah’s transformation and foreign relations. It argues that this Islamist movement has privileged material concerns over the religious dogma when both factors have not been coincidental. To do so, it uses a theoretical framework that presents the main characteristics of the anthropological and political interpretations of the role of culture and religion in defining the behaviour of international actors. In the chapter dedicated to Hezbollah, close attention is paid to the domestic and regional levels of analysis. When assessing Hezbollah’s religious identity, this paper argues that the salience of the pan-Islamic religious identity in Hezbollah’s origins has been replaced by an increased political pragmatism. It also argues that the fight against Israel represents Hezbollah’s raison d’être and that its resistance identity has not suffered major transformations and has been easily combined with religious rhetoric. Linking Hezbollah’s case study with the theoretical framework, this paper argues that political conceptions of cultural and religious identities provide the best analytical tool to understand the evolution of this Islamist movement.

Ethnic and religious polarization and social conflict

In this paper we examine the link between ethnic and religious polarization and conflict using interpersonal distances for ethnic and religious attitudes obtained from the World Values Survey. We use the Duclos et al (2004) polarization index. We measure conflict by means on an index of social unrest, as well as by the standard conflict onset or incidence based on a threshold number of deaths. Our results show that taking distances into account significantly improves the quality of the fit. Our measure of polarization outperforms the measure used by Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005) and the fractionalization index. We also obtain that both ethnic and religious polarization are significant in explaining conflict. The results improve when we use an indicator of social unrest as the dependent variable.

Understanding the religious behaviour of Muslims in the Netherlands and the UK

The position of Muslims in Western societies is the subject of intense study and debate. However, remarkably little attention has been paid to the practice of European Muslims and how Muslim religiosity relates to conventional measures of social and economic integration. In this paper we draw on theories of secularization, assimilation, revitalization and integration to explore the correlates of attendance at religious meetings for Muslims of different backgrounds in the Netherlands and the UK. We conclude that patterns of religiosity and secularisation cannot be generalised across national contexts.

Between pluralism and majoritarianism: the European Court of Human Rights on religious symbols and education

How is it possible to square the development of a consistent Europeanapproach to religious diversity with the recognition of the sometimes-conflictiveplurality of state-religion models? The Court´s support of the liberalprinciples of separation and neutrality have either been deplored by Christianconservatives as the result of European Christophobia, or celebratedby secularists as contributing to the formation of a Europe free of religion.In contrast, the present chapter argues for a differentiated approach toEuropean jurisprudence, outlining how the Court has been oscillating betweenan appealing liberal-pluralist perspective or framework, and a questionablemajoritarian one. Both perspectives are illustrated by focusing onrepresentative decisions in the area of religious education and symbols.

The long term effects of legalizing divorce on children

We estimate the effect of divorce legalization on the long-term well-being ofchildren. Our identification strategy relies on exploiting the different timing of divorcelegalization across European countries. Using European Community Household Paneldata, we compare the adult outcomes of cohorts who were raised in an environmentwhere divorce was banned with cohorts raised after divorce was legalized in the samecountry. We also have control countries where all cohorts were exposed (or notexposed) to divorce as children, thus leading to a difference-in-differences approach. Wefind that women who grew up under legal divorce have lower earnings and income aswell as worse health as adults compared with women who grew up under illegal divorce.These effects are not found for men. We find no effects of divorce legalization onchildren s family formation or dissolution patterns.

The effect of divorce laws on divorce rates in Europe

This paper analyzes a panel of 18 European countries spanning from 1950 to 2003 toexamine the extent to which the legal reforms leading to easier divorce that took placeduring the second half of the 20th century have contributed to the increase in divorce rates across Europe. We use a quasi-experimental set-up and exploit the different timing of the reforms in divorce laws across countries. We account for unobserved country-specificfactors by introducing country fixed effects, and we include country-specific trends tocontrol for time-varying factors at the country level that may be correlated with divorcerates and divorce laws, such as changing social norms or slow moving demographictrends. We find that the reforms were followed by significant increases in divorce rates.Overall, we estimate that the introduction of no-fault, unilateral divorce increased thedivorce rate by about 1, a sizeable effect given the average rate of 4.2 divorces per 1,000married people in 2002.

The risk of divorce and household saving behavior

We analyze the impact of an increase in the risk of divorce on the savingbehaviour of married couples. From a theoretical perspective, the expected sign of theeffect is ambiguous. We take advantage of the legalization of divorce in Ireland in 1996as an exogenous increase in the likelihood of marital dissolution. We analyze the savingbehaviour over time of couples who were married before the law was passed. We proposea difference-in-differences approach where we use as comparison groups either marriedcouples in other European countries (not affected by the law change), or Irish familieswho did not experience a significant increase in the expected risk of divorce (such as veryreligious families, or single individuals). Our results suggest that the increase in the riskof divorce brought about by the law was followed by an increase in the propensity to saveof married couples, consistent with a rise in precautionary savings interpretation. Anincrease in the risk of marital dissolution of about 40 percent led to a 7 to 13 percent risein the proportion of married couples reporting positive savings.

Religious Slaughter in Europe

Halal and Shechita slaughter were assessed in 135 European abattoirs. Shechita is carried out without stunning in all abattoirs, while 65% of cattle abattoirs, 50% small ruminants and 50% poultry abattoirs use preslaughter stunning for Halal Slaughter.

Structuration and branding of a religious tourism product: Catalonia sacra

This article aims to provide an overview of the products Catalonia has to offer in terms of religious tourism. The growing interest in this kind of tourism worldwide, and in Catalonia itself, along with the region's wealth of religious heritage (particularly connected to the Christian Church) contrast with the lack of religion-based tourism products available, which results in its absence from the region's image as a tourism destination. In view of this, the Faculty of Tourism (University of Girona), the Vic Bishopric's Albergueria-Centre for Cultural Dissemination and the Tarraconense Episcopal Conference's Interdiocese Secretariat for the Custody and Promotion of Holy Art (SICPAS) decided to address the situation with the help of funding from the Autonomous Government of Catalonia. In order to re-position Christian religious heritage in the image of Catalonia as a tourist destination, the aforementioned parties embarked upon a project to set up a series of routes throughout the region, branded under the name Catalonia Sacra